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ABSTRACT
This study deals with the nature and content of I ndia-Bang1a- 
desh political relations during the period 1972-75, when the Awami 
League Government was in power in Bangladesh. The Government of 
India had assisted the League, first, in bringing about the seces­
sion of East Pakistan and, subsequently, in consolidating its 
political power in the new State. This gave rise to a number of 
allegations in Bangladesh against the League Government, namely, 
that in seeking Indian military assistance to rid Bangladesh of 
the Pakistan Army, it had reached secret understandings with India 
which were inimical to Bangladesh's Interests; that it subsequently 
became a subaltern to Indian interests; and that Bangladesh's sover­
eignty was undermined by its political intimacy with New Delhi.
In the process of assessing the validity of these allegations, 
the thesis has sought to answer a larger and a more important 
question: What were the causes behind the deterioration of poli­
tical relations between India and Bangladesh by 1975, after an 
euphoric start In 1972?
As a theoretical tool the concept of influence relationship 
has been used in this study, where influence has been defined as 
follows: influence is manifested when A (the Indian leadership) 
affects, through non-coercive means, directly or indirectly, the 
behaviour of B (the Bangladesh leadership) in the hope that it 
redounds to the policy advantage of A, and vice versa. Such a 
theoretical tool has necessitated the treatment of only selective 
instances of bilateral relations between them; only those Issues
where influence could have operated in either direction have been 
chosen for examination.
The thesis comprises nine chapters in which are discussed, 
intev alia, the following issues: the Indo-Bang1adesh friendship 
treaty; the Bangladesh Army; the Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini; the border 
trade agreement; land border and maritime boundary delimitation 
talks; oil exploration in the Bay of Bengal; and the Ganges waters 
d i spute.
The findings of this study do not support any of the allega­
tions stated above. While the Tajuddin Government did accommodate 
the Indira Government during the crisis period, and was also willing 
to kowtow to it subsequently, Mujib was generally steadfast In his 
unwillingness to compromise on Bangladesh's national interests.
The study also finds that the gradual collapse in Indo-Bang1adesh 
political relations was a direct corollary of the League leader­
ship's political myopia, administrative ineptitude and its pro­
prietary attitude that characterized its rule in Bangladesh. While 
India does not stand exonerated, the League must bear the lion's 
share of the blame for the deterioration in that relationship.
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INTRODUCTION
India has an overwhelming, presence in the minds of the Bangla­
deshi elites because of the historical experiences between the 
peoples of the two countries, as well as the ‘tyranny of geography' 
which leaves Bangladesh surrounded by India on three sides. There­
fore, perceptions of India among the Bangladeshi elites range from 
concern to paranoia. There is also a false notion among a signifi­
cant section that Bangladesh is a preoccupation in the minds of the 
Indian leaders. The truth, however, is that while it may be a con­
stant worry in the minds of the West Bengalis, and perhaps also in 
the minds of the Assamese in the North, it certainly is not in the 
minds of the decision makers in New Delhi. This exaggerated self- 
importance has contributed to the distortions inherent in Indo-Bangla 
relat ions.
The desire to study the nature of Indo-Bang1adesh relations 
originated with my brief association with the Bangladesh Institute 
of International and Strategic Studies in Dhaka. As a working mem­
ber of the Institute, I was confronted with the belief among influ­
ential sections of the Bangladeshi elites that the causes of much 
of the adverse developments in the country can be traced back to 
the first four years after independence, 1972-75, when the Awami 
League was in power, and when Indo-Bangla relations were at their 
best. It was believed that during the latter part of the 1971 crisis, 
the Awami League had made secret arrangements with India to enable 
it to come to power with Indian military assistance; that it had 
allowed India to influence political developments within Bangladesh;
and that Bangladesh's sovereignty was somehow shortchanged by the 
Awami League's professed friendship with India. In short, Indo- 
Bangla relations as articulated by the Mujib and Indira Governments 
lie at the root of political instability in Bangladesh. These were 
serious allegations against the League Government, and had a per­
nicious effect on relations with India.
The credibility of those who condemned the Awami League was, 
however, suspect. One could not be sure that it was not a well- 
orchestrated propaganda by vested interests which were either part 
of, or in league with, the forces that removed the League Govern­
ment from power unconstitutionally. The military coup of 15 August
1975 had decimated much of the top leadership of the Awami League, 
and those still alive, whether inside the country or outside it, 
maintained their silence. No Awami League leader, so far, has come 
forward with a public defence of the League Government and its 
policies. It was therefore difficult to assess whether, and to 
what degree, the League Government had become a subaltern to Indian 
interests. These charges required a close scrutiny. This, then, 
is the motivating factor for choosing such a topic of study.
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But the utility of such a study certainly goes beyond that.
For instance, in spite of a plethora of political writings on sub­
continent affairs by specialists both within the region and without, 
there is a surprising paucity of literature dealing with Indo-Bangla 
bilateral relations. This is also true of India's bilateral rela­
tions with each of its other neighbours, excepting Pakistan. Scho­
larly analyses of India's political relations with its neighbours
2.
are so scanty that it may give one the impression that such studies 
are either intellectually less stimulating or politically unimpor­
tant. While most of the literature deals with India's role in the 
subcontinent from a regional point of view, or with the changing 
balance of forces in the region owing to the fluidity of the in­
ternational political order,the nature and content of India's bi­
lateral relations with its neighbours have hardly been dealt with 
in any systematic manner, and what literature exists treats the 
subject only tangentia 11y .
Given India's massive involvement in Bangladesh's independence 
struggle, it makes for a very challenging, if difficult, study as 
to why the cordial and potentially beneficial relationship deterio­
rated in such a short span of time. Did religious sentiments re- 
emerge as the deciding factor? Or was the nature of economic rela­
tions the cause of the disruptions in bilateral relations? Or was 
India impatient, overbearing and therefore 'over-present' in disre­
gard of the sensibilities of the Bangladeshis? Or perhaps there 
was no common ground, only false perceptions and expectations be­
tween the two countries? The study undertaken here tries to identify 
the underlying causes in the deterioration of Indo-Bangla relations, 
and may provide clues to decision makers in both countries in under­
standing the limitations inherent in the perception and psychology 
of the two peoples. The findings of the dynamics of Indo-Bang1adesh 
relations may also offer valuable insights to the understanding of 
India's often tumultuous relations with Nepal and Sri Lanka and 
vice versa.
3.
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A common assumption among India's detractors in Bangladesh has 
been that it was the nature of Indo-Bangla relations that influenced 
much of the developments within Bangladesh during the Mujib period.
A primary task of this study, therefore, is to examine to what ex­
tent India influenced Bangladesh's internal and external policies, 
and in what form and by what means. Accordingly, the concept of 
influence relationship has been used as an analytical tool. While 
the literature on the concept of influence relationship is directed 
mainly to the study of bilateral relations between superpowers and 
their client states, the concept has been revised to suit the re­
quirements of this study. The literature assumes that influence 
relationship, as defined in Chapter One, would operate only between 
two countries with active bilateral relations. Thus, this thesis 
concerns itself only with the period of the Awami League Government, 
when Indo-Bang1adesh relations were at their most intense.
IV
A word on the difficulties experienced while conducting research 
on this topic is also in order. It was hoped that there would be 
access to the archival files of the period in India and Pakistan.
But, the application for a research visa to India was rejected be­
cause the topic was considered sensitive by the authorities in New 
Delhi, even ten years later. A similar application to the Pakistan 
Government did not elicit an official response. It was learned later, 
through confidential sources, that the relevant authorities in India 
were wary of the use of the concept of influence relationship as the 
theoretical tool in the study of Indo-Bangla relations during the
Muj i b period; they feared that India's image would be maligned.
The Pakistan authorities were no less suspicious. Since in­
terviews with. Government officials and leaders of Bhutto's Pakistan 
People's Party - in power at the time - were an essential aspect 
of the research programme, the current martial law government, 
which forcibly removed Bhutto from power and put in jail most of 
his party leaders, considered the request a security risk. The 
research trip to Pakistan was cancelled.
Since research in India was imperative, entry was obtained 
by means of a tourist visa. Though access to archival material 
and current official sources was not possible, a vast amount of 
information was gathered from newspapers, Hansard and interviews 
with primary actors of that period, many of whom are now in retire­
ment. Thus, lack of access to the archives of the Indian Govern­
ment did not significantly hinder completion of this study.
V
A further note is to be made of the problem of terminology used 
in the thesis. This is a study of Bangladesh's relations with India 
and its effects on Bangladesh's internal politics, and vice versa. 
Therefore, it concerns only the elites of the country, who number 
perhaps less than five percent of the population. It is their con­
flicting interests and claims that have shaped the country's inter­
nal and external policies. It has little to do with the remaining 
ninety-five percent of the population which comprises the poor and 
illiterate, who have no influence or control over the events that 
shape their lives. Therefore, such phrases as 'Bangladesh's policy'
or 'national interest' actually refer to the policy of the dominant 
faction of the governing party and the interests of the dominant 
elite group at the time.
Also, the inability to resort to a proper typology of elite 
groupings is complicated by continuous political fragmentation 
among them, which has resulted in so many types of - and so fre­
quent changes in - political affiliation and allegiance. Any 
attempt to categorize the elites neatly - who were represented 
by one hundred and sixty-two parties in the May 1986 Parliamen­
tary elections - is a frustrating experience. Yet, for the bene­
fit of readers less familiar with Indo-Bangla affairs, an attempt 
is made below to classify loosely the Bangladeshi elites of that 
period into several broad categories, on the basis of their atti­
tude towards India.
One group comprised the pro-Chinese and the pro-lslamic. Mem­
bers of this group, though opposed to each other in their political 
beliefs and orientation, nonetheless, shared an underlying assump­
tion that Indian foreign policy was aimed basically at undermining 
the sovereignty of its neighbours. This group inevitably saw an 
'Indian hand1 in any untoward development in Bangladesh and, thus, 
prescribed a policy of close friendship, if not security alliance, 
with China or the United States as the best defence against the 
alleged ulterior motives of the hostile neighbour.
Another group comprised a tiny minority that held exactly op­
posite views. Its members considered India a benign power and saw 
great merit in establishing and maintaining the most cordial rela­
tions with the giant neighbour. A third group, which may be termed
loosely as the centrists, fell somewhere in between these two ex­
tremes. While members of this group did not see India as a neces­
sarily adversary power, they had to contend with Bangladesh's 
growing dependence on the West and, accordingly, were obliged to 
adopt an attitude which increasingly de-emphasized the crucial 
nature of Indo-Bangla relations. A fourth group could be identi­
fied which comprised people who tended to believe in political 
isolation and rejected dependence on any external source, regional 
or extra-regional. These four groups and their political inter­
actions may be said to have dictated the state of relations between 
India and Bangladesh during the period in review. To repeat, these 
categorizations are only a crude attempt to identify the various 
forces impacting on Indo-Bang1adesh relations, and, as such, should 
be treated with caution.
VI
This thesis is not a comprehensive examination of all aspects 
of I ndo-Bang1adesh relations during the Mujib period. The nature 
of the analytical tool used in this study has required the treat­
ment of only selective instances of bilateral relations between 
them; only those issues where influence could have operated in 
either direction have been chosen for examination.
The study is divided into nine chapters. Chapter One deals 
with the framework of enquiry. It provides the rationale for 
choosing the Influence theory as the preferred analytical tool.
Next it discusses the salient works on influence theory, and then 
proceeds to highlight the underlying assumptions, characteristics, 
determinants, and finally criteria for identifying instances of influence.
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Chapter Two discusses the historical background of the rela­
tionship between the Hindus and the Muslims of Bengal from 1757 ~ 
the year of the eclipse of Muslim rule in Bengal - to 19^7, when 
British rule yielded to the creation of two independent homelands 
on the basis of religion. This chapter discusses the British co­
lonial administration of Bengal, and how that shaped the perceptions 
of the Hindu and Muslim communities towards each other. The pur­
pose of this chapter is to highlight the historical context, which 
would provide the reader the perspective with which to judge sub­
sequent relations between the two communities.
Chapter Three discusses the various forces within Pakistan 
which gradually shaped the attitudes of the people of East Pakistan 
towards India. It details the political complexities of the East 
Pakistan crisis, the armed struggle leading to the independence of 
Bangladesh, and the political concerns of the Mujib and Indira 
Governments in the immediate aftermath of the struggle. The per­
ceptions and expectations of the two peoples and the realities of 
the period are also discussed.
The attempt to formalize the political relations between the 
two Governments by signing a friendship treaty, and the repercus­
sions thereof, form the subject of the fourth chapter. Also dis­
cussed are the reasons for, and the nature of, the secret wartime 
agreement between the Provisional Government of Bangladesh and the 
Indira Government; the rationale for the subsequent treaty; its 
effects on the internal politics of Bangladesh; and its implications 
for Bangladesh's external relations with other countries.
Chapter Five deals with the economic dimension of that
relationship, and is of major importance in understanding the aliena­
tion between the two peoples in such a short time. It discusses the 
conflict of interest between the Indian financial bourgeoisie- and the 
rising new entrepreneurial class in Bangladesh, and the positions of 
the two Governments in reference to it.
Chapter Six is concerned.with the differing perceptions of se­
curity in Dhaka and New Delhi. Bangladesh's significance to regional 
security and its role in India's defence strategy is discussed, as 
also, the issues of the necessity for a Bangladesh Army and for the 
Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini (national security force) as the security arm 
of Mujib's governing party. The issue of Bangladesh's membership in 
the Organization of the Islamic Conference and India's reaction to 
it are also discussed.
The negotiations on land and maritime border delimitation and 
on oil exploration in the Bay of Bengal form the subject matter of 
the seventh chapter. Perceptual differences of the two leaderships 
are discussed, as also the nature and content of the talks between 
them. Chapter Eight deals with the conflict over the sharing of the 
waters of the Ganges River. It discusses the Joint Rivers Commis­
sion and ministerial meetings and their results, examines the merits 
of the two proposals on the augmentation of the Ganges flow during 
the lean period, and explains the reasons behind the refusal of each 
Government to consider the other's proposal. It also examines the 
reasons for not giving the issue the priority it deserved and for 
choosing as Bangladesh's chief negotiators known hardliners on India.
The conclusion in Chapter Nine is divided into two parts. The 
first part provides a summary of findings in this study, and the
10.
second part discusses the validity of influence theory for thi
FRAMEWORK OF ENQUIRY
To decide on the conceptual tool that would be most appropri­
ate in investigating the issues comprising the type of study proposed 
here is not easy, since there will always be some sound argument for 
the theoretical models not chosen. Therefore one helpful way of 
getting around this problem might be to state at the outset what 
this study is not about. It is not a study of foreign policies as 
such of India and Bangladesh during the period 1972-75* A full 
treatment of the foreign policies of these two countries is not 
only beyond the scope of this work, it would also be of very little 
help to the present purpose, if at all. Nor is it a study of the 
full range of relations that India and Bangladesh entered into at 
this period; for instance, the scientific and cultural aspects will 
not be discussed here. Nor will there be any comprehensive examina­
tion of the total range of economic relations between the two coun­
tries.
The central question this thesis proposes to examine is: What 
were the causes behind the deterioration of political relations be­
tween India and Bangladesh by 1975, after an euphoric start in 1972? 
If it is assumed that the elites are the deciding factor, then it is 
necessary to concentrate on those specific issues that are directly 
responsible for the changes in their perceptions of India over the 
four year period.
The treatment of only selective instances of bilateral relations 
is however not without its drawbacks. For one thing, it introduces
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some arbitrariness on the part of the author In choosing those 
issues which he feels relevant to his study. Also, such an ap­
proach would seem to be a 'mixed bag' since it would cut across 
the fields of both comparative politics and international rela­
tions. The examination of selected issues and the specific in­
stances when they were manifest would require both the considera­
tion of inputs from the external environment and the analysis of 
the processes which made them salient within the respective poli­
ties. In some cases, the proper understanding of the issues in 
consideration would require the state to be seen as a closed system, 
impervious to its external environment, and the particular event 
to be wholly understood in the context of the idiosyncratic nature 
of its leaders, the ruling party, or in reference to the internal 
dynamics of the state. While in other cases, external inputs may 
be the key to understanding the nature of the specific issue of 
concern, and therefore, a better understanding of the forces - 
regional and extra-regional - that affect bilateral relations be­
tween two contiguous and asymmetric states such as India and 
Bangladesh would be essential. What this means is that the author 
should choose a conceptual tool that holds the greatest promise of 
edifying the problem and providing reasonably acceptable conclusions.
Initially two conceptual tools might be considered: the con­
cept of 'dependency relations' and that of 'power relations'. The 
intention here is not to comment on the relative virtues of these 
two models by going into detailed discussions of both, but to ex­
plore briefly their adequacy in providing a convenient framework 
for ordering the discussions that would follow. What applicability 
have these models to the study of political relations between India 
and Bangladesh?
Dependency relationship as that between the United States and 
Pakistan, for instance, and power relationship as exemplified by 
Soviet Union-East Bloc state relations or in some sense by USSR- 
Finland relations have existed as political phenomena most promi- 
nentlysince the conclusion of the Second World War, and the reasons 
are not difficult to assess. The advent of the post-19^5 period 
has seen the' proliferation of de-colonized countries and with that 
cross-cu1tura1 and cross-national exchanges have increased mani­
foldly; transactions whether in trade, verbal communication or 
human visits have simply become limitless. This has produced what 
Rosenau calls the “penetrated political society". He argues that 
due to "increasing obscuration of the boundaries between national 
political systems and their international environments...even the 
last stronghold of sovereignty - the power to decide the personnel, 
practices and policies of government - has become subject to inter­
nationalization".^ No developed or developing country is so self- 
sufficient as to be immune from internationalization. Thus, as 
another scholar observed, "What happens in India or Iran is no 
longer intelligible in terms of parochial Indian or Iranian events 
and forces, but must be seen as part of a world transformation in
which these particular pockets of semiautonomy are working out their
2
distinctive and yet somehow parallel destinies". The penetrated 
political system is therefore one in which "nonmembers of a national 
society participate directly and authoritatively, through actions
1. James N. Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy", 
in R. Barry Farrell ed. Approaches to Comparative and Interna- 
tional Politics, Evanston, I 11: Northwestern University Press,
1966, pp. 53-54.
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2. Fred W. Riggs, "The Theory of Developing Politics" World Politics 
vol. xvi, no. 1, October 1963, p. 171, cited ibid. , p. 55
taken jointly with the society's members in either the allocation 
of its values or the mobilization of support on behalf of its goals
In these instances, the concept of interdependence would seem, 
arguably, to be adequate as a tool for examining and understanding 
the political relations among states. However, in the particular 
instances cited above, the regimes in the weaker countries have had 
to align themselves with the stronger ally not necessarily so much 
to protect their countries1 interests as to consolidate and aggran­
dize their own hold over the national political system. In these 
cases,dependency relationship or power relationship might prove ade 
quate as conceptual tools in the understanding of the nature of 
relationship existing between them.
But India and Bangladesh seem to fall in a special category. 
They both profess nonalignment towards the blocs, and yet between 
them they are unable to develop relations of interdependence. At 
least three factors are to be noted here for a better understanding 
of this complexity. First, prior to the advent of the British in 
the South Asian subcontinent, the historical relationship between 
the peoples of what is now Bangladesh and those of the rest of 
India was one of coexistence. While there were the usual fluctua­
tions in the sizes of kingdoms in the region due to conquest and 
defeat, there is no evidence of overt and sustained hostility be­
tween the particular peoples of Bengal and those in the surrounding 
region. Indeed, the people of Bengal did not have a distinct na­
tional identity in the modern sense.
Second, after the British control of India, Bengal and other
3- Rosenau, op.cit. (I), p. 65
regions began to develop separate political and administrative 
identities. The British colonialists promulgated economic laws 
that favoured the Hindus, and allowed religious differences to 
come to the fore. Thus, during the British rule, Hindu-Muslim 
religious differences gradually developed into nocuous rivalry, 
which took its extreme form subsequently in the separate reli­
gious homelands in the subcontinent. Finally, with the creation 
of Bangladesh, new hopes were nourished on both sides of the 
border that bilateral relations between India and Bangladesh 
would develop into something more than just the coexistence of 
the past.
This new feeling was reinforced by India's assistance to the 
East Pakistanis during their armed struggle to secede from Pakistan.
At the height of the East Pakistan crisis, it was India that had 
borne the burden of the millions of East Bengali refugees, albeit 
with UN aid. It was India that had given shelter to the Awami 
League leadership and allowed it to function as an exile govern­
ment on its soil. It was India that had given arms, sanctuary and 
sustenance to Bangladesh's freedom fighters. Finally, it was the 
Indian Army which had brought about the swift surrender of the 
Pakistan Army in East Pakistan, thereby foreclosing the debilita­
ting effects of an attritional civil war.
These conflicting historical occurrences at least serve to 
crystallize the inherent contradictions and confusions in the 
region. And if on the basis of these observations, we reject the 
concepts of dependency relationship and power relationship as 
wholly inadequate for our needs, then we must find one that would 
measure up closer to our requirement.
15.
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One possibility would be to employ Keohane and Nye1s notions 
of ‘mutual sensitivity' and 'relative vulnerability1. While both 
are aspects of interdependence, the former takes note of "the ex­
tent to which change in one state affects change in others", that 
is, the susceptibility of the international actors to each other's 
conduct, and the latter describes the "relative costs of alterna­
tives for the parties", the less dependent state having the greater 
flexibility.^ It is argued here that these two aspects of interde­
pendence would provide us the necessary context in which to identify 
the conceptual tool which would be appropriate to our study.
A good measure of the relevance of these two notions is to be 
gained from an examination of the South Asian scene immediately 
after the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971. From the political 
point of view, the South Asian landscape was admittedly different 
after the birth of Bangladesh. As if at one brilliant stroke of 
political legerdemain, Indira Gandhi's Government was able to con­
vert the South Asian political and security environment from one 
of inherent insecurity to one of tolerable security for India.
The post-1962 three-front military threat to India was reduced to 
two fronts and the friendship treaty with the Soviet Union had con­
siderably allayed India's fear of China. Thus, with a truncated 
Pakistan and a friendly Bangladesh, India, by 1972, had become the
£
'hub power' of South Asia. Theoretically, it was in a position
b. "Power and Interdependence", Survival , vol. xv, no. 4, July/ 
August 1973, p. 160
5. Ibid.
6. The phrase 'hub power' is borrowed from Arnold Wolfers1 D i scord 
and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics, Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962, where the United States 
was first described as the hub power of the West.
to exercise influence over its neighbours if it chose to.
From the economic point of view, newly independent Bangladesh 
held a great promise to Indian industry, commerce and trade. There 
was a potentially hugh market for Indian technology, expertise and 
machinery. Indian and Bangladeshi industrialists dreamt of Indian 
credit and investments and of joint industrial ventures in Bangla­
desh. There were even hopes in certain circles in West Bengal that 
the port of Calcutta would find an additional lease on life with 
Bangladesh as the great hinterland.
From the security point of view, the independence of Bangladesh 
had converted an erstwhile official foe in East Pakistan to a depen­
dable ally, thus considerably easing tension and anxiety particularly 
in India's Eastern command. Additionally, a friendly Bangladesh 
could also be counted on not to have a cordial relationship, or at 
least one at the expense of India, with the latter's arch-enemies, 
China and Pakistan. That China had sided with Pakistan during the 
East Pakistan crisis, and had cast its first veto in the Security 
Council on Bangladesh's application for membership in the United 
Nations, were not lost on either Bangladesh or India.
Theoretically, these arguments would seem to provide a strong 
case for India and Bangladesh to appreciate their relative vulner­
ability to each other's internal and external policies. This was 
even more so given the nature of the contemporary international sys­
tem, which provides virtually no safeguard for the welfare of the 
member states. Security being the scarcest commodity in contempor­
ary existence,^ anxiety over security, combined with a very poor
17.
7. J. David Singer, "Inter-Nation Influence: A Formal Model"The Ameri- 
can Political Science Review, vol. 57, no. 2, June 1963, p • *+¿2
ability to predict the future state of affairs, impels governments 
to sue for coexistence. Since, in the case of India and Bangladesh, 
years of official hostility - and religious and economic rivalry 
prior to that - formed the immediate background, any attempt at a 
full-blooded interdependence in their political relations was bound 
to be an unpredictable undertaking. On the other hand, dependency 
relationship was also politically infeasible. The most realistic 
approach that each Government could perhaps hope for was to pursue 
a policy of coexistence and, in times of friendship between regimes 
as in the case of the Indira Congress and the Awami League, a policy 
of frequent resort to attempts to bring about desired policy changes 
in the other. It is from these considerations that, as a theoretical 
framework, I propose to use the concept of ‘influence relationship' 
to study Indo-Bang1adesh relations in the period 1972-75-
The foregoing observations do not provide us with anything in 
the way of formulating an influence theory; they merely argue for 
the relative importance that should be attached to influence rela­
tionship as a conceptual tool in the study of Indo-Bang1adesh re­
lations. There are, however, two shortcomings which need to be 
recognized at the outset. First, its use as a conceptual tool is 
fairly recent in the social science discipline. Preliminary 
writings on a theoretical model for influence relationship in the 
context* of international relations first appeared in the sixties; 
hardly any new ground has been broken in terms of its conceptual 
understanding in the last ten years.
Second, it has had a very limited application in the past. The 
reason perhaps does not rest on its applicability as a theoretical
tool as such, but is perhaps to be found in reference to power 
studies. Starting with Hans Morgenthau's seminal work in 1948 on 
the relationship between internationa1 politics and the struggle 
for power, the next two decades have witnessed an overwhelming de­
votion to the study of the role of power in international relations, 
and although the concept of influence finds its pedigree in power, 
it is quite likely that it could not make its own distinct and 
lasting mark in such an ambience of power studies. Whatever may 
be the case, influence as a political phenomenon is no less impor­
tant than that of power in the study of international relations; 
what is to be noted is that its degree, frequency and subtlety may 
vary with time and changes in the political environment.
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Though its ubiquity did not lead to a theory of influence as 
one might wish, we are still left to grapple with it at least as 
a model to suit our present purpose. Admittedly, theorizing is a 
difficult task; as Talcott Parsons described it: "the development of 
effective concepts of wide applicability, like establishing a formal 
garden in the wilderness, necessarily involves a great struggle to
8. See for instance, Harold Lasswel1 and Abraham Kaplan, Power 
and Society, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950; Robert 
Dahl, "The Concept of Power", Behavioural Science 2 (July 
1957), pp. 201-15; and his Modern Political Analysis, Engle­
wood Cliffs, N J : Prent i ce-Ha11, 1963; H.A. Simon, "Notes on 
Observations and Measurement of Political Power" Journal of 
Poli t ics, 15, (November 1953), pp. 500-16; Maurice A. Ash,
"An Analysis of Power, with Special Reference to International 
Politics", Wor1d Pol 11ics, vol.3, no. 2, (January 1951), pp. 
218-37; Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Two Faces of 
Power" The American Political Science Review, vol. 56, no. 4, 
(December 1962), pp. 947“52; W.H. Riker, "Some Ambiguities 
in the Notion of Power", The American Political Science Re­
view, vol. 58, no. 2, (June 1964), pp. 341-49; Dorwin Cart- 
wright ed. Studies in Social Power, Ann Arbor, Michigan:
Center for Social Research, 1953; K.J. Holsti, "Concept of 
Power in the Study of International Relations" Background,
7, (February 1964), pp. 179“94; J.H. Nagel, "Some Questions 
about the Concept of Power" Behavioural Science, 13, (March 
1968), pp. 129“37; Talcott Parsons, "On the Concept of Po­
litical Power" Proceedings of the American Philosophical 
Society, 107, (June 1963) , PP• 232-62; to name only a few.
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bring order out of obscurity and chaos, and a great deal of system­
atic planting and cultivation after the initial clearing and pruning 
9
has been done". In our case, the struggle is to separate it as a 
concept distinct from that of power. This is complicated by two 
drawbacks. First, because of a lack of a universally accepted terms 
and definitions, political scientists often employ a variety of terms: 
power, influence, force, coercion, control, might, persuasion, au­
thority. Second, when they concentrate on the term 'power1, it is 
used interchangeably with the term 'influence', as if these two terms 
were one and the s a m e . ^  The aim here is to distinguish between the 
two.
Lasswel1 and Kaplan were perhaps the earliest international 
political theorists to make a formal distinction between the concepts 
of power and influence in a manner that is helpful to the student of 
international politics. They pointed out that "it is the threat of 
sanctions which differentiates power from influence in general", 
arguing that power "is a special case of the exercise of influence". 
They defined power as "the process of affecting policies of others 
with the help of (actual or threatened) severe deprivations for non­
conformity with the policies intended".^ Thus influence may become 
power whenever the effect on policy is enforced through sanctions, 
mild or severe. And the exercise of influence is transformed into
9. "On the Concept of Influence" Public Opinion Quarterly, 27, 
(Spring 1963), p. 37
10. See, for instance K.J. Holsti, International Politics: A Frame­
work for Analysis, Englewood Cl i f f s , NJ~! Pren t i ce-Ha 11 , 19^7, 
chapter vii; David Baldwin, "Inter-nation Influence Revisited", 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 15, no. 4, (December 1971), 
PP. 471-86
11. Op.c i t . (8), p. 76
a power relationship “if the deprivations imposed by the influen­
tial are important enough to those over whom influence is being
• j i  i 1 2  exercised“.
This important distinction was missing in the earlier writings
on power. Bertrand Russell, for instance, defined power as “the
13
production of intended effects“. This definition of power leaves
a lot to be desired if it is to be employed in the political sense
or, specifically, in terms of decision-making, since “the production
of Intended effects“ is meaningful in the political context only as
it directly or indirectly involves other persons. Carl Friedrich
took note of this human dimension by suggesting that power “is a
certain kind of human relationship“ and proceeded to pen the 'rule
of anticipated reaction1: policies are determined by expectations
14
of the resulting conduct of those to be influenced. A few years 
earlier, R.H. Tawney defined power as “the capacity of an indivi­
dual or a group of individuals, to modify the conduct of other 
individuals or groups in the manner which he desires...“, leaving 
open the availability of sanctions when the intended effects are 
not forthcoming.^ Thus most of these early authors seem to echo 
Locke's conception of power when he stated that “political power,
then, I take to be a right of making laws, with penalties of death,
16
and consequently all less penalties..."
12. Ibid., p. 84
13- Power: A New Social Analysis, New York: W.W. Norton, 1938,
P. 35
14. Constitutional Government and Politics, New York: Harper, 1937,
pp. 12- 14 ~~ ~~~ ~
15. Equal 1ty, New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1931, p. 75
16. Two Treatises of Government, New York: Hafner Publishing Co.;
19*17, p. 122
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Writings of the sixties continued to display this trend of de­
fining power in terms of sanctions. Karl Deutsch, for instance, 
writing in the early sixties, defined power as the "ability of an 
individual or an organization to impose extrapolations or projec­
tions of their inner structure upon their environment". He further 
argued that "to have power means not to have to give in, and to 
force the environment of the other person to do so. Power is there­
fore the priority of output over intake".^ Carrying forward the 
same theme in a later study, he stated that "power is the ability
| Q
to prevail in conflict and to overcome obstacles". Yet another
scholar defined power in the international scene as "the capacity
19
of a political unit to impose its will upon other units". Thus
all these definitions bear the hallmark of Morgttnthau's critical
observation that power is the motive force in international politics,
and therefore, most nations face essentially three fundamental policy
choices - to maintain power, to increase power, or to demonstrate
20
power; and the notion of influence as a distinct and separate 
category went unrecognized.
It was in 1950 when Lasswel1 and Kaplan identified influence 
as a category distinct from power. This was followed by Robert 
Dahl's separation of the concept of power - "a special case of in­
fluence involving severe losses for noncompliance" - from that of
17. Nerves of Government, London: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963, 
p. 1 1 1
18. Analysis of International Relations, Englewood Cliffs, NJ :
Prentice-Ha11, 1978, p. 23
19• Raymond Aron, Peace and War, London: Doubleday and Company Ltd., 
1966, p. kS
20. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New
York: A1fred A. Knopf, 19^8, p. 21
influence - "a relation among actors ["such as individuals, groups,
associations, states^] in which one actor induces other actors to
21
act in some way they would not otherwise act". While Dahl's de­
finition of influence will require further refinement to suit our 
need, what is important here is the distinction made between power 
and influence.
A more detailed study made to date on the concepts 
of power and influence is by the team of Peter Bachrach and Morton 
S. Baratz. According to them, influence relations and power rela­
tions are not the same. "A power relationship exists when (a) there 
is a conflict over values or courses of action between A and B;
(b) B complies with A's wishes; and (c) he does so because he is 
fearful that A w i 11 deprive him of a value or values which he, B,
regards more highly than those which would have been achieved by 
22
noncompliance". They stress, however, that the availability of
a sanction endows A with power over B only if four conditions are 
23
fulfilled: (a) the person threatened is aware of what is expected 
of him; (b) the threatened sanction is actually regarded as a de­
privation by the person who is threatened; (c) the person threatened 
has greater esteem for the value which would be sacrificed should 
he disobey than for another value which would be foregone should 
he comply; and (d) the person threatened is persuaded that the 
threat against him is not idle.
23.
21. Ana 1ys i s , op.c11 .(8) , pp. 32 and 17
22. "Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework", The Ameri­
can Political Science Review, vol. 57, no. 3, (September 1963), 
p. 635
23. Ibid., p. 634
They argue that the condition that distinguishes power from 
influence is the threat to apply sanctions and therefore the pre­
sence of a power relationship is characterized by the occurrence 
of threats. An influence relationship, on the other hand, is mani­
fested without the application of threatened sanctions. "One per­
son has influence over another...to the extent that the first, 
without resorting to either a tacit or an overt threat of severe 
deprivations, causes the second to change his course of action".
Thus, power and influence are different "in that the exercise of
power depends upon potential sanctions, while the exercise of in-
24
fluence does not". Further, they reject the statement that "in­
fluence is persuasive while power is coercive Qand thatj we submit 
voluntarily to influence while power requires submission", arguing
that if submission is voluntary it is not influence but power that
25
operates, and if submission is under duress then force operates.
They admit, however, that sharp and clear distinctions between 
power and influence are exacerbated by the fact that power and 
influence often occur simultaneously and that one frequently leads 
to the other.
Having briefly discussed above some of the more salient works
26
on power and influence, let us now turn to the concept of influ­
ence itself.
24. Ibid., p. 637
25. Robert Bierstedt, "An Analysis of Social Power", American Socio­
logical Review, vol. 15 (December 1950), p. 731, quoted in ibid., 
p. 637, fn. 26
26. For studies that raise different aspects of power and influence
and not referred to above, see, Robert W. Cox and Harold K. Jacobson, 
The Anatomy of Influence, New Haven:Yale University Press, 1973, 
particularly chapters 1,2, and 11; and Kjell Goldmann and Gunnar 
Sjostedt ed. Power, Capabilities, Interdependence: Problems in the 
Study of International Influence, London: Sage Publications, 1977
24.
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Any study of influence relationship necessitates certain un­
derlying assumptions that need to be elaborated for the purposes 
of this study. First, it is an accepted fact that every nation 
engages in influence building - the process whereby the ruling 
elite of one country seeks to advance that country's national 
aims vis-a-vis another country without recourse to coercive means. 
Second, to be operationally useful, the concept of influence should 
be used in a very precise and restricted sense. This is all the 
more important in view of the fact that the term 'influence' is 
generally used by political scientists quite loosely and often 
interchangeably with such terms as power, coercion, force, etc. 
Attempts have already been made in the preceding pages to dis­
tinguish 'influence' from 'power1; continued attempts should be 
made to maintain a 'clean' terminology.
Third, it is assumed that one way of assessing influence 
is by studying the responses of those involved in the influence 
relationship. Thus, the nature of interaction between India 
and Bangladesh and the specific issue areas directly relevant 
to their national interests would be crucial to our study.
Fourth, although the spectrum of Indian interests in Bangla­
desh's internal and external affairs is understandably large, 
it does not follow that instances of influence are equally 
large because the actual number of issue areas critical to 
both countries' interests is, in reality, rather limited.
Fifth, the higher the stakes perceived by India or Bangladesh, the 
more likely each would try to influence the other's policies. Sixth, 
the lower the costs and the higher the probability of success per­
ceived, the more would be the disposition towards making an influence
attempt. Finally, it is reasonable to assume that each country
"will undertake an influence attempt if...the expected benefits
27
from the attempt are larger than the expected costs".
The above assumptions are made with the understanding that the
working definition of influence would be as follows: influence is
manifested when A (the Indian leadership) affects, through non-coer-
cive means, directly or indirectly, the behaviour of B (Bangladeshi
ruling elite) in the hope that it redounds to the policy advantage
28
of A, and vice versa. This is a qualitative improvement in our 
context, over other definitions of influence put forth.
James March has defined influence as "that which induces beha­
viour on the part of the individual at time tj different from that
which might be predicted on the basis of a knowledge of the indivi-
29
dual...at time tg". The key word appears to be 'different'; if 
the behaviour is not 'different' from what is normally expected 
then there is no influence. The deficiency in this definition lies 
in the fact that it does not take into account sustained predict­
able behaviour that may be due to the application of influence.
Robert Dahl's definition that influence is manifest when A "can
27. The ellipsis stands for the phrase "and only if" which I have 
deleted from Baldwin's assertion on the grounds that in a si­
tuation where a nation-state is desperate to influence a par­
ticular outcome, it could very well overlook this calculation.
See, Baldwin, o p .ci t. (10) pp. 482-3
28. I have revised the definition offered by Alvin Z. Rubinstein 
to suit my particular need. See his Red Star on the Nile,
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977, p. xiv
29. "An Introduction to the Theory and Measurement of Inf1uence", The 
American Political Science Review, vol. 49, no. 2, (June 1955
p. 438
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get B to do something that B would not otherwise do", suffers from
similar inadequacy in that it fails to accommodate the type of in-
30
fluence called perpetuation or reinforcement. It is quite likely
that B is already pursuing policies desired by A but, nevertheless,
A resorts to influence attempts to ensure that B w i 11 continue to
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do so. It may be recalled here that Bachrach and Baratz1 defini­
tion of influence given earlier is also based on a change in beha­
viour, and overlooks the operation of influence to effect a continua 
tion of a particular behaviour pattern. These defintions, therefore 
smack of power rather than influence. Rubinstein's definition is 
conceptually clearer because it distinguishes influence from other 
words such as power and force, by its emphasis on 'non-coercive 
means', and the operation of the influence process is not neces­
sarily predicated on any actual modification of behaviour of the 
actor to be influenced.
There are several characteristics of influence that should be 
noted. First, influence may or may not imply a modification of B's 
policy; as noted earlier, it may only reinforce or perpetuate exist­
ing policy. Second, it is generally issue-specific and situation- 
specific: when a particular policy of B has, or is anticipated to 
have, certain discernible connotations for A, it is likely that A 
will have recourse to influence attempts on B. The duration of in­
fluence will depend on the nature of the issue, and on the context
30. "The Concept of Power", o p .ci t . (8), though in his later book, 
Ana 1ys i s , op.ci t . (8), p. 40, he claims that "Of course this 
definition also includes instances in which actor A induces 
actor B to go on doing something he is now doing, though B 
word stop it except for A's inducement".
31. This argument is sustained in Singer, o p .c i t . (7), p. 421, and 
in Holsti, op.cit. (10), p. 195
in which the particular issue is generated; when these change, the 
nature of the influence relationship is likely to change.
Third, it is future-oriented, and the actual outcome of influ­
ence may not be evident until a later time. The decision, however, 
to engage in an influence attempt may be conditioned by experiences 
in the part of oneself or of others, or it may be a preemptive 
move to foreclose a certain eventuality. Fourth, it may be either 
a short-term or a long-term phenomenon depending on the importance, 
urgency or prevalence of an Issue or a situation; it does not pre­
suppose any time limit. Fifth, it Is an asymmetrical interaction 
process; since it is non-coercive in content, there is no direct 
correlation between influence capability and successful outcome; 
the only exception being that an endowed state may have more incen­
tives to offer to the state to be influenced, though that does not 
presuppose a particular outcome.
Sixth, it usually involves costs but there is no fixed pattern.
The influencer will usually make a rational choice regarding the cost
(say, for instance, in prestige, image, authority, friendship) of
an influence attempt and its benefits, and this estimate Is likely
32
to depend also on his perceptions of the probability of success.
Seventh, while the influence attempt may be issue-specific or situa-
tion-specific, the influence outcome may be multidimensional, mani-
33
festlng itself in different spheres. Finally, it is usually a
32. Baldwin, op.ci t . (10), p. 481
33* The distinction here is between Influence as a verb (process/
attempt) and influence as a noun (product/outcome). Rubinstein's 
definition portrays influence as a process and yet what is to be 
observed and assessed are outcomes. Rubinstein and others have 
recognised that this semantic confusion cannot be eliminated.
See, Rubinstein, op.ci t . (28), p. xiv
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two-way phenomenon; while A may initiate an influence attempt on
B, once the goal is realized or is in the process of being realized,
A may be influenced into amending its previous attitude or posture 
towards B; thus a one-way phenomenon may give rise to a feedback.
There are, however, a number of limiting factors which require 
that the above be accepted with caution. One cannot always assume 
that basic nationa1 preferences wi 11 remain constant no matter which 
political party is in power. Not only successive parties and fac­
tions bring their own political preferences and electoral commit­
ments into office, these same power holders may undergo value changes 
in the course of their exercise of power. This was the case, for 
instance, in Bangladesh when the ruling party, the Awami League, in 
January 1975, after three years in power, suddenly abandoned its 
lifelong pursuit of instituting a parliamentary democracy and imple­
mented a one-party presidential system instead.
Another factor to be noted is the internal unity or cohesiveness 
in carrying out policy. Where this is missing, the party or coalition 
in power can be severely hampered in its ability to conduct foreign 
policy. Finally, the flow of information between the parties in the 
influence relationship is also important, specially with respect to 
A's preferences regarding what policies B should adopt so as not to 
harm A's interests and vice versat and also the availability of al­
ternatives to each party to accommodate the other's desires. Thus, 
it is necessary to note the impermanence of elite values or struc­
tures, the unity and cohesiveness of the elite in power, and the 
proper flow of information between the countries engaged in the 
influence relationship, since these may vitiate the calculations
30.
It now remains to be seen under what conditions influence at­
tempts are likely to be initiated. An understanding of the deter- 
minonis of influence attempts would help us identify the contexts 
in which the influence process is likely to operate. On a general 
level at least six cases may be considered:
(1) "the first prerequisite for an influence at­
tempt is the perception on the part of A's 
decision-makers that A and B are, or will be, 
in a relationship of significant interdepen­
dence, and that B's future behaviour conse­
quently could well be such as to exercise 
either a harmful or beneficial impact on A " ; ^
(2) "the second determinant is that of the predic­
tions which A's decision-makers reach regarding 
the nature of B's future behaviour: What is B 
likely to do in the absence of any conscious 
influence attempt by A ? " ; ^
influence attempt will result only when A de­
velops certain preferences regarding B's current 
or future behaviour;
the number of times a state becomes involved 
in acts of influence depends upon the general 
level of interaction with another state; that 
is, the frequency of influence attempts will 
be directly related to the level of interac­
tion between the states concerned;
influence attempts are more likely where there 
is willingness to be influenced; that is, in­
fluence is contingent upon the degree and quality 
of responsiveness of state B;
finally, there is Carl Friedrich's 'rule of an­
ticipated reaction'. B wishes C to do x, but 
will not try to get C to do it because it fears 
that A w i 11 do y which is unfavourable to B's 
interests. Example: In pursuit of its desire 
to make the Indian Ocean a zone of peace,
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
34. Singer, op.ci t . (7), pp. 425 and 430
35. Ibid., p. 423
36. Ibid.
Bangladesh, B, would prefer that the navies 
of the major powers (USA, USSR, UK, France),
C, withdraw, x, from the Indian Ocean; but 
Bangladesh does not pursue this course of 
action because it fears that in the absence 
of the navies of the major powers, the Indian 
Navy, A, will play an hegemonic role, y, in 
the Indian Ocean which might not be beneficial 
to Bangladesh's long-term interests.
A very difficult hurdle, however, in any study of influence 
relationship between two countries is to identify accurately in­
stances of influence without which no assessment is possible. The 
following criteria for identifying instances of influence may be 
considered.^ First, shifts or changes in the position of the actor 
influenced would be a criterion. We may try to identify the con­
crete instances in which Bangladesh or India modifies its behaviour 
or stand in a manner congenial to the other's interests. From the 
degree, speed, frequency and implications of these modifications 
inferences can be made about the other's influence. Also, in order 
to influence, say, Bangladesh, into adopting a particular stance, 
India may have to adopt a certain posture too, and this shift from 
its original position could be a measurement of Bangladesh's indirect 
influence over India. The difficulty here would be to determine 
who influenced whom.
A second criterion for identifying instances of influence may 
be a sharp improvement in India's ability to carry out transactions 
in Bangladesh. The increase or expansion in India's diplomatic pre­
sence in Bangladesh, the greater access of Indian diplomats to the 
highest echelons of decision-making in Bangladesh, the frequency and
37- The first,second, fifth and sixth criteria have been borrowed 
from Rubinstein, op.cit. (28), pp. xv-xvi
level of inter-state visits, all these may serve as useful indica­
tors in identifying influence acts.
A third criterion may be the nature and content of the general 
level of involvement between the two Governments. For instance, a 
decision by the Bangladesh Government to send its military officers 
to India for special training instead of Britain or the United States, 
or the decision to replace other trading partners with India would 
constitute a certain acquiescence in Indian influence. Even if the 
trade pacts are logical in the context of price and proximity, in 
the case of India and Bangladesh, it would be the state of political 
relations that would be the persuasive factor in determining these 
o u t c o m e s .
Fourth, the level of responsiveness of one country to the needs 
of the other, and vice versa, would be another criterion. For in­
stance, a willingness to 'concede' aspects of national interests for 
the sake of bilateral harmony, or the decision to 'lower the a n t e 1 
so that negotiations will conclude successfully may be viewed as 
part and parcel of an influence relationship. Of course, where an 
influence relationship is inoperative, states may still 'concede' 
to influence a particular outcome, as was the case at the Simla 
Talks in 1972 between India and Pakistan, when India decided not to 
cash in on its military advantages vis-a-vis the latter in the hope 
that Bhutto's civilian government would be able to consolidate itself 
against the army's attempts to return to power.
Fifth, any sudden and significant increase in the quantity, 
quality and variety of resources committed by India to Bangladesh 
would suggest a change in the political relations between the two
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countries. This could even be such a non-tangible resource as 
India's diplomatic spearheading of Bangladesh's entry to the United 
Nations and other bodies. In its role as a mentor, India was quite 
easily persuaded to speak for Bangladesh's case in various world 
bodies. One could perhaps argue that the special understanding b e ­
tween Mrs. Gandhi and Tajuddin Ahmed, leader of the Bangladesh Pr o ­
visional Government in Calcutta, provided the scope for influence 
relationship to operate, enabling Bangladesh to seek the assistance 
of India's very capable political and diplomatic establishments.
Sixth, and a very important criterion, is the extent to which 
India's strategic position in South Asia improves. For instance, 
the signing of the Indo-Bang1adesh friendship treaty immediately 
after Bangladesh's independence, containing security clauses that 
prohibit entering into security or defence arrangements with third 
parties that might be injurious to one of the signatories, or e n ­
tering into mutual consultations should there be a security threat 
to either of the signatories from any quarter, could certainly be 
seen as improving India's strategic and tactical options in the sub­
continent. Also, the friendly relations between India and Bangla­
desh during the League Government were viewed by the People's Re­
public of China with suspicion, and China refused to recognize 
Bangladesh. This of course redounded to Indian interests, since 
the absence of Chinese diplomatic presence in Dhaka also meant the 
absence of the possibility of Chinese machinations against India 
through Bangladesh.
These six criteria will be employed in the concluding chapter 
to ascertain whether influence relationship operated between the 
two countries during the period of this study.
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Chapter 2 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: 1757 - 1947
There was a tremendous amount of fraternal feeling towards India 
after the Indo-Bang1adesh victory over Pakistan in December 1971, 
arising from gratitude for India's all-out support for the people 
of Bangladesh in their struggle for independence. There was much 
promise and hope that this relationship would endure many years to 
come; but it petered out within five years.
To explain why this happened so quickly requires an examination 
of the underlying currents that shaped this re 1 a t i o n s h i p . It would 
appear that historical perceptions of the Bengali Muslims of Bangla­
desh may have been partly responsible for the collapse of this rela­
tionship. If that is true, what were these historical perceptions?
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the British colonial 
administration of Bengal, what effect it had on the Muslim community, 
and how that shaped the perceptions of the Hindu and Muslim c o m muni­
ties towards each other.
Historians assign 1757 as the year of the eclipse of Muslim 
rule in Bengal. In that year, in the battle of Plassey, Nawab 
SIrajudoula was defeated by the British and colonial rule was in­
formally established. Shortly thereafter, a series of a d ministra­
tive measures pertaining to colonial rule were introduced, radically 
changing the Hindu-Muslim relationship in the society. These were:
1) revision of the land system; 2) dropping of Persian as the lan­
guage of government; 3) introduction of the New Administrative Policy; 
and 4) change in army recruitment policy. These four measures went 
a long way in consolidating and formalizing colonial rule in India 
and in dethroning the Muslims from all seats of power. In the course 
of time, a deep sense of alienation developed between the two reli­
gious communities, giving scope for separatist tendencies to develop 
among the M u s 1 ims.
1) Revision of the land s y s t e m : The principal source of income
of the Moghul Government and the Muslim aristocracy was land revenue.
The Muslim rulers of Bengal were not indigenous to the land where
Hindus were in the majority and therefore thought it politically
expedient to keep themselves aloof from the actual collection of
the revenue. It was also politically expedient for them to allow
some Hindus to be associated with the revenue collection process
and to allow them to keep a percentage for t h e m s e l v e s J  After
collecting the revenue, the Hindu bailiffs would keep their share
of the profits and pass on the rest to their M u s 1 im superiors who
2
monopolized the higher posts in the revenue administration. The 
Muslim superiors would, in turn, keep their share and forward the 
rest to the imperial coffers.
After the battles of Plassey and Buxer, this set-up was c o m ­
pletely revised. The East India Company, having extracted from the
1. A.R. Mai lick, British Policy and the Muslims in Bengal, 1757"
1856, Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Pakistan, 1961 , p. 32
35.
2. Ibid. , p. 33
Moghul ruler in Delhi the grant of diwani (revenue collection) of 
Bengal, devised a new plan to ensure, quicken and increase the c o l ­
lection of revenue -- a system of farming out the revenue collection 
to the highest bidder. These bidders were Calcutta merchants, 
dealers and money-lenders, a class of Hindu speculators who had 
made their fortunes by trading with the Europeans or serving as 
local agents of European companies.
The effects of this new farming system (introduced in 1772 and 
abolished in 1779) on most of the society of Bengal - the Nawab, the 
aristocracy and the peasantry - were most telling. After the N a w a b 1 
defeat, he became "a tool, a cipher in the hands of the foreigners1'
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who "was allowed to govern, never to rule". His allowance was dras 
tically reduced, which left him politically and financially impover­
ished. The aristocracy fared no better. The system of farming out 
revenue through auction ousted many of these landlords who could not 
compete against the Hindu merchants and bankers of Calcutta. The 
Muslim superiors who held the position between the landlord and the 
Hindu collectors were also replaced by English collectors.
Under this system, corruption, fraud and exploitation had be­
come so rampant that the India Act of 1784 commanded the Company 
"to enquire into the alleged grievances of the landholders and if 
founded in truth to afford them redress and to establish permanent 
rules for the settlement and collection of the revenue and for a d ­
ministration of justice, founded in the ancient laws and local
3. G.B. Malleson, The Decisive Battles of India, L o n don,1883, 
p. 70
usages of the country." The upshot was the Permanent Settlement 
of 1793, which made over the lands of Bengal to a new class of 
zamindars (holders of large estates). The new revenue system c o m ­
prised the state, the Hindu bailiffs who collected the revenue from 
the peasants, and the peasantry itself. The Muslim aristocracy had 
no role to play,^ and by 1793 it was displaced by the Hindus and the 
£
Br i t i s h .
The final blow to the Muslim upper class came as a result of 
Resumption proceedings of the Government. Under Muslim rule, p e r ­
sons of scholastic distinction or religious merit were granted lands 
by the state in lieu of salary or stipends;^ but the Resumption Law 
denied the continuation of rent-free grants to the Muslim aristocracy.
The peasants and weavers forming the majority represented the 
lower order of Muslim society. When the system of farming out the 
revenue to the highest bidder was introduced, it left the peasants 
utterly vulnerable to the rapacity and extortion of the revenue 
farmers. The zamindar-peasant relationship deteriorated further 
with the Permanent Settlement. The new zcarrindar, having won the 
zamindari in auction, in turn, farmed out his estate to the farmer 
who offered him the highest profit over and above the revenue fixed 
by the Government. The farmer, in turn, auctioned it off to others 
"till farm within farm became the order of the day each resembling
k. Quoted in N.K. Sinha, The Economic History of B e n g a l , vol. II, 
Calcutta: Firma K.L. M u k h o p a d h y a y , 1962, p . 23
5. W.W. Hunter, The Indian Musa 1 m a n s , London, 1872, p. 162
6. Ibid. , p. 163; also see, J.W. Kaye, Selections from the Papers 
of Lord M e t c a 1f e , London, 1855, p. 253
7. F.J. Shore, Notes on Indian Affairs, vol. 1, p.
a screw upon a screw, the last coming down on the tenant with the
g
pressure of them all". As the peasant was totally dependent on the
q
land, for him there was no way out. To this must be added the h a ­
rassment of the peasants by the Indigo planters, who were mostly 
English and took advantage of the distress of the peasants to in­
duce them into entering disadvantageous contracts, thereby binding 
them to the planters "as a bond slave to the f a c t o r y " . ^
The weavers were no match for the owners of the Dundee mills. 
Arbitrary price fixing, disincentives for finished products from 
India, and unfair trading regulations went hand in hand in under­
mining the economic viability of this section of Muslim s o c i e t y . ^
Thus the impact of the new land system in Bengal was to create 
a new Hindu exploiting class, and, simultaneously, greatly impover­
ish the Muslim aristocracy and the Muslim peasants; the end result 
was growing Muslim hatred of the Hindus.
2) Replacement of Persian as the language of g o v e r n m e n t : Pe r ­
sian was the language of the Muslim court. The East India Company, 
trading being its primary interest, thought it advisable at first to 
retain Persian as the official language. Gradually, however, Persian 
was replaced by Bengali, which opened up government services to the 
B e n g a 1 i-speaking Hindus. It must be noted that while the language
8. W.H. Sleeman, Rambles and Recollections of an Indian O f f i c i a l , 
vol . 1 , London"] 1893, P» 83, cited in Mai lick, o p . c i t . p. 52
9. Ibid., pp. 52-53
10. Ibid., p . 54
11. Report of the Indigo Commission, Parliamentary Papers XLIV, 
1861, cited ibid., pp. 5 3“56
of the Muslim masses of Bengal - peasants and weavers - was Bengali, 
the aristocracy spoke Persian, Arabic or Urdu. With Bengali becom­
ing the official language, a large section of the Muslim aristocracy 
was automatically disqualified from state employment.
As the Company's territorial acquisitions increased and its 
military and financial control expanded, its administrators rea­
lized that the current standard of education was woefully inadequate. 
Thus with the renewal of the Company's Charter in 1813, an e d u c a ­
tional clause sanctioning Government assistance in the education 
of the natives was approved. Two decades later, in 1835, the 
Government of William Bentinck passed a resolution to the effect 
that "all the funds at the disposal of the Government would hence­
forth be spent in imparting to the Indians a knowledge of English
12
literature and science".
The idea of Western education with its secular emphasis struck
fear in the hearts of the Muslim aristocracy, who saw in this a new
attempt by the British to undermine their religion and render their
1 3
community susceptible to the preachings of the missionaries. They 
reacted by remaining aloof to these developments.
The Hindus, on the other hand, saw in these developments the
opportunity to bring themselves abreast of the rulers. In the course
of time they acquired proficiency in English and were easily employed
in mercantile and banking establishments as well as in administra- 
14
tive services.
12. Quoted in Ram G o p a l , Indian Muslims: A Political History (1858- 
1947), London: Asia Pub 1i sh i ng H o u s e , 1959, p. i"S
13. Ibid. , pp. 18-19
14. Nirmal Kumar Bose, A Social History, Calcutta, 1964, pp. 30-31
39.
A series of measures passed in subsequent years pushed the M u s ­
lims further into oblivion. In 1837 English was made the official 
language of the Government, and in 1844 examination in English was 
required for official employment. By 1859 the posts of Deputy M a g ­
istrate and Deputy Collector were reserved for candidates with a 
good knowledge of English. In 1864 English alone became "the lan­
guage of examination for the more coveted appointments in the Civil
Service", and in the same year all law examinations were conducted
• c i • u i n Eng 1 ish.
Thus the replacement of Persian by Bengali and later by English 
increased the isolation of the Muslim community in the Bengal society 
and further heightened its alienation from the Hindus.
3) Introduction of the New Administrative P o l i c y : Most of the 
important offices of state were the monopoly of the Muslim ari s t o ­
cracy in the Moghul period, with the fiscal and accounting posts
generally going to Hindus. This administrative set-up continued
16
for several decades under the Company's rule. By the 1830 s , h o w ­
ever, things had changed. With the introduction of Bengali, the 
lower appointments in government were opened to Hindus, while the 
introduction of English ousted the Muslim aristocracy from the 
senior administrative services. They were replaced by English o f ­
ficers. This depletion of Muslims from the government services 
continued unabated, as a result of which by 1871 Muslims held one 
post for every seven posts held by Hindus, or one post for every
15. Anil Seal, The Emergence of Indian N a t i o n a l i s m , Cambridge, 
1968, p. 302
16. Hunter, op.cit., p. 167
k] .
fourteen posts held by Europeans. In the whole administrative body, 
the ratio of jobs held bv Muslims to the total jobs available fell 
to on e - t w e n t y - t h i r d . A telling summary of all this is to be found 
in Hunter's observation of 1871: "there is now scarcely a Government 
office in Calcutta in which a Mohammadan can hope for any post above 
the rank of porter, messenger, filler of ink pots, and mender of 
pens".^ ^
Though remedial measures were subsequently taken by the Bengal 
Government to increase the prospects of employment for their Muslim 
subjects, it was not before the feeling of antagonism had developed 
among the Muslims towards the British and the Hindus.
k) Change in army recruitment p o l i c y : For a fair majority of 
the Muslim aristocracy, military service was a vocation. The early 
settlers had been conquerors first; the tradition of military s er­
vice had remained with them.
After the Muslim defeat at the hands of the British, the fate 
of those in the army was more or less sealed. The Nawabs of Bengal
| Q
were allowed to maintain only a token force. Neither the Muslim
generals nor the lower ranks found service in the Company's army;
19
for security reasons preference was given to the Tel Ingas of
20
South India to man the lower ranks. Those military chiefs for­
tunate enough to have grants of land settled down as landlords with
21
their followers and soldiers doing the work of peasants. Others,
17. Ibid. , p. 170
18. J.C. Sinha, Economic Annals of B e n g a l , London, 1927, PP* 9 5“96 
19- Hunter, op.c i t . , p. 165
20. Mai lick, o p .c i t . , p. 32
21. Ibid.
42.
who had no such grants, became military colonists and headed great
land reclamation projects in the dense jungles of the deltaic Eas-
22
tern districts. On reclaimed land they settled down as landlords, 
and apportioned out the land to their soldiers, relatives and fol­
lowers who cultivated it and paid tax to their chief. According to 
Rubbi, this process was partly responsible for the disproportion-
ately large dependence on the soil of the Muslim population of 
23
B e n g a 1.
Thus, as we have seen, "three distinct streams of wealth ran
perennially into the coffers of a noble Mussalman House - Military
Command, the Collection of Revenue, and Judicial or Political Em-
24
ploy"; none were available to it now. The series of measures 
adopted by the British struck at the very source of a Muslim ho u s e ­
hold's livelihood, thereby undermining its economic moorings in 
Bengal society.
I I
It was only towards the end of the nineteenth century that the 
Muslims began awakening from the torpor into which they had fallen 
and this seems to have been due to four factors: 1) the influence 
of Hunter's work; 2) the issue of the origin of the Bengali Muslims; 
3) demographic changes; and 4) Hindu revivalism.
1) Influence of Hunter's w o r k : In 1871 Sir William Wilson 
Hunter, a senior British civil servant, wrote a book, The Indian
22. Hunter, op.c i t . p. 154
23- Fazli Rubbi, Origin of the Musalmans of B e n g a l , Calcutta,
1395, pp. 73-79
24. Hunter, op.c i t . , p. 159
Musalmccns: Are they bound in conscience to rebel against the Queen? 
in which he gave a detailed account of the plight of the Muslims 
under English rule. He argued that the Faraizi and Wahhabi m o v e ­
ments, which were launched in the early nineteenth century to purify 
Islam from Hindu practices, later became anti-British agitations 
because of the mounting grievances of the Muslims under British 
rule; until such grievances were removed, peaceful coexistence 
between the British and the Muslims would be hampered. Pointing 
out the fact that the vast majority of the Muslims had in fact 
acquiesced in British rule in India, Hunter, in his final chapter, 
detailed the legitimate Muslim grievances against the English rulers.
His work had an electric effect on the mentally depressed M u s ­
lim community and left a lasting impression not only on the minds 
of the educated Muslims but also on the minds of the colonial rulers. 
The influence of this book was manifested in the various reform 
commissions that the British subsequently instituted to ascertain 
the best means of rehabilitating the Muslims.
2) The issue of the origin of the Bengali M u s l i m s : With 
Hunter's work already stimulating discussions in the literate c i r ­
cles of Bengal society, the Census Report of 1872 inspired a new 
debate on the true origin of the Bengali Muslims. The standard 
view held at the time was that the Muslims of Bengal "were recruited
from the dregs of the Hindu Community, and embraced Islam as a short
25
cut to social promotion". Not only were the upper class Hindus
43.
25. Sir Herbert Risley, The People of India, 2nd edition, New Delhi 
W. Cooke, 1969, P* 14V
kk.
convinced of it, eminent British authorities on the subject seemed
. 26 
to confirm it.
This observation was, however, controverted by Fazli Rubbi, in 
charge of the finances of the Nawab of Murshidabad, who argued that 
the Muslims were not converts of the lower orders of the Hindu co m ­
munity but the descendents of settlers from Turkey, Arabia, Iran and 
Afghanistan. To support his claim, he cited the Arabic and Persian
contents of the Bengali spoken by the Muslims as opposed to the
27
Sanskritized Bengali of the Hindus. Whether Rubbi 's arguments 
were scientifically valid or not is unimportant here; what is im­
portant is that this claim stirred the imaginations of the educated 
Muslims of Bengal who began to see themselves as the scions of non- 
Bengali Muslims. These educated Bengali Muslims began to consider
themselves as a separate entity and sought to preserve it by infus-
2 8
ing into their language more words from Persian and Arabic.
3) Demographic c h a n g e s : By the end of the nineteenth century, 
important demographic changes were taking place in Bengal, with the 
Muslims coming into the majority. Analysing this increase, O'Donnell, 
in 1891, observed that "it appears that nineteen years ago in Bengal 
Proper Hindus numbered nearly half a million more than Musalmans did,
26. See for instance, James Wise, Notes on the Races, Castes and 
Trades of Eastern B e n g a l , L o n d o n , 1 S o 3 ; Francis Buchanan, An 
Account of the District of Purnea in 1 8 0 9 ~ 1 0 , Bihar and Orissa 
Research Society, 1928 ; E . A . Gait, Census o T  India, 1901, vol.
VI, Part I, Report, pp. 165“181
27. Rubbi , op.ci t . (23)
28. Amelendu De, Roots of Separatism in Nineteenth Century B e n g a l , 
Calcutta: Ratna Prakashan, 1974, p. 30
not only overtaken the Hindus but have surpassed them by a million- 
29
and-a-half". This increase gave the educated Muslims the psycho­
logical confidence of being in the majority, thus providing them 
the political strength to articulate their demands and secure their 
rights and privileges in the subsequent years.
4) H indu rev i v a 1 i s m : Introspection of the Hindu religion and 
culture was a dominant theme in the Bengal society of the nineteenth 
century. After Muslim dominance of Bengal for about six centuries, 
the advent of British colonial rule provided the Bengali Hindus with 
the opportunity to reassert their religious views and practices.
The first reformist movement was Raja Rammohun Roy's Brahma 
Samaj which, although open to members of all other religions, could 
not attract non-Hindus because of its emphasis on the cult of Hinduism. 
The reformists believed in a more secular interpretation of their 
re 1 i g i o n .
The revivalists, however, asserted the superiority of Hinduism 
over all other religions and demanded the blind acceptance of all 
the social manifestations of Hinduism, such as child marriage, p r o ­
hibition of widow marriage, and the caste system. Rajnarayan Basu's 
movement of 1871, Hindu Dharmer Sreshtata (Superiority of the Hindu 
Religion), and the Arya Samaj movement of 1875 are two such e x a m p l e s . ^  
The latter gave rise to the Suddhi movement whose aim was the c o n ­
version of non-Hindus to Hinduism and the re-conversion of converted
and that in the space o f  less than two deca d e s ,  the M u s a l m a n s  have
29* C.J. O'Donnell, Census of India, vol. Ill, The Report, 1891, 
p. 1^7, quoted in ibid., p. 32
30. De, op.ci t. , p. 71
Hindus. The Gorakshini, (cow protection) movement to stop the 
slaughter of cows by Muslims during religious festivals caused 
considerable animosity between the two religious g r o u p s . ^
But what created the worst feelings of separatism between them 
was the effects of an impressive amount of Hindu literature whose 
theme was anti-Muslim. Historical facts were distorted to show 
fictional victories in battles against Muslims; Muslim women o b ­
serving purdah were shown to be secretly hankering after Hindu 
generals; Muslim notables were portrayed as cruel, lecherous and
32
villainous; and Muslim rule in general was cast in a poor light.
Some, like Bankim Chatterjee, used profane language to denigrate 
Islam's prophet, Mohammad. A major effect of the writings of this 
period w a s , therefore, to sow the seeds of separatism.
Thus the influence of Hunter's work, the debates on the origin 
of the Bengali Muslims, the demographic changes which brought the 
Muslims into the majority and the various Hindu movements, all 
served to create an unmistakable awareness among the Hindus and 
the Muslims that they were two different peoples with contrasting 
religious and social systems.
I I I
Communal tension and conflict in Bengal was further exacerbated 
by the Muslims who engaged in a number of activities in order to 
purify their religious and social systems, regain their self-esteem
46.
31. Gopal, op.ci t . , pp. 86-87
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Poetry, Dhaka: Bang la Academy, 1970
and counter the increasing Hindu dominance. These were: 1) the 
Faraizi and Wahhabi movements; 2) the Mohammadan Literary Society;
3) the Central National Mohammadan Association; k) anjumans; and 
5) pub 1 i sh i n g .
1) The Faraizi and Wahhabi m o v e m e n t s : The Faraizi (1818) and 
the Wahhabi (1827) movements started as religious reformist m o v e ­
ments whose initial objective was to purify Islam in Bengal by re­
moving Hindu practices and influences. But the official dethrone­
ment of Islam and the socio-political and economic changes in Bengal 
that began to affect the Muslim community adversely, gave these 
movements an increasingly political character. "In the agrarian 
sphere these movements stood for defending the socio-economic in­
terests of the Muslim peasants against the Hindu zamindars and 
European indigo planters. When the British government came forward
to protect the zamindars and the planters as well as to maintain law
33
and order in the country", these became anti-British agitations.
These movements alleviated some of the sufferings of the M u s ­
lim peasantry by bringing to the notice of the British the economic 
oppressions of the zamindars and the indigo planters. This led to 
enquiry commissions and reform laws. The British were reminded that 
they would have to come to terms with the Bengali Muslims, and the 
latter realized that the path of confrontation would yield very 
little in terms of their betterment. In effect, Bengali Muslims 
experienced a quasi-renaissance which strengthened their identity 
as a separate religio-social community and laid the foundation for
33- De, o p . c i t . , p. 19
2) The Mohammadan Literary S o c i e t y : Founded in Calcutta in 
1863 by Nawab Abdul Latif of Faridpur in East Bengal, its membership 
comprised mostly the Muslim aristocracy and the rich middle class, 
and its deliberations were in Persian, Arabic or Urdu. The Society 
argued for an increased share of higher education for the Muslims.
It suggested Bengali as the language of primary education for the
lower orders of the Muslim society, who were ethnically linked to
the Hindus, and Urdu for the upper and middle classes descended from
the Moghuls. The Society was also of the opinion that Sanskrit words
in the Bengali spoken by the Muslims should be replaced by Arabic
35
and Persian words.
3) The Central National Mohammadan A s s o c i a t i o n : This associa­
tion was founded in Calcutta in 1877 by Syed Amir A 1 i. Its professed 
loyalty to the British Crown placed it in good stead with the Govern­
ment, which often consulted it on important "legislative, administra­
tive and educational questions". In 1883 the association submitted
a Memorial to the Government "fully describing the disabilities under 
which the Muslims laboured", which resulted in a Government resolution 
allowing for the establishment of scholarships in Bengal for the pro-
36
motion of primary education among Muslims.
Side by side with promoting English education, this association 
also upheld the need for madrasa (religious school) education, and 
much of its efforts were devoted towards harmonizing these seemingly
34. Kazi Abdul Wadud, Banglar Jagaran (Bengal's Awakening), Calcutta, 
1363 (Bengali year) , pp. 125, 12&
35. De, op.ci t . , p. 33
48.
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a se p a r a t e  political m o v e m e n t  alo n g  re l i gious lines.
3 6 . Ibid. ,  p . 34
contradictory approaches to education. From the political point of 
view, the association was to the Muslims what the Congress was to 
the Hindus because much of the Muslim correspondence with the Govern 
ment was channelled through it. In this way, the Association was 
able to remove some of the anti-British prejudice of the Muslims.
b) Anjumans: Anjumans or “associations" came into being as a 
consequence of the Faraizi and Wahhabi movements, which had, in thei 
most virulent phases, become indistinguishable from an anti-British 
jihad. The educated section of Muslim society was concerned about 
the consequences of these agitations, and of tne need to redefine 
Islam's place in the new political and administrative set-up. It 
was to the credit of Syed Amir A 1 i that ccnQumans were formed 
throughout the country to provide the forum where Muslim thought 
and opinion could be re-directed away from the British towards the 
question of Islam and its role in society and statecraft. It was 
hoped that such introspection among the Muslims would lead to a 
greater unity within the community and provide a new fillip to the
37
process of Is1 a m i z a t i o n .
5) Pub 1i sh i n g : Two types of literary work by Bengali Muslims 
appeared in the third quarter of the nineteenth century. One d e ­
voted itself to religious issues, expounding and upholding the
o
essential tenets of Islam, while the second sought to portray the
37- T.W. Arnold, The Preaching of Islam, London, 1896, p. 235
3 8 . For instance, Mohammad Naimuddin's Zobdatal Masael , Calcutta, 
1873; Sheikh Abdur Rahim's Hazrat Mohammadar Jiban Charitra 0 
Dharman i t i, Calcutta, 1888; Mir Musharraf Hossain's B i shadha
S i n d h u , Calcutta, 1885; and a number of Bengali monthlies, such 
as, Akbare Eslamia published from 1883 to 1893.
socio-economic and political malaise in which Muslims found them­
selves. The general thrust of the latter was to highlight the in­
justices suffered by the Muslims and to call upon the community to
39
rise from its indolence and backwardness.
IV
The imperatives of colonial rule had pushed the Muslims into 
political oblivion, and by the time they realized the need to bring 
themselves abreast of the rulers, the Hindus had already registered 
giant strides in all walks of colonial life. By the middle of the 
nineteenth century, they clearly enjoyed a superior social position 
which found expression in communal terms; the Muslims were also 
quick to engage in communal activities. Henceforth, most a c t i v i ­
ties in the two communities tended to be mutually exclusive and 
separatist, and this was helped in no small measure by the role of 
religion as a barrier to intermarriage, and hence as a self-perpe- 
tuating mechanism for division.
The twentieth century began in a climate of political distrust, 
social hostility and religious bigotry, giving rise to riots in 
Bengal in 1907, 1918, 1926, 1930, 19^1 and 19^6. The Indian National 
Congress, formed in 1885, became primarily a forum for Hindu ag i t a ­
tion against the British. While many Muslims joined it, the majority 
abstained, preferring the Central National Mohammadan Association 
as their conduit to the colonial Government. However, the need for 
a political forum parallel to the Congress was gradually felt by 
the Muslim leaders in Bengal. In 1906, they, with support from
50.
39. For instance, Sheikh Abdus Sobhan's H i n d u - M u s a 1 m a n , Calcutta, 
1888
Muslim leaders in other parts of India and with the blessings of 
40
the British, founded the Muslim League in Dhaka. From then on, 
the majority Muslim view was articulated through the League, a l ­
though certain prominent Muslim leaders chose to stay with the 
C o n g r e s s .
In 1905 Bengal was partitioned into a M u s 1im-majority East
Bengal and a Hindu-majority West Bengal - that is, on the basis
of community - though the British publicly insisted it was for ad-
41
ministrative convenience. This aroused Muslim political c o n s c i o u s ­
ness in Bengal and at the same time caused panic among its 
economically dominant Hindus. Though Bengal had to be re-united 
in 1911 in the face of massive agitations by the Hindus, its re­
unification reinforced rather than curbed theseparatist feeling
42
among the M u s 11 m s .
In the following years demands for the British withdrawal from 
India became widespread. The Congress, professing a secular plat­
form argued that India should not be divided communally, while the 
Muslim League emphasized its 'Two Nation' theory that called for a 
separate homeland for the Muslims of India. Though in the late 
1920s and early 1930s League resolutions only demanded 'safeguards' 
for the Muslim minority within India, by the late 1930s the Muslims 
were portrayed as a nation, not as a minority. The basis of
40. Mary Minto, India, Minto and M o r l e y , pp. 28-29, cited in G o p a l , 
op.c i t ., p. 92
41. Leonard A. Gordon, "Divided Bengal: Problems of Nationalism and 
Identity in the 19^+7 Partition" Journal of Commonwealth and Com- 
parat i ve Pol i ti cs , vol. xvi , no. 2, July 1978, pp. 1 39" 1 ^ 0
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nationality was the community identity; territorial identity was
r . 43
of secondary importance.
In 1940, a Bengali Muslim leader, Fazlul H a q , moved the famous
Lahore Resolution that called upon the British to divide India on
the basis of the Two Nation theory and establish two Muslim states 
44
of Pakistan. However, the legitimacy of the claims and c o u nter­
claims of the Congress and the Muslim League continued to be d e ­
bated until 19^6, during which year general elections were held 
all over India to ascertain the support for the positions held by 
the two parties. The Muslims, who formed the majority of the rural
population of undivided Bengal, gave an overwhelming mandate (116
45
out of 119 seats) in favour of Pakistan, thus forcing the Con­
gress to concede and the British Government to recognize that India 
had to be divided on a communal basis. But it must be noted that 
the primary motive behind the Bengali Muslim's support for Pakistan 
was their economic emancipation, though this was misread by the
46
non-Bengali Muslims of Pakistan.
43. G. Allana (ed.) Pakistan Movement: Historical D o c u m e n t s ,
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Cone 1 us i o n : Moghul rule in India was an overlordship of an 
invading Muslim minority over an indigenous Hindu majority. When 
the British captured power in India, the Hindus were able to re­
lease their pent-up frustrations and bitterness against the Muslims, 
whose initial reaction seemed to be one of sullen withdrawal. But 
increasing Hindu assertiveness from the mid-l850s onwards triggered 
the Bengali Muslims into seeking a legitimate existence of their 
own. The growing exclusive and separatist tendencies in the two 
communities that marked the third quarter of the nineteenth century 
gave rise to social hostility and religious bigotry, culminating in 
a number of race riots in this century. The two communities sought 
to realize their competing interests through two separate political 
parties. Among the Bengali Muslims, while the upper classes d e ­
sired political control of a territory of their own, the underpri­
vileged majority primarily desired economic emancipation. By the 
late 1940s the British were in a position to relinquish their power 
in India, and in 19^+7 India and Pakistan became two separate in­
dependent states. The bloodbath that followed in the wake of the 
Partition of Bengal left bitter memories in the two communities, 
but the Bengali Muslims were secure in the knowledge that they no 
longer had to suffer economic deprivation at the hands of Bengali 
H i n d u s .
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Chapter 3 
THE FORMATIVE YEARS, 1971 - 1972
The previous chapter dealt with the background to the Hindu- 
Muslim rivalry in Bengal. We saw how the Hindus, displaced from 
power and status during the six centuries of Muslim rule, were 
able to make a considerable comeback vis-a-vis the Muslims under 
colonial rule and how the resulting incompatibility between the 
two had led to the partition of British India in August 1947.
This chapter is specifically concerned with the period of 
the armed struggle for the independence of East Pakistan and its 
immediate aftermath. The images, perceptions and expectations that 
the Indians and the East Bengalis had of each other will be d i s ­
cussed. Equally important, the realities and perceptions current 
in the two countries in this period will be examined in order that 
the context in which the Indo-Bang1adesh relations developed can 
be properly understood.
I
By the end of the sixties, there were discernible changes in 
the attitudes of the East Bengalis (East Pakistanis) towards the 
Indians and vice versa. Broadly speaking, at least three explana­
tory factors may be offered: the growing alienation of the East 
Bengalis from West Pakistan; unsuccessful attempts by the Pakistani 
rulers to infuse a n t i - 1ndianism among the East Bengalis; and India's 
sensitivity to the political aspirations of the East Bengalis.
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What the East Bengalis thought they secured through partition, 
namely, the promise of economic wellbeing, they soon stood to lose 
in Pakistan. What followed in the next twenty-four years was m a s ­
sive economic exploitation of the East Pakistanis by the military- 
industrial oligarchy based in West Pakistan and controlled by the 
Muslim League. The economic relations between the two provinces 
transformed East Pakistan into a veritable colony of West Pakistan.^ 
The feeling of neglect that the East Bengalis experienced had a 
double effect; memories of their pre-partition experiences began 
to recede into the background as the exploitation by West Pakistan 
came into sharper relief. N o t  only were the attention of the East 
Bengalis focussed on how to contain this economic exploitation, they 
also had to contend with the Muslim League's effort to arabicize 
their language and Islamize their culture.
This alienation had started even before 1947. The East Bengalis
had anticipated their special needs within the framework of Pakistan
at least as early as 1940. That year, the Lahore Resolution moved
by East Bengal's Fazlul Haq had visualized two independent sovereign
states for the Muslims of India, but in April 1946 at the Muslim
League Legislators' Convention in Delhi, this was amended to esta-
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blish one Pakistan with East-West partnership. Thus East Bengal's
1. Government of East Pakistan, Planning Department, Economic Dis­
parities Between East and West P a k i s t a n , 1963; Government of 
Pakistan, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Central Statistical O f ­
fice, Twenty Years of Pakistan in Statistics, 1947-67; Planning 
Comm i s s i o n , The Mid-Plan Review of the Third Five Year P l a n ,
1965~70 and Final Evaluation of the Second Five Year P l a n ; 
Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey of Pakistan, 1961-68. For 
some excellent studies of the economic relations between the two 
provinces, see Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National In­
tégrât ion, New York: Columbia University Press, 1972; Edward S. 
Mason et.al., Conflict in East Pakistan: Background and Prospects 
in Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 
Bangladesh Documents, vol. 1, pp. 9“14
2. M.A. Zaman, "Emergence of Bangladesh: Its Historical Perspective", 
Civilization, vol. 25 (1975), p. 273, fn. 3
attempt at autonomous statehood was nullified by the Muslim League 
leadership with the argument that the amendment would serve the 
greater national interest. In the subsequent years, inter-wing 
politics was wholly dominated by the continuous attempts of the 
East Bengalis to secure a fair deal from the Pakistan Government 
and by the latter's suppression of all such attempts.
In 1948, within a year after independence, there were already 
grumblings of discontent in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan 
as East Bengalis complained of "being neglected and treated merely
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as a 'Colony1 of Western Pakistan". During his first visit to East
Pakistan, Mohammad A 1i Jinnah, the first Governor General of Pakistan,
ina public meeting dismissed Bengali - spoken by 56 percent of the
population of Pakistan - as a state language and asserted that Urdu
Ij
- spoken by less than 6 percent - would be the state language.
This precipitated a province-wide language movement which climaxed 
in the police firing on students on 21 February 1952, and with that 
the floodgate of a new nationalism in East Pakistan opened up; since 
then, the East Bengalis have observed 21 February as the 'Day of 
Martyrs' {Shaheed Dibosh).
After the Indo-Pakistan war of September 1965, the Pakistan 
Government's decision to sever all trade and communication links 
between East Pakistan and the neighbouring Indian states adversely 
affected the East Bengalis' trading interests. The loss in trade
3. Khalid B. Sayeed, The Political System of P a k i s t a n , Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1967, p . 64
4. For the details on the arguments and counter-arguments between 
Jinnah and the East Bengali students on the language issue, see 
Kamruddin Ahmed, A Socio Political History of Bengal and the 
Birth of Bangladesh, 4th ed., Dhaka 1975, PP- 100-101
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was supplanted by greater inter-wing trade, to East Bengal's e c o n o ­
mic detriment."* Indian music, movies and literature, particularly 
Bengali Nobel laureate Rabindranath Tagore's works, were also banned. 
Years later Sheikh Mujib summed up the East Bengali sentiments:
These upstarts £west Pakistanis] were completely 
oblivious of the fact that Tagore's contribution 
was something which the Bengali literature could 
not do wi t h o u t . ^
In 1968 charges of secessionist activities with Indian c o l l u ­
sion were brought against Mujib, some of his close colleagues and a 
few Bengali officers in the armed services.^ The Agartala Conspir­
acy Case, as it came to be known, was finally withdrawn for lack of 
sufficient evidence. And in 1971 when the Awami League won an a bso­
lute majority in the National Assembly in the first national elections 
in the country's history, Pakistan's then Chief Martial Law A d m i n i s ­
trator, General Yahya Khan, having publicly declared Mujib as the
g
next Prime Minister of Pakistan, two and a half months later con-
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demned him as a traitor. These incidents, though they provide only 
a partial picture, do serve to indicate some sense of the alienation 
the East Bengalis experienced in Pakistan.
The second factor that seemed to have contributed to the changes 
in the attitudes of the East Bengalis towards India was the ceaseless, 
though unsuccessful, attempts by the Pakistani rulers to infuse
5. Jahan, op.ci t . (1)
6. The Hindu (Madras), 12 January 1971, p. 5
7. Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Information Press Note, 
dated 5 January 1968, in The Pakistan Observer (Dhaka) 6 
January 19 6 8.
8. Bangladesh D o c u m e n t s , o p .ci t ., p. 144; Far Eastern Economic 
R e v i e w , TS December 1971, P- 6
9- Ibid., p. 276
anti-Indian sentiments among them. Pre-partition experiences would 
suggest that East Bengalis should have been more anti-Hindu and anti- 
Indian than West Pakistanis. Indeed, East Bengalis were much more 
enthusiastic about a Muslim Pakistan than the rest of the Muslims in 
the subcontinent. As noted in the previous chapter, it was the d e ­
cisive mandate in favour of the division of India into two states 
given by the Muslims of undivided Bengal in the general election of 
1946 in British India that had clinched the issue for the Muslim 
League, and to which both the Congress and the British Raj had to 
concede. In 1947 when Pakistan came into being East Pakistan was 
more pro-Pakistani than the Western wing possibly because "it had 
greater bitter experiences of communal d i s c r i m i n a t i o n " . ^
But economic reasons were in the forefront. Before 1947, West 
Bengal, comprising merely one-third the territory of Bengal, c o m ­
pletely dominated Bengal politically and economically. This was 
possible because East Bengal served as its hinterland. After 1947,
West Bengal became a dwarfed state in the Indian Union because its 
hinterland had become a part of Pakistan. The relative importance 
of the two Bengals thus changed. Psychologically, for the Bengali 
Muslims, separate statehood removed many of the causes for bitter­
ness and hatred towards the Bengali Hindus and therefore towards 
India. There was little scope for continued adversary relations 
between the two Bengals, and whatever contact there was between them 
was regulated at the Union level. The leaders of East Bengal, now 
East Pakistan, were primarily concerned with defining the political 
and economic role their province would play in the new-born Pakistan
58.
10. Zaman, o p . c i t . , p. 275
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state and "did not share the passionate anti-Indian and anti-Hindu
But the leaders of West Pakistan, who now constituted the M u s ­
lim League leadership, were still preoccupied with the two-nation 
theory, the fundamental premise of which was the Hindu-Muslim di-
Hindu India so long as territorial disputes arising out of p arti­
tion, such as the Kashmir problem, were not resolved to their 
satisfaction. For them, it was necessary that the communal iden­
tity be prolonged.
In the March 1954 provincial elections in East Pakistan, the
governing party, the Muslim League with its communal orientation,
was routed by the secular-oriented United Front, composed of H a q 1 s
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Krishak Sramik Party and Suhrawardy's Awami League. The newly- 
elected Chief Minister of East Pakistan, Fazlul Haq, paid an o f f i ­
cial visit to Calcutta where, on 30 April 1954, he publicly d e ­
clared: "I do not believe that the political division of a country 
could by itself necessarily remove the bases of contact, friendship 
and mutual dependence [between East Bengal and West " . ^
11. Mizanur Rahman Shelly, Emergence of a New Nation in a Multipolar 
World: B a n g l a d e s h , Dhaka: University Press Ltd., 1977, p. 53
12. However, having got Pakistan, Jinnah, as the first President of 
the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, made a policy declaration 
that suggested that the communal approach to politics would 
henceforth be downplayed. But within six months of this policy 
statement, he began to speak of Islamic socialism and democracy. 
Ahmed, o p .c i t . , p. 102
feelings of the principally non-Bengali Pakistani e s t a b l i s h m e n t " . ^
chotomy. They were unable to overcome their differences with
13• Ibid. , p p . 113“H  4
14. Morning News (Dhaka), 10 May 1954; The Statesman (Calcutta),
3 May 1954
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Wi t h i n  w e e k s  H a q 1 s G o v e r n m e n t  was d i s m i s s e d .  **
In 1965 when, under Soviet mediation, the Tashkent Declaration
was signed to end the Indo-Pakistan war, in West Pakistan there were
cries of sell-out to the 'enemy' whereas in East Pakistan it was
16
hailed and accepted. These and other incidents made East Pakistani 
leaders suspect in the eyes of the West Pakistan-based non-Bengali 
central leadership, and this divergence in their perceptions of India 
increased the alienation between the two.
Political leaders in India were aware of these differing a t t i ­
tudes of the peoples of the two provinces towards India. Unless 
issues of vital national interest were at stake, such as the sharing
15. The reason for this dismissal is unclear. According to Shelly, 
Haq's 'pro-India' leanings might have been the reason. But 
Ahmed suggests that the United Front's leftist leanings and
its stand on the question of autonomy for East Pakistan caused 
its dismissal. It should be remembered that during this period 
Pakistan had joined SEATO and was considering the Mutual De­
fence Assistance Agreement with the USA and also the Baghdad 
Pact. After the Front's victory, its elected members and 
those outside the Assembly had signed a joint statement c a l l ­
ing upon the central Government to stay clear of military pacts. 
In any case, two months after the election there were planned 
labour riots and thousands of workers were killed in Dhaka and 
in Chittagong Hill Tracts. The central Government immediately 
dismissed the United Front ministry and declared an emergency 
in East Pakistan. See, Shelly, o p .c i t ., p. 55; Ahmed, o p .c i t ., 
pp. 115-117; and Pran Chopra ed. The Challenge of Bangladesh 
Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1971, pp. 25-25.
16. The primary reason for East Pakistan's support for the Tashkent 
Declaration may have been the feeling of insecurity that p er­
vaded the East Bengalis because East Pakistan had been left 
totally undefended against possible Indian attack. It may 
also be recalled that Foreign Minister Zulfiqar A 1 i Bhutto 
subsequently resigned from the Ayub cabinet and publicly c o n ­
demned the Government for betraying the country's interests. 
Bhutto also launched his People's Party of Pakistan with an 
eye on capitalizing on the anti-Indian hysteria of the West 
Pakistanis, to which he had personally contributed by decl a r ­
ing a thousand years' war on India. See, Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 25 December 1971, p. 5; 8 January 1972, p. 3.
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of the Ganges waters with East Pakistan, India's disposition towards
East Pakistan seemed on the whole to be non-a n t a g o n i s t i c .^  In fact,
when occasion permitted, West Bengalis sympathized with the East
Bengalis in their grievances against West Pakistan. For instance,
in 1948 when the language movement was launched in East Pakistan in
response to Jinnah's insensitive anti-Bengali remarks, the literate
circle in West Bengal gave its full sympathy and support to the East
Bengali demand that Bengali be made one of the national languages 
18
of Pakistan. While this could not have been entirely a matter of 
altruism or Bengali solidarity, it did create if not a fellow feel­
ing between the two Bengals a rift between the two Pakistans. This 
was of course viewed by Jinnah as a "sinister phenomenon", a machina-
1Q
tion of the "political agencies and organs of the Indian Press".
What a n n o y e d  the East Bengalis further was that Jinnah chose only to
comment on the Indian reaction, remaining silent in the face of the
20
genuine concerns expressed by the East Pakistanis.
When the Pakistan Government declared after the 1965 war that
the defence of East Pakistan was left to the Chinese, East Bengalis
were shocked. Citing the above, General Fazal Muqueem Khan wrote:
For the first time since independence in 1947 
they [East Pakistanis] felt insecure and h elp­
less. The bonafides and efficacy of a strong 
Centre became suspect in their e y e s ^ j
17- This could have been due to the presence of a large Hindu m i n o r ­
ity in East B e n g a 1.
18. Amrita Bazar Patrika (Calcutta), 27 February 1948; Ananda Bazar 
Patrika (Calcutta), 27 February 1948.
19- Jinnah's radio broadcast from Dhaka on 28 March 1948, cited in 
Z.A. Bhutto, The Great T r a g e d y , Karachi: People's Party Publica­
tions, 1971, p. 4; S h e l 1y , o p T c i t ., p. 54.
20. For details, see Ahmed, o p .c i t ., pp. 9 9”101
21. Pakistan's Crisis in L e a d e r s h i p , Lahore: National Book Founda­
tion, 1973, p.7
the opinion that East Bengal was a 'separate entity' with which
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India had no quarrel. It appears that this particular view was 
based on an informed assessment of a growing secular territorial 
nationalism in East Pakistan which, to the Indian leaders, promised 
to be an effective counter to the religion-based a n t i - Indianism of 
West Pakistan. Thus Indian Prime Minister Lai Bahadur Shastri 
decided not to invade East Pakistan in September 1965 on the a d ­
vice of the then Indian Chief of Army Staff, General J. Choudhury,
who, being a Bengali himself, was "more sensitive to the political
23
advantages of making the gesture". Indeed, this gesture would 
seem to have paid dividends in 1971 when the dissident political 
leaders of East Pakistan appealed for and secured Indian assistance 
to create Bangladesh.
The Pakistani leadership had failed to instil any fanatic anti- 
Indianism among the East Bengalis primarily because of the latter's 
pre-deposition towards a secular approach to politics and because 
of what appears to be the Indian leaderships' deft handling of the 
people of East Bengal. The socio-economic and political discrimina­
tion suffered by the East Pakistanis at the hands of the West Pakis­
tani m i 1 itary-industria 1-bureaucratic oligarchy remained the do m i n ­
ant issue in their minds and, in some sense, this contributed to 
the lessening of reservations towards India.
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Fortunately for the East Pakistanis, the Indian leadership was of
22. Pran Chopra, India's Second L i b e r a t i o n , Delhi: Vikas, 1973, 
pp. 66-67
23. Ibid.
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Events in East Pakistan took a turn for the worse after the 
Awami League's victory in the December 1970 elections in which it 
secured 167 of the 169 seats in East Pakistan, giving it an a b s o ­
lute majority in the Pakistan National Assembly. With the P akis­
tan Army standing to lose the most, the League's autonomy platform, 
on the basis of which it won the election, was now seen to be a 
threat to the country's unity, and the Martial Law Authority p ost­
poned the opening of the National Assembly.
The growing internal disorder took an ominous turn when an 
Indian plane was hijacked to Lahore and blown up, with the hijackers 
receiving a hero's welcome at the airport from Zulfiqar A 1i Bhutto, 
the new majority party leader in West Pakistan. An influential 
Dhaka daily, Tne People, strongly supported India's demand for c om­
pensation and accused the Government of "unpardonable neglect" in
24
permitting the "mad action of the two hijackers". Another prom­
inent Bengali daily, Purbodesh stated that "isolated incidents like
hijacking will not serve any purpose except to complicate India-
25
Pakistan relations further".
On 1 March 1971, Indira Gandhi and the 'progressive' wing of 
the ruling Congress Party were returned to power with a strong m a n ­
date (an increment of her party's seats in Parliament from 228 to 
350) in a snap national election in India. There was jubilation
24. The H i n d u , 13 February 1971, p. 9
25. Ibid.
in East Pakistan as, in numerous public meetings, hopes were e x ­
pressed that "better days for India and Bangladesh are not far
off, and that border trade between the two countries will resume
26
again". Trade between the two countries had been suspended in
27
the aftermath of the 1965 war. During his December campaign,
Mujib himself had talked of the need to restore Indo-Pakistani
2 8
trade and to establish mutually beneficial relations.
On the same day, the East Pakistanis launched a movement of 
civil disobedience to protest the postponement of the opening of 
the National Assembly. The Calcutta station of the state-owned 
All India Radio began regular, sympathetic coverage of the d eve­
lopments, resulting in a growing pro-East Bengal sentiment in West 
2°)
Bengal. " On the night of 25 March 1971 the Pakistan Army formally 
took over the authority to govern in East Pakistan.
It is not clear whether there were any contacts between Mujib 
and the Indian Government during the very tense Mujib-Yahya neg o ­
tiations immediately prior to the Army takeover in East P a k i s t a n . ^
But the subsequent nine months provided ample opportunity for the
64.
26. Ibid., 16 March 1971, p. 6
27. Bang 1a d e s h , Washington D.C.: Embassy of Bangladesh, vol. 2, 
no. 23, 17 November 1972, p. 4
28. The H i n d u , 16 March 1971.
29. Ibid. , 12 March 1971, p. 8
30. There have been official denials of any such contact. But a c ­
cording to Captain (Rtd) M.S. Ali, an Awami League Member of 
Parliament who served as a courier between Muj i b and the Indian 
Deputy High Commissioner in Dhaka, in March 1971, Mujib received 
a message from Indira Gandhi that read: "If you are for total 
independence, we shall be with you all the way". This could 
not be corroborated. Interview in Dhaka in July 1985*
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Indira Government and the Bangladesh Provisional Government in 
Calcutta to identify their respective positions and interests and 
coordinate their activities.
Initially the Indira Government was anxious to ascertain the 
political orientation of the leadership behind the East Bengali 
armed struggle. When by the second week of April it was learned 
that the resistence was under the command of the Awami League and 
that most of the party's senior leaders had fled to India, Mrs.
Gandhi acquiesced in the formation of a Provisional Government in 
C a 1 c u t t a .^ ^
The die was cast. Not only was there no turning back for the 
Indira Government, Mrs. Gandhi also had to make sure that the League 
was victorious. Should the Pakistan Army succeed in its policies in 
East Pakistan, her Government would be permanently saddled with the 
politically embarrassing presence of the Provisional Government, and 
the large number of refugees who would comp 1 icate West Bengal politics. 
Not only would any hope of political reconciliation with the East 
Bengalis be denied, relations with Pakistan would be permanently 
damaged, thus adversely affecting India's image in the Muslim M i d ­
dle East, in the Nonaligned Movement and in the Commonwealth. Worst 
of all, continuation of the crisis would result in greater regional 
instability and in an increased scope for external interference.
For the Provisional Government and its supporters defeat would 
mean permanent exile, and a struggle of attrition would mean the 
loss of leadership and transfer of control of the resistance to the
31. Shelly, o p .c i t . , pp. 60-61
leftist forces. In either case, India was their only hope. Out 
of this political contretemps was born an entente oordiale co m ­
mitting both Governments to the same goal.
But, in I n d i a , outside the ruling circle there was a feeling that not
enough was being done to aid the East Bengalis. It was suggested
in the Lok Sabha that India should invoke the Genocide Convention
and mobilize support for the East Bengalis in the United Nations
32
and in the internationa1 community. Mr. Hiren Mukherjee of the
Communist Party of India stated:
Bangla Desh, to which so many of us here in 
this House also belong, is bleeding from a 
thousand wounds, because the people have risen 
in a revolution, almost without precedent in 
history and are now being sought to be punish­
ed by those who do not know anything but the 
law of the j u n g l e . ^
Mr. Samar Guha of the Praja Socialist Party said that the d e ­
claration of independence of Bangladesh "had given an opportunity
34
to undo the misery from the partition of Bengal". And the Jan
Sangh Parliamentary Group voted to sponsor an adjournment motion
in the Lok Sabha to censure the Government for its failure to re-
35
cognize Bangladesh. The Bangladesh Provisional Government also
requested recognition by the Indian Government on three occasions.
The fourth request was made on 4 December 1971:
Our joint stand against military machinations 
of Pakistan would be further facilitated if we 
entered into formal diplomatic relations with
66.
32. The H i n d u , 28 March 1971, p. 9
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid. , 23 May 1971 , p. 9
each other. May we, therefore, repeat our 
request to Your Excellency that the Gove r n ­
ment of India accord immediate recognition 
to our country and our G o v e r n m e n t . ^
On 18 April 1971 the Pakistani Deputy High Commission in Calcutta
was taken over by the mission's Bengali members, who swore allegiance
37
to the Provisional Government. India disregarded Pakistan's pr o ­
testations and demand to hand over the Bengali staff, thus putting 
its own representation in Dhaka at risk. On the contrary, the West 
Bengal Government provided the Provisional Government with official 
quarters. The Union Government provided sanctuary, training and w e a ­
pons to the Mukti Bahini (Liberation Force). India also provided 
finances, diplomatic assistance to mobilize international opinion 
in favour of the East Bengalis and political advice and guidance. 
India's ambassador to the Soviet Union and confidant to Indira 
Gandhi, D.P. Dhar, was appointed as liaison man with an office in 
C a 1c u t t a .
But these were not without irritations, and tense moments o c c a s ­
ionally surfaced. Dhar's actions were at times found to be pompous. 
According to Ambassador Abul Fateh, a liaison officer in the Provi­
sional Government:
He was a bit imposing. Dhar called a meeting 
of all secretaries in the Provisional Govern­
ment around December 1971 [^without approval 
from the Provisional Government] . I person­
ally found it irksome and did not attend
36. Ibid. , 7 December 1971, p. 12; for the contents of the letters 
from the Provisional Government to the Indian Government urging 
Indian recognition, see Bangladesh D o c u m e n t s , pp. 578-587
37- Financial Times (London), 19 April 1971
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38. Interview in Dhaka on 5 June 1985
Perhaps the greatest irritation was India's role in the forma­
tion and training of the Mujib Bahini (Mujib Force). The issue of 
creating such a force was discussed and rejected by the Provisional 
Government perhaps because of its fear that this force led by the 
militant wing of the party could pose a challenge to its authority, 
particularly since the latter saw itself as the true bearer of M u j i b 's 
ideology. But India gave full support to its creation and provided
39
it with arms and special training. The Indira Government allegedly
viewed the Mujib Bahini as an auxiliary force to maintain control
40
over the situation should the Mukti Bahini get out of control.
It would seem logical that the Indira Government would wish to make
sure that the leadership of the resistance remained in the Mujib
fold, but this was not appreciated by the Provisional Government,
particularly since the two Bahinis found themselves on a few occa-s-
41
ions pitched against each other.
There was also some difficulty at the political level. In May 
1971 the Central Committee of the pro-Moscow East Bengal Communist 
Party suggested the formation of a National Liberation Front com p r i ­
sing all the parties fighting in the struggle. It was argued that 
formation of such a front would unite all the political parties and 
their followers in a common cause, and that the picture of unity
would help to secure the support of all the progressive forces in
hi
the world, including the socialist bloc. The Indian Government,
39- For details see Abdul Wadud Bhuiyan, Emergence of Bangladesh 
and Role of Awami L e a g u e , New D e 1h i : V i kas , 1982, pp. 248-249
40. Ibid., Also Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 February 1972, p. 18
41. Ibid.
68.
42. I b i d . , p. 250
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though committed to the League, found the proposal attractive and 
useful and strongly recommended it to the Provisional Government.
But the Awami League was adamant, perhaps out of fear of creating 
precedents for similar claims on the Government after independence.
On 9 September 1971, a compromise was reached and a Consultative 
Committee was formed that included the chiefs of four pro-indepen-
43
dence parties.
If the Provisional Government had any doubts about the Indian
Government, Indians too, it appears, had doubts about the Provisional
Government. According to Inder Malhotra, editor of the Times of India.
A large segment of the informed public thought 
it was basically a phony government, but after 
liberation Bangladesh will sort out its problems 
...One could see there were internal strains...
Its weaknesses became evident to me on the day 
of liberation and a few days later. We got re­
ports that this government was reluctant to go 
to Dhaka. Dhar needed a lot of persuasion.
That is when the imperfection surfaced. It b e ­
came evident that this government's ability to ^  
govern was poor. Only M u j i b 1s prestige was high.
It appears that even the Mukti Bahini had doubts about the Provisional
45
Government's leadership capability, and the people in Dhaka shared
• u , u 46 in that doubt.
43- They were Maulana Bhashani of the pro-China National Awami Party, 
Moni Singh of the East Pakistan Communist Party, Muzaffar Ahmed 
of the pro-Moscow National Awami Party and Monoranjan Dhar of 
the newly founded Bangladesh Congress Party.
44. Interview in New Delhi on 26 April 1985
45. Bhuiyan, o p .ci t ♦ , p. 248
46. Across-the-board random interviews with people in Dhaka who re­
call the events of late 1971 reveal that a surprisingly large 
number believed at the time that the members of the Provisional 
Government mainly gourmandized and womanized in Calcutta while 
the Mukti Bahini boys were actually fighting for their country. 
These interviews were conducted in May-August 1985.
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The Indian support for the East Bengali struggle was based on 
a number of expectations. One was that the League after it came to 
power would establish a secular democratic government, and India 
would no longer have to contend with another military dictatorship 
on its borders. This was a logical expectation on the part of the 
Indian leaders, given the political evolution undergone by the East 
Bengalis and the Awami League. It was also one rationale for the 
Congress (l) to throw its support behind the League.
The diversity in religious systems and beliefs in India had 
forced the Congress Party to adopt a secular platform at its in­
ception in 1885; this secular orientation of the Congress continued 
and, at times, was even externalized. After 19^+7 one important 
"consequence of this underlying, pervasive psychology of the Indian 
elite was the tendency to sympathize with and, if possible, enco u r ­
age those political forces within Pakistan which stood for secular-
47
ism in politics and underplayed the Islamic theme".
48
The League had opted for the secular path in 1955. By the 
mid-1960s the League was in the vanguard of the East Bengali nationa­
list movement that challenged the state ideology of Muslim nationalism. 
As the party attracted followers and became, like the pre-1947 Co n ­
gress, an umbrella party, its values and ideals came to be subsumed
47- Shelly, o p .c i t . , p. 52
48. M. R a s h i d u z z a m a n , "The Awami League in the Political Develop­
ment of Pakistan", Asian Survey, vol. 10, no. 7, July 1970, 
pp. 575-576
Lq
under the rubric of secularism, socialism and democracy; by 1971 
it had the proper credentials to seek and secure Indian assistance.
However, it must be noted here that secularism as understood 
and practised in Incfia was quite different from the secularism 
practised in Bangladesh. In India, the concept of secularism has 
come to mean the equal right of all religious groups to voice their 
political b e l i e f s . ^  This interpretation of secularism took after 
the Gandhian belief that all human endeavour should be directed to 
the quest for truth, which has no prescribed p a t h . ^  Different co m ­
munities would take to different paths in search of the truth, and 
in the modern state structure that would be reflected in the various 
political orientations and organisations of the communities. The 
rel igion-based pol i t ical parties in India, such as the Jan Sangh, 
the Jama 'at i Islam3 and t h eAkali Dal were such manifestations.
In East Pakistan, secularism as practised by the Awami League 
was similar to that of the Congress. But after independence the 
concept of secularism underwent a qualitative change; it was given 
a more literal interpretation: separation of religion from all 
worldly matters. The League leadership believed that the communal- 
ist approach to the practice of statecraft, as in Pakistan from 
19^7 to 1971, was a primary cause of alienation within the society,
49. The drift towards socialism and secularism was aided by the pre­
sence of members of leftist parties, including the Communist Par­
ty which had penetrated the Awami League in the fifties. Thus
in the Provisional Government, excepting Muj i b , the top two were 
formerly of leftist parties.
50. Imtiaz Ahmed, Class, Underlying Values and Indian Foreign P o l i c y , 
Seminar paper, D h a k a : Bang 1adesh Inst i tute of Internat i onaI and 
Strategic Studies, 1985, P- 21
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and therefore took an early stand against it by banning all reli-
52
gion-based parties in the future Bangladesh.
This was no doubt reinforced by the tactical necessity of the 
period. A public espousal of its secularist ideology in the period 
before independence brought for the League Government”in-Exi1e in­
stant support from all political parties in India; and after inde­
pendence, India's continued support was assured.
In the first official reaction to the events in East Pakistan,
Prime Minister Gandhi told the Lok Sobha:
Something new had happened in East Bengal - d e ­
mocratic elections in which an entire people had 
spoken with almost one voice. We had welcomed 
t h i s ... because the values for which the v i c tori­
ous Awami League stood were the values...for 
which we have always stood and for which we have 
always spoken o u t . ^
She underscored the ideological affinity between the two Governments
once again in her statement in the Rajya Sabha the same day:
We are interested in this mat t e r ... because Mujibur 
Rahman has stood for the values which we ourselves 
cherish - the values of democracy, the values of 
secularism, and the values of social i s m . ^
Thus the East Bengali struggle was of special significance to 
India because it appeared to vindicate India's secularist philosophy.
52. The H i n d u , 12 December 1971, p. 9
53. Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bang 1a- 
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Something new had happened in East Bengal - democratic 
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and for which we have always spoken out.
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According to one Indian scholar, "the struggle for Bangladesh 
dramatically exposed the inherent fallacy of the so-called two- 
nation theory (that the Hindus and Muslims of undivided India were 
two different nations)" and "has delivered, one hopes, a death blow 
to the creation of theocratic states in the middle of the Twentieth 
55
Century". According to another:
Bangladesh is an eloquent testimony against all 
such narrow definitions of national identity and 
citizenship. It clearly shows that the bond of 
religious unity is at best a tenuous one; and, 
in today's changing world, citizenship and nation- 
hood are political concepts and not religious ones.
The fact that the majority of Pakistan's Muslim population had 
sought India's assistance against fellow Muslims of West Pakistan 
and had also promised eternal friendship with India was of p ower­
ful propaganda value to India as it could be used to weaken the 
psychological attachment some Indian Muslims purportedly still 
felt for P a k i s t a n , ^  and to vitiate the forces of Hindu and Muslim 
c o m m u n a 1 i sm.
Statements by members of the Bangladesh Provisional Government 
added substance to the Indian leadership's expectations that Bangla­
desh when independent would pursue a secularist policy. At the 
height of the war, on 12 December 1971, before a gathering of over 
one hundred Indian and foreign press and media people, Syed Nazrul 
Islam, Acting President of the Provisional Government, announced 
the banning of four political parties in East Bengal for their
55. M.S. Rajan, "Bangladesh and After" Pac i fi c Affa i r s , vol. 45, 
no. 2, (Summer 1972), p. 191
56. Imtiaz Ahmed, "Psychological Repercussions" Seminar #150, 
February 1972, p. 20
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"anti-people and communal activities". He asserted that "no party 
with a communal outlook would be allowed to function in Bangladesh"
r O
and that "there would be absolute religious freedom in Bangladesh". 
The next day, he and Tajuddin Ahmed, the Prime Minister, both reaf­
firmed that "religion would have no place in politics in the new-born
republic" and that "Bangladesh would show to the world that all re-
59
ligions enjoyed equal respect in this country".
Such statements of assurance not only allayed whatever linger­
ing fear there was in the minds of East Bengal's Hindu minority, they 
also served to 'd e - s e n s i t i z e ' the West Bengalis who have always been 
particularly sensitive to the treatment East Bengali Hindus received 
in the Muslim state of Pakistan. They demonstrated to the Indian 
public that their Government's support for the Bangladesh movement 
did not go in vain; and the chances of an electoral victory for Con­
gress (I) in the CP I-control1ed West Bengal increased.
But for the Provisional Government a secular policy was more 
easily declared than implemented. Once the party came to power 
there was confusion among both its top leadership, including Mujib 
himself, and the rank and file as to what secularism was all about.
In retrospect, it appears that within the party secularism meant 
different things to different members and, in fact, to those members 
with an Islamic bent, secularism could very well have been a mere 
lip-service to the Hindu members.
Nevertheless, in the new state of Bangladesh secularism was
58. The H i n d u , 12 December 1971» p. 9 
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considered a necessary governing policy. As Foreign Minister Kamal 
Hossa i n recaI 1e d :
We did not want to carry over into our state this 
kind of communal ism which we saw being fomented in 
the last days of Pakistan. We also thought that 
for the whole of the subcontinent this might re­
present a new start because Pakistan in a sense 
had as its rationale the solving of the communal 
question. All of the communal riots, the communal 
bitterness that had characterized the Indian polity 
before 19^7, we thought 19^7 would solve that pr o ­
blem. Looking back thirty years we found that it 
had not...We did not want religion to be obtruding 
into political affairs in a way which would be d i ­
visive and we wanted that communal ism as an element 
should be exorcised from our national life. This 
was the main aspiration which led us to include 
secularism in our C o n s t i t u t i o n . ^
Though the party's secular philosophy was only tolerable to its 
minority rightist members, the Government's decision to incorporate 
secularism in the Constitution was, to some rightists, rather into­
lerable. Khondakar Mostaque Ahmed, a senior member of the Mujib 
Cab i net, a rgued :
If you are a socialist democracy, is it not self- 
evident that such a democracy ensuring equal rights 
to everybody should be secular as well? Then why 
this separate, unnecessary e m p h a s i s ? ^
A preliminary draft of the Bangladesh Constitution mentioned 
that Islam was the religion of the majority in Bangladesh, but that 
people belonging to other faiths would be free to practise their re­
ligion without hindrance. When it was placed on the floor for debate, 
there were loud protests from numerous Constituent Assembly members
who wanted the declaration on secularism to be a positive formula-
, , . . 6 2  
tion and not a grudging concession.
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Even with its inclusion in the Constitution as one of the four 
state pillars (others being socialism, nationalism and democracy), 
there remained a number of unanswered questions: do you invoke Allah 
in public speeches? Do you remain true to Islamic ideals and prac­
tices? Should religion have any role in public and political life? 
The Government was not able to give any clear direction.
In practice, the confusion increased. When the Constituent A s ­
sembly met for the first time in April 1972, the Speaker Shah Abdul 
Hamid, in keeping with "the wishes of the country's leaders that se­
cularism should be one of the four pillars of the Constitution",
ruled out the suggestion of a member that the Quran be read as an 
6 3
invocation. This went against the sentiments of some members.
The conflict between secular policy and Islamic sentiment was fin­
ally resolved by introducing readings from the Quran and also from 
the Gita, the latter in deference to the Hindu members of Parliament. 
Later, at the eighteenth sitting of the Second Session of the A s ­
sembly on 14 December 1972, Tripitak reading was also introduced so 
as not to offend the Buddhist minorities of the country.
But difficulties continued. When the resolution of condolence
for the martyrs of the war was being adopted, the Speaker requested
the members to stand for a minute in silence. Prime Minister Mujib
intervened to request a monajatj the traditional Islamic form of 
6?
prayer. But at a conference of the Bangla Students' Union where 
Mujib was present, a secular minute of silence was observed at the
63. I b i d .
64. Jatiyo Sangsad, Official P r o c e e d i n g s , 2nd Session, 1st Sitting, 
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It was obvious that the Government was not sure how to imple­
ment its secular policy, thus causing doubts in the public mind 
about its secular conviction. As a result many people thought that 
secularism was a manifestation of Indian influence, while a few 
actually believed it to be an Indian imposition. As Foreign S e ­
cretary Abul Fateh observed:
Secularism came by compulsion because Mujibnagar 
fjOvernment [[the Provisional Government] was in 
India and heavily dependent on India for moral, 
material and diplomatic support. Its secular po­
licy existed only to the extent that the party 
opened its doors to the H i n d u s . ^
To what extent it benefited the Hindus of Bangladesh is also 
uncertain. An Hindu minister of the Cabinet remained unconvinced 
that secularism would benefit the Hindus. According to this m i n i s ­
ter the days of Pakistan were far better because the Hindus were 
treated as a minority and given special privileges by law. But now 
in independent secular Bangladesh, special privileges were abolished
68
and the Hindus had to compete with the Muslims in all walks of life.
Obviously Fateh's and the Hindu minister's idea of secularism 
was rather limited, but that in fact seems to have been the general 
case. Only a few, like Dr. Kamal Hossain, could properly articulate it:
i n s istence of a student leader.
66. I b i d .
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terview in New Delhi in May 1985- Mr. Nayar had interviewed 
the Hindu minister in 1972.
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Secularism was a principle which had this very 
wide and liberal vision and it had nothing to 
do with trying to either keep the Hindus happy 
or giving some minorities some special privi­
leges. That was not the concept. The concept 
was to build a political order which would be 
free from these communal overtones.
o9
IV
A second expectation was that assistance to Bangladesh would 
bring an economic windfall to India. It was assumed that Bangla­
desh would readily engage in joint economic activities because the 
geographic reality of the Eastern region made it desirable and 
imperat i ve.
A free Bangla Desh will make possible mutually 
beneficial trade and economic relations between 
Bangla Desh and India. The restoration of the 
transport and trade links that geography di c ­
tates will reduce production costs all over the 
eastern region of the subcontinent. The ensuing 
vast and unified market would attract capital 
and industry. The dying economy of Bengal will 
be revitalized and its politics transformed in 
the long run.^g
India's strategic interest in oil exploration in Tripura would 
also be served. Instead of transporting the crude through pipelines 
via Assam to West Bengal, it could be transported to Bangladesh's 
coastal port of Chittagong by pipeline and from there by coastal 
vessels to India, with substantial savings in transportation costs.'7
But what was most emphasized both in and outside government was 
the economic complementarity between the two countries:
6 9 . Interview in Dhaka in July 1985
70. Ashok Sanjay Guha, "Bangla Desh and Indian Self-Interest" Econo 
mic and Political Weekly (Bombay), vol. v i , 15 May 1971, p . 9&3
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A friendly Bangla Desh will provide a natural 
market for Indian goods. Economically it will 
be a complementary system to West Bengal and 
give a substantial fillip to the sagging econo­
my of West Bengal in particular and eastern 
India in g e n e r a l .^
Proponents of this theory argued that "a collaborationist psychosis 
must govern India's chief financial decision makers" and that the 
Bangladesh currency would have to remain tied to the vicissitudes of 
the Indian rupee for quite some time because India would remain Bangla­
desh's "chief and dominant trading partner". Further, Bangladesh
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could get most of its required manufactured goods from India.
It was assumed that Indian capital and business interests would 
forge suitable links with indigenous interests in Bangladesh because 
"are not labour costs in Bangla Desh lower than in Eastern India?"
The resulting joint venture activities would "pave the way for a 
genuine integration of the economy of Bangla Desh with the economy
74
of Eastern India". An independent East Bengal would therefore 
"confer immense benefits on the people of Bangladesh and those of 
the Indian states surrounding Bangladesh, which had for centuries, 
and until 19^7, an integrated e c o n o m y " . ^
Thus the literature of the period is replete with suggestions 
of how Bangladesh's independence would be an economic boom for the 
entire eastern region of the subcontinent. But much of these
72. J. B h a t t a c h a r j e e , "Case for Indian Military Intervention" Econo- 
mic and Political W e e k l y , vol. vi, no. 27, 3 July 1971, p. 1323
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expectations were belied by political realities. With the e x c e p ­
tion of Mrs. Gandhi and perhaps a few others, neither in government 
nor outside it was there any recognition that with the very fact of 
Bangladesh becoming independent, it would have to emphasize its 
national priorities over the regional priorities. It was simply 
assumed that Bangladesh would have no objection to becoming part 
of a regional integrative economic arrangement. That such an 'in­
tegrated economy' had once made East Bengal the hinterland of the 
Calcutta metropolis, and that the social, economic and political 
ramifications thereof had caused much disaffection between the 
Bengali Hindus and Muslims, were overlooked.
The year 1972 started with the trip of the country's first
Foreign Minister, Abdus Samad Azad, to New Delhi in order to lay
the groundwork for an Indo-Bang1adesh economic accord. The result
was a trade agreement signed on 28 March 1972 immediately after
Mrs. Gandhi's visit to Dhaka. Article 4 of that agreement -
In order to meet the day to day requirements of 
the people living within a sixteen kilometre belt 
of the border between West Bengal , Assam, M e g h a ­
laya, Tripura and Mizoram on the one hand and 
Bangla Desh on the other, and with a view to pro­
viding facilities to these peoples to dispose of 
their goods, border trade shall be allowed in 
specified c o m m o d i t i e s ...
77
- fulfilled the campaign promises of both leaders.
Previously, during Mujib's visit to Calcutta, it had been agreed 
by the two Prime Ministers that regular talks, consultations and visits 
of delegations would take place between the two countries to facilitate
76. Bangladesh D o c u m e n t s , op.ci t . , vol. II, p. 649
77. Ibid., pp. 643-644
cooperation in the fields of development and trade; that interstate 
trade would be on a state-to-state basis; and that representatives 
of Bangladesh and Indian Planning Commissions should meet periodical 1 
to identify areas of mutual cooperation in the development processes
r l. . 7 8
of the two countries.
In the Joint Declaration of the two Prime Ministers during Mrs.
Gandhi's visit to Dhaka, it was further decided that
in order to strengthen cooperation between the 
two countries, regular consultations shall be 
held between the officials of the Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs, Defence, Planning Commissions 
and the Ministries and Departments dealing with 
economic, commercial, cultural and technical a f ­
fairs of the two Governments. Such consultation 
will take place periodically, at least once every 
six months.
/y
Thus from the outset the two countries seemed to lay down the basis 
for an 'integrated' economic plan for the region. Though MujIb never 
spoke of the 'complementary' nature of the Bangladesh and Indian 
economies, the left-oriented former Prime Minister and current Fin­
ance and Planning Minister, Tajuddin Ahmed, frequently stressed the 
comp 1ementary nature of the two economies and the unqualified b ene­
fits to be had from an integrated approach to the economic issues
8o
affecting the two countries. Within three months, however, the 
border trade agreement ran into difficulty. This will be discussed 
in Chapter 5-
Three specific expectations of the Indian trade and financial
78. Bangladesh D o c u m e n t s , vol. II, o p .c i t . p. 637 
79- Ibid., pp. 643-644
80. The H i n d u , 10 June 1972, p. 1. He also rejected aid from the
US; see, Far Eastern Economic Review 19 February 1972, p. 18;
15 November 1974, p. 3^
circles went unfulfilled, however. The Indian jute industry had 
been unable to compete with the Pakistan jute industry because 
the export of jute from East Bengal had been at a heavily subsi­
dized price and without export duty. The jute industry circle in 
West Bengal expressed the hope that the "Bangladesh government 
will take early steps towards the fixation of fair price for its
jute exports in the international market, to ensure mutually bene-
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ficial collaboration in jute industry between the two countries".
There was also the hope that India and Bangladesh would make 
joint efforts in regard to exports of jute and tea, the two pro­
ducts in which Pakistan and India competed for international m a r ­
kets. Foreign Minister Swaran Singh downplayed it, saying that the 
question of joint endeavour "would rise only after the Bangladesh
government has evolved trade and development plans in the light of
82
its requirements".
The third expectation was that Indian private capital would 
have access to the Bangladesh market. But the Deputy Minister for 
External Affairs told the Rajya Sabha that Indian private capital 
would not be allowed initially into Bangladesh at the latter's e x ­
press wish and Indian economic aid would be channelled through state 
83
agencies. Dissenting voices, however, felt that "it would be
impractical, given the character of the two economies, to ban trade
84
through private channels". This did not dampen the enthusiasm
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of Indian businessmen who continued to dream of lucrative economic 
cooperation between the two countries. There was even the sugges­
tion of a free trade area or a customs union comprising the two 
countries. But solitary voices advised caution:
Talk about either a 'free trade area' or a 
'customs union' at this time is certainly u n ­
realistic and may even prove detrimental to 
Bangladesh which is still industrially very 
much less developed as compared to its n eigh­
bouring regions of West Bengal. Such an a r ­
rangement would perpetuate Qthe^ industrial 
backwardness of Bangladesh leading to possi­
ble misunderstanding between the two countries 
...In the interest of maintaining better re­
lations, it may be more worthwhile thinking 
in terms of evolving an area of preferential 
tariff arrangements conducive to the indus­
trial development of Bangladesh.g
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Besides the expected economic windfall, there was also the hope 
that once Bangladesh became independent, India's defence and security 
problems in the east would be considerably reduced.
Territorial division of British India had resulted in a grave 
security problem for the Indian Union. "Moth-eaten" Pakistan, as 
Jinnah described it, flanked India on two sides, doubling India's 
defence needs. Since 19^8 Pakistan had invaded India four times. 
The 1962 Sino-lndian border incident had caught India unawares and 
considerably heightened its sense of insecurity. To all this must 
be added the secessionist activities in its eastern states border­
ing Burma and China.
85. Ibid.
The independence of Bangladesh with Indian assistance would, 
it was expected, bring the League to power, thus ensuring a friend­
ly government with professed secular democratic values. Besides, 
the East Bengalis who had suffered the odium of military dictator­
ship would ensure that the military never gained the upper hand in 
the country's politics. In any case, Bangladesh surrounded by 
friendly India would not require a strong military, thus consider­
ably alleviating the Eastern Command's previous preoccupation with 
the East Pakistan border.
A friendly Bangladesh would also mean little or no Chinese or 
American influence in Bangladesh's politics and certainly not as 
much as in Pakistan, where this influence contributed to its anti- 
Indian posture. It was also expected that the secessionists and 
terrorists in its rebellious eastern states would no longer get 
sanctuary, training and arms as they used to from the Pakistan 
G o v e r n m e n t .
Thus, India stood to gain a lot by assisting the League to come 
to power in a free Bangladesh. Whether these expectations were rea­
lized will be discussed in subsequent chapters.
VI
The Indira Government's recognition of Bangladesh on 6 December 
1971 was hailed by Indian opposition leaders as a "bold and courageous" 
decision that would open a "golden chapter in the history of the 
Indian sub-continent". While Jyotirmoy Basu of CPl(M) called it 
"the day of days since 1947", Jan Sangh leader, Vajpayee, spoke of
84.
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"a relationship which will not yield to pressure of any diplomacy".
Khondakar Mostaque Ahmed, Foreign Minister in the Provisional 
Government, hoped that "the great nation of India and the emerging 
nation of Bangladesh can supplement and complement each other a c ­
cording to their capabilities to put up the monumental example of
8 7
peaceful co-existence under the principle of Panch Sheel". Abdus
Samad A z a d , the first Foreign Minister of Bangladesh said:
Mrs. Gandhi's name will be written in golden 
letters in the history of Bangla Desh. Every 
word, every commitment she has given to Bangla 
Desh including her commitment as to the recog­
nition of Bangla Desh and its timing has been 
honoured by her.gg
After Bangladesh's independence the fund of gratitude and g o o d ­
will for India seemed almost inexhaustible. On Mujib's return home, 
Mrs. Gandhi's portrait was carried alongside Mujib during the m o t o r ­
cade. Bangladeshis made numerous requests to Indian visitors for 
portraits of Mrs. Gandhi to adorn their houses as a token of grati-
j 89t u d e .
On his way home after his release from Pakistan, Mujib stopped 
in New Delhi to thank the people and the Government of India for 
helping Bangladesh make the journey from "darkness to light, c a p ­
tivity to freedom, desolation to hope". He also declared:
I am aware that the people in India are not 
very rich. Yet they gave food, shelter, s uc­
cour and fed millions of our people, which
86. The H i n d u , 7 December 1971, p. 12
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could not but be by sacrificing their own needs.
We will never forget this...The kindness, sympa­
thy and consideration shown by the people of 
India, the armed forces of India and the Indian 
leaders we will never forget...The people of my 
country will be eternally grateful to the people 
and Government of India for having stood by us 
in our darkest hour.^g
In the first week of February 1972, on his first state visit 
to India, Mujib thanked the Indian Press "for projecting the truth 
about Bangla Desh at a time when it was difficult to get it from 
within the country". He also expressed his "profound gratitude to 
the Indian Army because they not on 1y ...contributed directly to the
91
freedom struggle, but they also showed exemplary behaviour in public".
Mrs. Gandhi returned the compliment during her first state visit 
to Bangladesh in the second week of March 1972 by describing the Mukti 
Bdhini as "a saga of c o u r a g e ... the flame of truth, the flame of j u s ­
tice". During this visit, the eternal friendship professed by both
sides was sealed in a twenty-five year Treaty of Friendship, Coopera- 
92
tion and Peace.
While the expressions of gratitude and goodwill continued una- 
93
bated, Indian economic and technical assistance also flowed in.
Two engineers from the Indian railways were sent to assist the Bangla­
desh Railway in the re-laying of damaged rails. Their salaries were
94
paid by the Indian High Commission in Dhaka. The Corps of Signals
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of the Indian Army restored telecommunication links within Bangla­
desh and between Bangladesh and India; all the special equipment 
necessary was supplied by India. A special consignment of sixty 
tank wagons of kerosene was sent to meet the acute shortage in 
Bangladesh. The Shipping Corporation of India placed at Bangla­
desh's disposal two ocean-going ships to export the accumulated 
jute and jute goods in the Chaina port. The Indian Ministry of 
Petroleum and Chemicals sent its senior officials to re-start pro­
duction at the Chittagong Refinery and to explore the possibility 
of feeding it with Indian crude. The Bangladesh Assistance Commit­
tee in India announced that it would place a fleet of twenty amb u ­
lances at the disposal of the Bangladesh Health Ministry. The 
Committee also collected Rupees 23 million (then US$ 3.2 million) 
and a large quantity of clothing for Bangladesh. The Indian drug 
industry set up a working group to formulate a plan to increase 
production to meet requirements in Bangladesh. The President of 
the Federation of the Indian Chambers of Commerce declared that the 
Federation was prepared to assist the Bangladesh Government in the 
reconstruction and development of its economy. And in May, India 
rushed 400,000 tons of foodgrain to Bangladesh to meet the acute
95
food shortage; this was out of the 764,500 tons pledged by India.
India also selected twenty-eight IAS (Indian Administrative 
Service) and IPS (Indian Police Service) officers to help establish 
civil administration in Bangladesh at the request of the Bangladesh
95. For details of the above assistance see The H i n d u , 23 December 
1971; 1,2,8,11,23,29 January 1972; 5 May 1972; and Bangladesh 
O b s e r v e r , 25 January 1972. All US dollar amounts given in 
parentheses throughout this study are calculated at the then 
exchange rates.
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Government, according to Indian sources. But according to Foreign
Secretary S.A. Karim:.
When our government was to be established in 
Dhaka, the Indians had already prepared a list 
of advisors for various ministries and were 
ready to fly them to Dhaka. This is why the 
Chinese government said later that Bangladesh 
was the Manchukuo government of India because 
the Manchukuo was theoretically independent 
after 1931 but theJapanese officials manned 
almost all administrative departments. They 
were the policy makers. But I understand that 
was quashed in C a 1cutta itself, in Mujibnagar. 
Nobody actually came, but they had thought of
And according to a member of the Provisional Government, the 
Indian Army had also offered officers to assist in the initial a d ­
ministration of the country:
By November-December we got information that a 
large number of Bengali administrative officers 
were killed. We also knew that a fairly large 
contingent of Bengali administrative officers 
was stranded in Pakistan. So in December 1971,
Generals Aurora and Sarkar offered Indian o f f i ­
cers from the army to administratively assist 
the new g o v e r n m e n t .
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But the offer was not accepted.
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Thus in those initial months after independence when Western 
and United Nations aid was yet to pour in, India became the sole 
guarantor of the survival of the new state. Emotions and sentiments 
flowed across the border, and in the euphoria of that moment there 
was no dearth of fellow feeling. The song Amar Shonar Bangla ("My 
Golden Bengal"), written by Tagore, a Bengali Hindu, was chosen as 
the country's national anthem; that the song serenaded the whole of 
Bengal was of little concern.
The hope for the future blanketed out past history as India
magnanimously gave and Bangladesh eagerly took whatever came forth.
As Karim r ecal1s :
Whatever happened, whether it was petroleum 
shortage or food shortage here and there, we 
would pick up the telephone and ring up our 
counterpart in India requesting him to please 
help us, and India tried to help u s .^q q
And according to Ruhul Quddus, Principal Secretary to the Prime 
M i n i s t e r :
A program was chalked out to send essentials 
such as kerosene, petroleum, salt, foodstuff 
etc., to the various districts from India...
India gave us almost everything we needed and ^  
wanted. Indian economic aid saved us initially.
Thus Indo-Bang1adesh relations were set well on the friendship track
and no one thought that they could become derailed.
VI I
Throughout the period of the struggle (March-December 1971) and 
into the first year of independence, both the Indira Government and the
100. Interview, op.ci t ♦ , fn. 97
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two successive Bangladesh Governments (Tajuddin Cabinet and the 
Mujib Cabinet) had to tackle a number of sensitive issues with 
mixed results.
One such issue was the selection of the commander of the joint 
Indo-Bang1adesh Force. Since the Mukti Bahini was fighting for the 
independence of its country and had been fighting the Pakistan Army 
much before the Indian Army came onto the scene, there was obvious 
emotional appeal for a Bangladeshi commander. But the expectation 
on the other side was that since the bulk of the professional fight­
ing force and arsenal was Indian, the commander would have to be an 
Indian. The issue was finally resolved by both Governments settling 
for an officer with the rank of a corps commander. The highest 
ranking officer available on the Bangladesh side at the time was 
Colonel M.A.G. Osmani, the commander-in-chief of the Mukti Bahini.
So, India's Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora became the com­
mander of the joint force. But in order to appease Colonel Osmani,
the Indians gave him a brigadier, Brigadier Gupta, as his personal 
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staff officer. The Indian Prime Minister also provided Osmani
103
with a Dakota aircraft for his war-time travel.
But this was not without some bitterness in the Mukti Bahini, 
where the prevailing sentiment was that Osmani could have been pro­
moted to the rank of a general by the Provisional Government and
104
given command of the joint force. While this may have been a
102. Interview with General Aurora in New Delhi on 1 May 1985
103. Interview with General Osmani in Dhaka in May 1985
104. Confidential interview with one of Mujib's private secretaries, 
Dhaka, 15 July 1985
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legitimate expectation since the Mukti Bahini absorbed the brunt 
of the war, it did not take into account the political limitations 
of a Provisional Government that was at the mercy of the host 
Government.
After Bangladesh's independence, Prime Minister Mujib invited 
Mrs. Gandhi to visit Bangladesh. Though Mrs. Gandhi was keen, she 
was also sensitive to the Chinese charge that Bangladesh was a " crea­
tion of India" and the Indian Army in Dhaka was an occupation force.
To avoid adverse international propaganda, she did not wish to visit 
Bangladesh while Indian troops were still there. Consequently, 
though an agreement was signed to pull out all Indian troops by
25 March, they were withdrawn two weeks early and Mrs. Gandhi started 
her state visit in the third week of March. Upon her return to New 
Delhi, she declared in the Rajya Sabha:
No group or individuals in India should make the 
mistake of imagining that the freedom of Bangla­
desh is a gift from India. It is an achievement 
of the people of Bangladesh and a fruit of their 
sacr i f i c e s .j
This was not only to check post-war Indian hubris in certain quarters, 
but also to deflate Chinese propaganda by officially setting the re­
cord straight.
Prime Minister Mujib also demonstrated good sense in handling 
sensitive issues. With East Bengal's independence, certain sections 
in West Bengal had entertained nostalgia for a greater Bengal. Prior 
to M u j i b 's first official visit to Calcutta, he was asked by a 
foreign correspondent whether there was any possibility of forming
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a greater Bengal. The Prime Minister replied:
My dream of Bangladesh has been fulfilled. I 
do not want an inch more of territory. You have 
seen the map of Bangladesh in our flag. I am 
happy with that much of territory. Our inten­
tion is that West Bengal should remain in India 
and that we should have the-friend 1iest of rela­
tionships with the people of West Bengal, for 
that matter, Q h e ]  whole of India. ^
This declaration certainly undermined any secessionism there might
have been. In addition, in his first public address in Calcutta,
he reaffirmed his party's commitment to the principles of socialism,
secularism and democracy, and added 'nationalism* as the fourth 
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principle. This pointed implication was not lost on those who 
had entertained hopes of a greater Bengal, and the Indira Government 
could not but be pleased.
There were, however, several faux pas that displeased the 
Bangladeshis. One was the way the surrender ceremony was handled.
The Pakistan Army in East Pakistan was to surrender to the joint 
command of the Indo-Bang1adesh Force. During the surrender ceremony 
on 16 December 1971 in Dhaka, Colonel Osmani was absent; the lone 
representative of the Provisional Government was brushed aside by 
a group of Indian generals "so that the world received a very d i f ­
ferent impression regarding the nature of the 'joint command' ".
The Mukti Bahini which had fought for eight months the worst battles 
against the Pakistan Army was reduced to an inconsequential force.
Not only did its sacrifices for its motherland go unrecognised, it 
was also denied any official presence on the day of final victory.
107- Bangladesh O b s e r v e r , 15 January 1972. Incidentally, the map 
of Bangladesh was dropped from the flag by the third week of 
January 1972. Far Eastern Economic Review 22 January 1972, p. 5
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The Indian Army had come at the eleventh hour and seized the v i c ­
tory that belonged to it. To add insult to injury, the whole crisis 
was dubbed both in India and abroad as an Indo-Pakistan war, re­
ducing, in one sweep, the eight-month long Mukti Bahini-?akistan 
war to an eleven-day I ndo-Pakistan struggle.
This had devastating political consequences for the League 
Government. Even before the conclusion of the war, the Provisional 
Government had lost its credibility in the eyes of the Mukti Bahini 
for falling to display proper leadership in various war-related 
issues. These events, together with the surrender ceremony, al i e n ­
ated most of the Army officers in the Bahini, who later became the 
senior leadership in the Bangladesh Army, from the League Government. 
Worse yet, the seeds of a n t i - Indianism were planted within the nascent 
army, with fatal consequences five years later.
The second blunder was the looting of mills, factories, offices
and hospitals by the Indian Army in the first few days after the
1 09
surrender of the Pakistan Army. Hospital equipment, especially 
of the Combined Military Hospital in the Dhaka cantonment, was re­
moved to India. In April 1974 Muj i b had to go to the Soviet 
Union for a lung operation, since he could not be operated on in 
Bangladesh for lack of the normal facilities at the C M H . ^
But what reinforced the Mukti Bahini's hostility towards the 
Indians was the taking away by the Indian Army of all the armaments
109. Guardian (London), 21 June 1972
110. Interview with General Wasiuddin in New York, 29 March 1985
111. Interview with Shamsur Rahman, Mujib's ambassador to the 
Soviet Union, in Dhaka on 9 July 1985
armament, it was sufficiently modern and enough in quantity to equip
1 1 2
the nascent Bangladesh Army. The Bangladeshi military officers, 
including Colonel Osmani who became M u j i b 's defence advisor upon 
the latter's return, felt that Bangladesh had a right to its share 
of the booty and that the arsenal should not have been removed w i t h ­
out the Bangladesh Government's prior approval. But as General 
Aurora explained:
We brought out a certain number of weapons from 
Bangladesh. We rightly or wrongly felt that they 
would not be of much use to Bangladesh. With the 
situation in Bangladesh as it was, more weapons 
lying around would make it chaotic.
With hindsight, the Indian General was probably right, since certain
unrecovered weapons have greatly contributed to the lawlessness that
permeates the country even to this day; but it did very little for
Bangladeshi nationalist pride. The primary motive of the Indira
Government perhaps was to prevent this arsenal from falling into
extremist hands that could mount a direct challenge to the League 
1 1 4
leadership. Whatever its justification, it was not appreciated
by the Bangladeshis; one Bangladeshi officer, Major Jalil, was im­
prisoned allegedly for resisting the transfer of the surrendered 
weapons to India.
112. Confidential interview with a senior Bangladesh Army officer, 
Dhaka, 9 July 1985. For some idea of the quantity surrendered, 
see The H i n d u , 24 December 1971, p. 9
113. Interview, o p .ci t ., f n . 102
114. Incidentally, the Far Eastern Economic Review (18 December
1971, p. 6) points out that the "Indian army wasted time with 
minor towns and garrisons instead of going to Dacca directly 
because they wanted to take possession of Pakistani arms and 
ammunitions and prevent them falling into hands of extremists 
who could some day subvert the new state".
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s u r r e n d e r e d  by the Pakis ta n  Army. W h i l e  much of it was not hea v y
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The other eye-brow raising incident was India's insistence that 
its High Commissioner become the doyen of the diplomatic corps. In 
diplomatic practice, the first ambassador to present his credentials 
Is considered the senior-most ambassador, becoming the doyen. A c ­
cording to Foreign Secretary Karim:
India was not the first country to appoint an 
ambassador to Dhaka. I think it was the East 
German ambassador who was the first one ready 
to present his credentials. The date had a l ­
ready been fixed...When the Indians realized 
it...they insisted that this had to be changed.
So Subimal Dutt was the first High Commissioner 
to present his credentials and become the dean 
of the diplomatic corps.
On occasions, however, the Indian leadership made allowances for
Bangladeshi sentiment. According to Mr. Justice Abu Sayeed Chowdhury,
the Provisional Government's most respected roving ambassador at the
time and later Bangladesh's first President, during his meeting with
Mrs. Gandhi in London in late October 1971 he pressed her for an
early recognition of Bangladesh by India, adding:
After all, what can I offer you by way of re­
ward. Bangladesh will never be a vassel kingdom 
of India, but Bangladesh will be a friend of 
India if that is of any value to you.
Mrs Gandhi is said to have replied:
It has been good of you Just I ce Chowdhury to talk 
of a reward and you have offered friendship. I 
think even that should be left to the people of 
Bangladesh to decide. My reward would be if I 
find democracy functioning in a neighbouring 
country. I do not want military dictatorship 
either in Bangladesh or in P a k i s t a n . . ^
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The future President recalls being overcome by the sincerity of 
the Prime Minister's remarks and remains convinced that "India did 
not want to colonize Bangladesh because India wanted to project the 
image of a benefactor, both in the region and internationally too". ^
After the country's independence, Mrs. Gandhi posted to Bangla­
desh one of her most capable and senior ambassadors - a Bengali. Mr. 
Subimal Dutt, India's ambassador to the Soviet Union, was the first 
High Commissioner to Bangladesh. Born in the district of Chittagong 
in Bangladesh, he had been an administrative officer in East Bengal 
before partition. His successor, Samar Sen, India's Permanent Re­
presentative to the United Nations at the time, was also a Bengali.
This trend was changed only after General Ziaur Rahman, who came to
power after Mujib, expressed his displeasure at having a Bengali-
118
speaking Indian High Commissioner in Dhaka.
On India's Republic Day celebrations in late January 1972, a
special 'Bangladesh Spectacle' was presented by 1,000 persons. It
depicted the horrors perpetrated by the Pakistan Army on innocent
East Bengalis, the influx of refugees into India, the rise of the
Mukti Bahin'L and the role of the Indian armed forces. It was pre-
1 1 9
sented with Bengali songs as background music. On the Bangladesh
independence day celebrations on 26 March, Mrs. Gandhi, who normally 
did not attend diplomatic receptions, made an exception and attended
1 20
the reception given by the Bangladesh High Commissioner in New Delhi.
117. Ibid.
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Cone 1 us i o n : In 19^7 East Bengalis voted to secede from India 
in order to give the fullest expression to their culture, religion 
and economic freedom. But the chauvinism of the West Pakistani 
leaders belied that expectation, providing the rationale for the 
1971 wa r .
Had the East Bengalis not been economically and politically 
exploited by the Western wing, East Bengal would have probably re­
mained with Pakistan. Its fight for survival was universally held 
in India as proof of the failure of religion-based statehood, the 
failure of the two-nation theory. This was not so. Admittedly, 
the two-nation theory was a political ploy by the Indian Muslims 
to carve out a separate territory over which they could rule, but 
the validity of the theory remains unchallenged. What was not fore­
seen was that economic and political discrimination could still 
take place within a state whose peoples had elected to unite under 
one flag and solely on the basis of religion.
East Bengal's independence neither invalidated the j u stifica­
tion for theocratic states, nor validated secular statehood. Se­
cularism was adopted by Bangladesh not as a rejection of religion, 
but as a conscious attempt to institute a new political order in 
which the pursuit of statecraft would be least hampered by religi­
ous pandering. But to most Indians, it was as though the East 
Bengalis had finally rectified an historical error. Moreover, it 
was assumed that Bangladesh would be eternally pro-Indian.
This flaw in perception lay in the inability of most Indians 
to understand the East Bengali personality. The political cha r a c ­
ter of the Bangladeshi could be understood only by recognizing the
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importance to him of his religion and culture. Muslimness and 
Bengaliness are two equally important aspects of his character, 
and both are inseparably linked to each other. Though East Bengalis 
were economically exploited equally in United Bengal and in Pakistan, 
prior to 19^7 their Muslimness was under threat, and therefore they 
seceded from India. But after 19^7 their Bengal iness was under 
threat, and therefore they seceded from Pakistan. The East Bengalis 
realized their total emancipation in two stages.
But psychological contradictions remained. Tagore's song,
Amor Shonccr Banglaj written in the emotionally charged atmosphere 
of Bengal in the first decade of this century to inspire the Be n ­
gali Hindus to launch their successful ant I-partition movement in 
1905, was chosen as the national anthem, suggesting perhaps the 
Bengali Muslims' desire for a certain unity of Bengali culture and 
spirit. But the adoption of a flag initially with a map of Bangla­
desh at the center defined, according to Mujib, the geographical 
limitations of Bangladeshi nationalism. West Bengal would not be 
part of that nationalism. Thus there were complex dimensions in 
the Bangladeshi character that remain latent and unexplored.
Bengal, once the vanguard state of undivided India, slipped 
into irrelevance after 1947- The independence of East Bengal was 
like a spiritual renaissance for West Bengal, with great hopes for 
the future. This perhaps explains West Bengal's intense preoccupa­
tion with East Bengal's independence. For the Indian Union, h ow­
ever, it was pure reason of state that led India to assist the 
East Bengal independence movement.
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But in the process there were tremendous changes in the e x p e c ­
tations of the participants in this political drama. The Provisional 
Government, preoccupied with the exigencies of the period, did not 
realize the consequences for Bangladesh of its collusion with India.
The subsequent Mujib Government also had little freedom of choice 
or action. Saddled with the extraordinary task of reconstructing 
the war-torn economy and rehabilitating its dislocated people, it 
had only India to assist it during its gargantuan e n d e a ­
vours. The policies and statements of the Government formulated in 
the exigency of the period later became suspect in the eyes of the 
people and were exploited by vested interests. The promise of e t e r ­
nal friendship with India became a political liability soon thereafter.
The Indian Government also endeavoured to take a realistic view 
of the new situation and attempted to formulate policies and state­
ments keeping in mind the possible reactions of the people of Bangla­
desh. But its response to the latent fears in Bangladesh of Indian 
economic dominance remained inadequate. Despite the sincere efforts 
on both sides, the tactical failures and political complexities of 
the period threatened to undo a promising relationship.
In the context of influence relationship, each country was able 
to influence certain outcomes in the other, both before and after 
the war. By providing sanctuary and diplomatic and military as s i s ­
tance, Mrs. Gandhi reinforced the indebtedness of the Provisional 
Government to India. The compromised position the Provisional Govern­
ment found itself in influenced it to accept the formation of the 
Consultative Committee that included four other parties. It could 
perhaps also be argued that the prevailing situation influenced the
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Provisional Government to desist from demanding Colonel Osmani's 
presence in the surrender ceremony, or from preventing the trans­
fer tQ India of the weapons surrendered by the Pakistani Army.
After the war, the Indian Government was able to prevail upon the 
Mujib Government to make its High Commissioner the dean of the 
diplomatic corps. No doubt, Indian assistance to Bangladesh was 
responsible for influencing this concession from the League Govern­
ment .
On the other hand, the Provisional Government's announcement 
banning all re 1 igion-based parties in independent Bangladesh did 
in no small measure reinforce total Indian support for the East 
Bengalis. Following independence, raising secularism to the status 
of a state principle also served to reinforce India's continued co m ­
mitment to Bangladesh. Thus each country successfully influenced 
the other when the occasion demanded so.
100.
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FORMALIZING THE POLITICAL RELATIONS:
THE INDO-BANGLADESH TREATY
The Indo-Bang1adesh friendship treaty was seen by the Bangla­
desh and Indian leaders as one concrete manifestation of their 
public commitment to eternal friendship between the two countries. 
But neither of the two Governments fully realized at the time the 
adverse repercussions the treaty would generate for I n d o - B a n g 1adesh 
relations. Perhaps only in retrospect is it possible to explain 
why the treaty, instead of cementing the professed bond of friend­
ship between the two countries, actually alienated the Bangladeshi 
elite from a promising relationship with India.
For nine months in 1971 destiny had forced the Indian Govern­
ment and the Bangladesh Provisional Government in Calcutta to c ol­
laborate to bring about a particular political outcome in East 
Pakistan. Much energy, planning, arsenal and blood had gone into 
that collaboration, so that by December 1971 their shared endeavour 
had brought forth the desired result. In the euphoria of those days 
the new relationship between the two countries was described by the 
two Governments in hyperbolic terms: many superlatives were uttered, 
promises made and commitments given. The friendship treaty was one 
such commitment.
But the signing of the treaty led to condemnation of the League 
Government from important quarters. Many of the opposition parties^
1. For statements from the opposition benches, see Jatiyo Sangsad, 
Official P r o c e e d i n g s , 1st Session, 1st Sitting, 9 and 13 April 
1973; also 2nd Session, 29th Sitting, 7 July 1973-
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as well as influential sections of the Bangladesh Army saw it as 
a blatant attempt by India to undermine Bangladesh's sovereignty.
The League Government itself became suspect in their eyes. Not
3
only were these sentiments fostered through the media, they also
4
crept into what would otherwise be considered scholarly writings.
It is therefore important that the friendship treaty be studied 
and analyzed in order to examine the validity of the many charges 
labelled against it. Through such an approach, one h o p e s , it would 
be possible to explore to what extent this treaty damaged the e v o ­
lution of positive relations between the Indira-Mujib Governments 
and, in the broader context, between India and Bangladesh.
Treaty P r o v i s i o n s : At Mujib's invitation, Indian Prime M i n i s ­
ter Indira Gandhi paid her first state visit to Bangladesh from 17 
to 19 March 1972. At the conclusion of the visit the two Prime 
Ministers signed a Joint Declaration, the most significant aspect 
of which was the decision to enter into a Treaty of Friendship, 
Cooperation and Peace. As a "concrete expression to the similarity 
of views, ideals and interests between India and Bangladesh", the
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cers who served during the League Government. Even as late 
as 1985, General Ershad, the current strongman in Bangladesh, 
expressed similar sentiments. Interviews in Dhaka in July- 
August 1 985 -
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4. For instance, Kamal Siddiqui, The Political Economy of Indo- 
Bangladesh R e l a t i o n s , unpublished MA thesis, School of Orien­
tal and African Studies, University of London, September 1975, 
pp. 17~ 18; also, Talukdar M a n i r u z z a m a n , The Bangladesh Revo­
lution and Its A f t e r m a t h , Dhaka: Books International Ltd.,
1380, pp. 163“164; Moudud A h m e d , Bangladesh: Constitutional 
Quest for A u t o n o m y , Dhaka: The University Press Ltd., 1979, 
p. 276, fn. 4
treaty was signed in Dhaka on 19 March 1972, valid for twenty-five 
years and with the provision to renew by mutual agreement.
The treaty contained ten objectives in the Preamble and twelve 
articles in the main body. The Preamble highlighted the "common 
ideals of peace, secularism, democracy, socialism and nationalism" 
and pledged adherence to "the basic tenets of nonalignment, p eace­
ful coexistence, mutual cooperation, non-interference in internal 
affairs and respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty".
The Preamble also expressed the determination of the two countries 
"to maintain fraternaland good neighbourly relations and transform 
their border imto a border of eternal peace and friendship". The 
two sides agreed that in order to strengthen world peace and s e ­
curity and to bring about a relaxation of internatÎo n a 1 tension, the 
best approach was "through cooperation and not through conflict or 
confrontât i o n " .
Article I solemnly declared that there would be lasting peace 
and friendship between the two countries and their peoples and that 
each side would respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the other and refrain from interfering in its internal 
affairs. Article 2 was more global in thrust as it condemned "colo­
nialism and racialism in all forms and manifestations" and pledged 
support for national liberation struggles. Article 3 reaffirmed 
the two countries' faith in the policy of nonalignment and peace­
ful coexistence as important contributing factors in detente and 
the securing of global peace.
The necessity of maintaining regular contacts between the two
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Governments was laid down in Article 4. It was agreed that there 
would be regular "meetings and exchanges of views at all levels" 
to keep either party informed of the other's stand on major inter­
national problems affecting the interests of both states.
Under the provisions of Articles 5 and 7 the two parties pledged 
to promote relations in the areas of sports, culture and health and 
also to cooperate in economic, scientific and technical fields. It 
was further agreed that they would cooperate in the development of 
trade, transport and communications between them "on the basis of 
the principles of equality, mutual benefit and the most-fa v o u r e d ­
nation principle".
Article 6 was crucial to both the countries, perhaps more so 
to Bangladesh, as it addressed the perennial problem of sharing the 
waters of the major rivers that flowed through both countries. It 
was agreed that joint studies and actions would be undertaken "in 
the fields of flood control, river basin development and the develop­
ment of hydro-electric power and irrigation".
Articles 8,9 and 10 are generally assumed to be the operative 
clauses of the treaty as they laid down the parameters of the secu­
rity and defence relations between the two countries. Article 8 
stipulated that neither country shall "enter into or participate in 
any military alliance directed against the other party", and each 
party was treaty bound to "refrain from any aggression against the 
other party". Each country also pledged not to allow "the use of 
its territory for committing any act that may cause military damage 
to or constitute a threat to the security of the other High
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Contracting Party". This security concern was carried into Article 
9 which pledged both parties to "refrain from giving any assistance 
to any third party taking part in an armed conflict against the other 
party", and should there be any attack or threat of attack on either 
party, they "shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in 
order to take appropriate affective measures to eliminate the threat 
and thus ensure peace and security of their countries". Article 10 
sealed the security understanding with the declaration that neither 
party shall "undertake any commitment, secret or open, toward one or 
more States which may be incompatible with the present Treaty".
Reactions to the T r e a t y : On the Indian side there was no d i s ­
cernible negative reaction to the treaty perhaps because it was o b ­
vious that as far as Indian self-interest was concerned India would 
not be disadvantaged In any way from a friendship treaty with Bangla­
desh. In her statement in Parliament on 20 March 1972 Mrs. Gandhi 
declared that
the Treaty embodies the Will of the two Govern­
ments to pursue common policies in matters of 
interest to both countries and solemnizes the 
close ties of friendship between our two cou n ­
tries and peoples cemented through blood and 
sacrifice. The Treaty...will guide us in our 
journey into the future in quest of peace, good 
n e i g h b o u r 1 iness and the well-being of our two 
peoples, j.
There was no adverse comment in or out of Parliament on the treaty.
In fact, among the remarkably few commentaries, there was great hope 
and expectation that the foundation of perhaps an entente oordiale 
had been laid:
5. Government of India, Ministry of Information and B r o a d c a s t i n g , 
Bangladesh Documents, vol. II, 1972, p. 648
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There are few examples in history of such a 
close treaty relationship that India and Bangla­
desh have established which extends almost to 
every sphere of life, ranging from defence and 
foreign affairs to transit and trade, economic 
and technical assistance, cultural cooperation 
and coordination of efforts to tame the rampa­
ging rivers in the eastern region.^
Generally however, in India, little was said and much less 
written about the treaty or its possible consequences for the d e ­
velopment of Indo-Bang1adesh relations. The reason for what appears 
to be a rather muted response perhaps lies in the possibility that 
even as early as 1972 informed circles in India were fully aware of 
the dangers of wide publicity, since the banning of religion-based 
parties in Bangladesh certainly did not mean that anti-Indian senti­
ments were totally suppressed. It is conceivable that the Indian 
Government and elite establishment, mindful of possible anti-lndian- 
ism being generated by the treaty, desisted from any enthusiastic 
public articulation of its benefits. In the event, the treaty was 
seen as "the primary document, the firm base from which the two 
nations were to start the climb to the peaks of cooperation and 
political and economic progress",^ and left at that. Mrs. Gandhi, 
however, did feel the need to assure the people of Bangladesh that 
while "India will stand by Q t h e  B a n g l a d e s h i ^  ..if there was any 
threat to their territorial integrity", the treaty per se was not
a military pact between the two states, nor was there any secret
8
understanding between the two Governments.
6. The H i n d u , 20 March 1972, p. 1
7. K. Krishna Moorthy, "Progress of Indo-Bangla Relations" The 
H i n d u , 26 January 1973, p. 8
8. At a press conference in Dhaka on 19 March 1972; The H i n d u ,
20 March 1972, p. 7
The Bangladesh Government had chosen not to give wide publicity to
the treaty as well, perhaps because of similar considerations to
those that weighed on the Indian Government's mind. Additionally,
the Government was hampered by its inability to command the support
of the entire rank and file in the party. An influential section
of the Awami League - comprising the rightists led by Khondakar
Mostaque Ahmed - was particularly concerned in addition to the
security clauses, with the far-reaching consequences of Article 6,
which stipulated joint endeavours in river basin development by
harnessing the waters of the Brahmaputra, Meghna and the Ganges
Rivers that, together with their tributaries, make up the lifeline
of Bangladesh. As one informed source, who later became a minister
in a subsequent government, explained:
Under any agreement or Treaty for cooperation and 
assistance between two unequal states, between a 
large and powerful country on the one hand and a 
small and weak country on the other, the benefit 
would generally go in favour of the powerful one.
It is on this very point of view that a sizeable 
section of the Awami League was not in favour of 
such a treaty. But they were over-shadowed by the 
dominant Indian lobby inside the Government.Q
Reactions among the opposition parties were much more vocal, as 
they unanimously demanded the treaty be rescinded. In late December
1972, Maulana Bhashani formed a 7"Party Action Committee whose primary 
demand was to rid the country of this treaty, which, it asserted, was 
meant to guarantee India's domination and influence over the future 
course of Bangladesh and thereby extend and establish its own sphere
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The react i o n  from the B a n g l a d e s h  side wa s  a n y t h i n g  but muted.
9. Moudud Ahmed, Bangladesh: Era of Sheikh Mujibur R a h m a n , Dhaka: The 
University Press LtdT] 1983, P . i"90
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of influence over the subcontinent. According to the Committee, the 
treaty could not serve Bangladesh's interests as claimed by the Govern- 
«. 10 men t .
The most pungent comments came from the influential left-of-centre 
English-1anguage weekly Holiday, and these were directed against A r t i ­
cles. 9 and 10. Claiming that India was playing the Big Brother role, 
Holiday argued that Articles 9 and 10 "clearly give enough
leeway to the Indian Government to infringe upon the sovereign right 
of the Bangladesh people" and that in fact "Indian defence and for­
eign policies have now become Bangladesh's policies as well". There­
fore, "Bangladesh would have to h a n d o v e r  its defence and foreign 
ministries to Messrs Jagjivan Ram and Sardar Swa ran Singh respec­
tively". Article 9 was attacked also for its vagueness, which would 
a 11ow it to b e :
invoked any time to check so much as even a d e ­
monstration of popular discontent in Bangladesh.
In other words, the Treaty is meant not to toler­
ate any opposition to the present government in 
Bangladesh - no matter how healthy and construc­
tive it may be for the national i n t e r e s t . ^
The debate in Parliament over the treaty was no less vocal, even 
though there were only a handful on the opposition benches. President 
Abu Sayeed Chowdhury, in his address to the Assembly, extolled India 
for standing by Bangladesh during the perilous days of the liberation
struggle and described the treaty as "the practical expression" of the
12 . . .  
friendship between the two states". But the opposition saw it
10. Ibid.
11. H o i i d a y , 26 March 1972, p. 1
12. Jatiyo Sangsad, Official P r o c e e d i n g s , 1st Session, 1st Sitting,
9 April 1973, p."^5
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differently. It interpreted the treaty as an infringement of Bangla­
desh's sovereign rights and appealed to the Assembly to reject it 
forthwith. According to one Member of Parliament:
this treaty denies me Qsiq] the right to enter 
into a treaty with someone else, to have friend­
ship with someone else, to make unilateral d e c i ­
sions...New Delhi's influence over our foreign 
policy is inevitable...This treaty has denied 
us friends...We are not n o n a 1 igned. . .we have be­
come entangled in a grand alliance and our 
sovereignty is very limited._
According to another, the wording of the friendship treaty provided 
no scope to rescind it, thereby tying Bangladesh to the Indian secu­
rity arrangement in the subcontinent. He enquired why Bangladesh,
being a sovereign country, should be denied the right to negotiate
r  . . . , 1 4
for its own interests.
The League Government was quite prepared to respond to these
charges. Amirul Islam, a State Minister in the Cabinet, described
the treaty as reflecting Bangladesh's sovereign status in that it
was able to negotiate a treaty with India as an e q u a l . ^  Tofael
Ahmed, the Prime Minister's political secretary challenged the claim
that the treaty had made Bangladesh friendless in the world:
I want to say that if that were true, then in 
the past 1 year 4 months 100 countries would 
not have recognized Bang 1a d e s h ...it is not a 
military t r e a t y ...this is a treaty for peace 
and f r i e n d s h i p . ..The Bengali nation will for­
ever remember with deep gratitude the friendly 
forces of that friendly country who wrote part 
of Bengal's history with their b l o o d . ^
13. Ibid., 13 April 1973, pp. 154-158
14. Ibid., 2nd Session, 29th Sitting, 7 July 1973, PP- 1817, 1820
15. Ibid., 1st Session, 6th Sitting, 18 April 1973, pp. 227-228. 
Also see Mr. Nure Alam Siddiqui's defence, pp. 251-253
16. Ibid., 1st Session, 7th Sitting, 19 April 1973, pp. 287-288
1 10.
And Foreign Minister Kama 1 Hossain remarked:
I find it difficult to understand how the co n ­
solidation of friendly relations with the neigh­
bouring country that has stood by our side during 
the difficult days of our freedom struggle, can 
go against the interest of our country. I fail 
to understand which aspect of this treaty is co n ­
trary to our Interests...Every clause of the 
treaty is equally applicable to either country.
Each of the signatory \^ s'icT\ has committed itself 
not to adopt any means that would be contrary to 
the interests of the other...The treaty agreements 
have been based on the principles of our foreign 
policy, and by doing so our sovereignty and in­
dependence have been p r e s e r v e d . ^
In short, Kamal Hossain's arguments were predicated on the premise 
that the friendship treaty did not obstruct Bangladesh from p ursu­
ing its declared policy of 'friendship for all, malice to none' and 
that no provision of the treaty prejudiced the interests of either 
country.
Outside the Parliament, the Government's reaction to the O p p o ­
sition's charges was less measured. At least in one instance a senior 
Cabinet Minister, Syed Nazrul Islam, declared that neither India nor 
Bangladesh interfered in the other's internal affairs, and that the 
League would forcefully resist all attempts to drive a wedge into the
friendship betwen India and Bangladesh. He then rounded off his pub-
18
lie speech with a bitter attack on Beijing's policies towards Dhaka.
It is significant that none of the other political parties in 
Bangladesh supported the League in its stand on the friendship treaty. 
Even Moni Singh's pro-Moscow Communist Party of Bangladesh (CPB) and 
Muzaffar Ahmed's pro-Moscow National Awami Party (NAP-M), both of
17- Ibid., pp. 324-325; also The H i n d u , 21 April 1973, p. 9
18. The Hindu, 6 March 1973, p. 6
which rode on the coattails of the Awami League, did not actively 
support it, perhaps because the treaty seemed to increase public 
apprehension rather than support. Since both the NAP-M and the CPB 
were pursuing a closed-door policy of making common cause with the 
League in the hope of being called to share power with it, they pe r ­
haps thought it best to maintain a neutral posture by abstaining 
from the public debate on the issue. That it was a successful stra­
tegy can be seen from the fact that by the beginning of 1975 both 
the NAP-M and the CPB joined the League in precipitating a 'consti­
tutional coup' whereby the multi-party par 1 iamentary system was re­
placed by a one-party presidential system, with the NAP-M and CPB 
leaders holding prominent positions within the new power structure.
Broadly speaking, the reaction against the friendship treaty
seemed to emanate from three interest groups: those who wished to
1 9
have intimate relations with China; those wanting a revival of
20
the Islamic connection, particularly with Pakistan; and those who
genuinely felt that Bangladesh's freedom to articulate its foreign
policy in its own image was somehow shortchanged by the treaty agree-
21
ment with India. The pro-China group had a powerful instrument in
Holiday whose editor, Enayetullah Khan, was a self-described "patho-
22
logically a n t i - Indian". Mindful of the state of Sino-Indian rel at i ons ,
19. The pro-Chinese parties such as Mohammad Toaha's Communist Party 
of Bangladesh (Marxist-Leninist), Maulana Bhashani's National 
Awami Party, and splinter groups that followed the Maoist line.
20. The Tightest parties such as the Muslim League, the Jama'at i 
Islam, the Bangladesh Democratic League, and the rightist wing 
of the Awami League led by Khondakar Mostaque Ahmed.
21. The militant wing of the Awami League that split from the main 
body in 1972 to form the Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal (National Socia­
list Party) and preached scientific socialism.
22. This is how Mr. Enayetullah Khan, currently Bangladesh's ambassa­
dor to China, described himself to the author during an interview 
in Beijing, China on 16 August 1985.
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this group was sensitive to the intimate nature of the Indo-Bangla- 
desh relationship. India was seen as a domineering, hegemonic power 
and Bangladesh's only effective counter to this, according to this 
group, was China. This was more so because among the superpowers 
the Soviet Union was seen as India's patron, and the United States 
as hostile to Bangladesh's interests on account of its rule during 
the 1971 war, as well as ideologically, because of its capitalistic 
mode of production. However, in those early years this group was 
considerably hampered in its public articulation of a pro-China 
policy because of the image Bangladeshis had of China owing to its 
public support of Pakistan and its veto in the Security Council against 
Bangladesh's membership in the United Nations.
The second interest group which strongly objected to the treaty
was pro-lslamic in orientation. In fact, this group was a marriage
23
of three sub-groups: those who did not favour Bangladesh's inde­
pendent statehood, and were ready even then to re-unite with Pakistan 
if possible; those who accepted the reality of Bangladesh but wished 
to maintain a strong link with Pakistan; and those who enthusiastically 
supported and even fought for Bangladesh's independence but also be­
lieved in the Islamic Ummah (community) and the need to maintain the 
'umbilical' link with the Muslim Middle East. To all three sub-groups, 
a friendship treaty with India hampered the attainment of their re­
spective and sometimes overlapping political goals.
The first sub-group was considerably emboldened by the declara­
tion of President Zulfiqar A 1 i Bhutto of Pakistan that Bangladesh was
23. Fn. 20, but not In that order.
had temporarily occupied it. To add substance to his Government's
stand, the very first article of the new Constitution of Pakistan,
adopted in the National Assembly, declared Bangladesh as its terri-
24
tory. To the second sub-group, accepting the reality of Bangla­
desh was very hard indeed, but warm relations with India were psycho­
logically unbearable; the solace seemed to lie in restoring emotional 
ties with Pakistan. To the third sub-group, unlike the others, being 
a Bengali was as important as being a Muslim, both these identities 
being equally necessary. Thus, independent statehood in which the 
Bengali language and culture could flourish was as necessary as the 
new state's umbilical link with the Muslim Ummah to keep vigorously 
alive its religious identity. This sub-group, like the two others, 
was concerned that the Government's stress on secularism would u nder­
mine the country's religious foundations and that the friendship treaty 
would play a significant role in that.
To the third group, an independent state of Bangladesh was of 
more concern than religion and culture. This group, which had the 
largest following of the three, was extremely concerned at the possi­
ble dilution and even weakening of Bangladesh's sovereignty. Articles 
8,9 and 10 were its prime concern. The arguments against these
24. The draft of Pakistan's new Islamic Constitution presented to 
the National Assembly on 31 December 1972 provided for the re­
turn of "East Pakistan" to the proposed Federal Republic "as 
and when foreign aggression in that province and its effects 
are eliminated". The first article of the new Constitution 
adopted in the National Assembly (fifth In its history) in 
April 1973 made a wishful reference to its lost territory. It 
said: "The Constitution shall be appropriately amended so as 
to enable the people of the province of East Pakistan, as and 
when foreign aggression in that province and its effects are 
eliminated, to be represented in the affairs of the federation". 
The Hindu, 1 January 1973 and 11 April 1973
still an integral part o f Pakis ta n  e x c e p t  that h o s t i l e  foreign troops
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military provisions in the treaty ran thus: the treaty binds Bangla­
desh to the regional and global security interests of India and, by 
extension, the Soviet Union; Bangladesh, surrounded by 'friendly' 
India, was shielded from the outside world and therefore no j u s t i ­
fication exists for a security arrangement with India against n o n ­
existent third parties; a security link with India would drag Bangla­
desh much against its will into conflagrations where no Bangladeshi 
national interest would be served; for instance given the geography 
of the Northeast, the Chinese, in any future military struggle against 
India, could easily block off strategic passages, whereupon India, by 
a liberal interpretation of the military clauses of the treaty, could
send men and materiel through overland routes across Bangladesh's
25
territory, thus dragging Bangladesh into India's war. This group 
maintained that the treaty was actually prejudicial to Bangladesh's 
interests, and was not essential to Indo-Bang1adesh relations.
Thus the friendship treaty helped to coalesce opposing opinion, 
and put the League Government on the defensive. But the Government 
made no attempt to reveal to the public or to those in opposition the 
background to the treaty, how it came about, or why. It is therefore 
necessary to throw light on the political circumstances that led to 
the signing of such a treaty.
Background to the friendship t r e a t y : When the Yahya-Mujib talks 
failed and the Pakistan Army struck with full force in East Pakistan 
on the night of 25 March 1971, the Awami League leaders, with the 
exception of Mujib, fled to India, where they formed the Provisional
Government of Bangladesh in Calcutta in April 1371 under the leader­
ship of Tajuddin Ahmed.
One of the first concerns of this government was how to eject 
the Pakistan Army from East Pakistan so that the political control 
in Bangladesh could be secured by the Awami League, which had received 
an overwhelming public mandate to govern the whole of Pakistan in the 
December 1970 elections. The Provisional Government was painfully 
aware of its inadequate military capability to fight the extremely 
disciplined and well-armed Pakistan Army. The officers of the East 
Bengal Regiment (exclusively manned by Bengalis) stationed in Bangla­
desh, who established the initial rebel command and organized the
armed struggles against the Pakistan Army, had done so spontaneously
26
and without any directive from the Provisional Government. They 
were professional military officers with no political affiliation. 
Under the circumstances, the Provisional Government had to consider 
ways and means by which its own legitimacy as the sole representative 
of the Bangladeshi people could remain unchallenged and at the same 
time the conclusion of the struggle in its favour could be expedited.
Thus the idea of a special treaty with India took root. The 
Provisional Government hoped to achieve several objectives through 
this treaty. First, since a treaty could only be entered into by
26. In fact, at least on three occasions between 3 and 25 March 1971 
.when they, together with officers from the East Bengal Rifles, 
presented to Mujib detailed plans to counter the Pakistan Army,
Mujib demurred. When war broke out, the Mukti Bdhini initially 
took matters into its own hands. Anthony Mascarenhas, The Rape 
of Bangladesh, New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1972, cited 
in S .M . A 1 i, After che Dark Night: Problems of Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman, New Delhi: Thomson Press ( I nd i a) L t d ., 1973 , PP • 25-26
independent sovereign governments, it would imply Indian recognition 
not only of Bangladesh but also of the Provisional Government as the 
genuine government of the Bangladeshi people. This would be a trem­
endous moral boost for the Awami League. Obversely, it would be a 
blow to Pakistan, particularly to its Army fighting in East Pakistan. 
The reality of Bangladesh becoming an independent state would also 
be a step closer.
Second, the treaty would provide the formal and legal bases to 
seek the assistance of the Indian Army to counter the Pakistan Army, 
and the entire military operation would be carried out while m a i n ­
taining the independent character of Bangladesh. As the armed strug­
gle inside East Pakistan intensified and official exchanges between 
the two Governments on the contingency of war increased, the special 
treaty appeared to the Provisional Government quite indispensable. 
Ambassador Abul Fateh, who had defected to the Bangladeshi cause and 
served in the Provisional Government, recalls:
In September 1971, I posed a question to [Acting 
President] Syed Nazrul Islam: Will you sign a 
friendship treaty? His answer was, "Right away".
He wanted to sign the treaty then and there b e ­
cause it would mean India's recognition and it 
could bring Indian military help for Bang 1a d e s h . ^
It is not clear whether the idea of the treaty was extensively 
discussed among all the members of the Provisional Government, or 
whether there was any unanimity of view on the issue. One might safe 
ly assume that the discussions must have been confined to the inner 
group led by Tajuddin Ahmed, since the pro-lslamic and the pro-US
27- Interview with Ambassador Abul Fateh who served as Bangladesh's 
first Foreign Secretary. Dhaka, 5 June 1985
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group of Khondakar Mostaque Ahmed, Taheruddln Thakur and Mahbub Alam 
Chashi was a pariah in the Provisional Government because of its 
'secret' contact with the US Consulate in Calcutta.
In any event, a draft of the treaty was drawn up by Prime Mi n i s ­
ter Tajuddin Ahmed and Amirul Islam and they discussed it with D.P. 
Dhar, Mrs. Gandhi's liaison man in Calcutta. This was followed by 
another meeting between Tajuddin Ahmed, Dhar and Syed Nazrul Islam.
As Amirul Islam recalled:
It was actually at the insistance of the Bangla­
desh Provisional Government, mainly Tajuddin A h ­
med, that this treaty came about. A full forty- 
eight hours of exclusive discussion on this 
treaty took place in a separate apartment in 
Calcutta. The treaty was extensively discussed 
and in total secrecy. It was linked to the Indian 
Army participation and to India's recognition of 
our country.
According to Islam, the Provisional Government had discussed with
29
the Indian Government four essential points regarding the treaty:
1. Indian recognition of Bangladesh;
2. Request for the Indian Army to participate directly 
in the struggle, in addition to assistance for the 
Mukti Bahirii in training, sanctuary and arms;
3. Actual operation and stay of the Indian Army in 
Bangladesh: how the war was to be conducted, how 
destruction was to be minimized, and how to plan 
a short and quick victory; and
k. Withdrawal of the Indian Army as soon as the Bangla­
desh Government requested it.
India's main worry seems to have been whether its Army would face
resistance from the Bengali Muslims of East Pakistan. To face this
28. Interview in Dhaka on 15 June 1985
29. Ibid.
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possibility the Indian Army had with it civil advisors to maintain 
liaison with Bangladesh's civil officers; after the surrender of the 
Pakistan Army, these liaison officers were recalled.^
The secret negotiations, however, were never made public during 
the entire war period. On 16 November 1971, Indira Gandhi gave the 
international community an ultimatum of two weeks to resolve the East 
Pakistan crisis politically. A section of the Indian press speculated 
that should the crisis remain unresolved, the Indian Government would 
unilaterally "declare a state of emergency, extend recognition to the 
Bangladesh governm e n t - i n - e x i 1e , enter into a defence treaty with the 
Bengali guerrillas and openly support the Mukti Bdhini. It was b e ­
lieved that if India was forced into a war the defence clauses of the 
Indo-Bang1adesh Treaty of Friendship could be evoked by the Bengalis 
to invite Indian forces into Bangladesh. At the same time, the treaty
would justify India's decision to meet the Mukti Bahini's demand for
31
arms and military assistance".
At 5:45 pm on 3 December 1971 Pakistan launched a pre-emptive
32
air strike and several ground attacks in the Western sector. On 
6 December Mrs. Gandhi formally recognized Bangladesh and with that 
the Indian forces launched an all out attack in East Pakistan. On 
16 December the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan surrendered to the 
Joint Indo-Bangla Command. On 22 December the Provisional Government
30. M.A.W. Bhuiyan, Emergence of Bangladesh and Role of Awami L e a g u e , 
New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1982, p. 255
31. The H i n d u , 1 January 1972, p. 9
32. There were, however, military provocations across the East P akis­
tan border by Indian forces from as early as October. See The 
Times (London), 23 November 1971; The Daily Telegraph (L o n d o n ) ,
25 November 1971; and Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 December 
1971, p. 7
took Its seat in Dhaka. On 31 December 1971 the Foreign Minister of
Bangladesh was asked by a member of the press if there would be a
treaty of friendship between India and Bangladesh, to which he re-
33
plied that there was no need for such a treaty. When Mrs. Gandhi 
was asked a similar question in a press conference, she merely re­
ferred to the Bangladesh Foreign Minister's statement of the previous
34
day. If one assumes that a secret pact was signed during the war 
period, then it logically follows that no new treaty between the two 
countries would be necessary. But it is clear that both the Govern­
ments were committed to secrecy.
The issue did not die there, however, as there were numerous
speculations in the Indian press about the possibility of a treaty.
On 14 January 1972 at a press conference in Dhaka, Prime Minister
Mujib was asked whether there would be a special treaty between India
and Bangladesh. He replied:
We have a very special relationship. The re­
lationship is the friendliest, Our treaty of 
friendship is in our h e a r t s . ^
On the invitation of the Government of India, Mujib paid an 
official visit to Calcutta from 6 to 8 February 1972. The Joint 
Statement on the talks between the two Prime Ministers at the co n ­
clusion of the visit made no reference to any friendship treaty.
Yet at the conclusion of Indira Gandhi's visit to Dhaka from 17 to 
19 March 1972 the much speculated Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation 
and Peace between the two countries was finally signed. The following
119.
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34. Bangladesh D o c u m e n t s , vol. Il, op.ci t . p. 635
35. Ibid.
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day Tne Hindu declared:
A draft of this treaty was discussed by the 
Prime Ministers of India and Bangladesh at 
their meeting in Calcutta last month when they 
agreed in principle to sign, but preferred to 
defer it until Mrs. Gandhi's visit to Dacca so 
that the announcement could come as a fitting 
climax to the withdrawal of the Indian forces.
Mujib Government's Tactical F a i l u r e : The Government seems to 
have erred in handling the treaty issue. It had not made public the 
existence of any pact with the Indian Government, though after inde­
pendence it was widely suspected that a secret pact existed. It 
was not until mid-January 1973 that the Bangladesh Foreign Minister,
Abdus Samad Azad, grudgingly admitted to the existence of a secret
37
understanding between the two Governments during the war.
Immediately after independence, when pro-Indian feeling was at 
its peak, public support for the League was almost universal and Mujib 
himself was at full political ascendance, it would not have been di f ­
ficult to explain the political circumstances and the exigency of the 
war period that necessitated entering into such an arrangement with 
India. A timely explanation would have taken the wind out of o p p o s i ­
tion sails, denying it any political mileage on this issue. But by 
failing to act decisively, the League found itself on the defensive. 
This reflected negatively on the credibility of the party and cast a 
shadow on I ndo-Bar.g 1 adesh relations. Labelling the Government's y e a r ­
long silence as "a strange travesty of people's rights", Holiday 
warned that
the deadly pattern of distrust, subterfuge and 
dark motives which typified Pakistan's rule
36. Issue of 20 March 1972, p. 1 
37- Holiday, 21 January 1973
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ominously threatens to be repeated. The libera­
tion struggle of Bangladesh was a clear and total 
rejection of a corrupt and untenable system...The 
present government is under moral compulsion to 
make public the details of the p a c t ...u n 1 e s s , of 
course, it has a skeleton in the cupboard.
It is unclear why the League chose to remain silent over an issue 
as critical as this. It may be that in the changed circumstances 
of independence, the secret understandings would have appeared too 
yielding to Indian interests. It is also possible that Mujib might 
not have liked these understandings and was unable to do anything 
about them, and therefore preferred to maintain silence over the 
i s s u e .
The Government did not even publicly discuss the open treaty. 
Several explanations may be offered. One explanation could be that 
at the time the treaty was signed, the Bangladesh Government was 
materially and psychologically indebted to India for its support 
during the war period and painfully aware of the need to maintain 
that dependence for some time into the future, especially since a s ­
sistance from other quarters was not yet forthcoming. Any public 
criticism of the treaty would have been extremely embarrassing to 
the League Government, and could have also jeopardized the continua 
tion of the much-needed Indian assistance.
A  s e c o n d  p 1a u s i b 1e explanation is that the treaty was viewed 
by the Government as merely an institutionalization of what was a l ­
ready a reality - namely, the special friendship between the two 
countries. The treaty was not seen as a radical departure from the
3 8 . Ibid.
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existing state of relations, and hence there was no need to a r t i c u ­
late it further in public. Interviews with members of that Govern­
ment support this view. For instance, President Chowdhury was of
39
the opinion that "the friendship treaty was merely a communique".
And Foreign Secretary Karim recalled:
It was always an unstated assumption that 
Bang 1adesh-1ndia relationship was a special 
relationship and because we are going to 
have a special relationship why not insti­
tutionalize it through a treaty that could 
create a framework for more c o o p e r a t i o n .^
A third possible explanation is that at the time the Treaty was 
signed the Government was saddled with numerous problems that it had 
to tackle simultaneously. The treaty was only one issue among a gamut 
of many other very pressing issues; thus the Government could not give 
as much public exposure to the treaty as it otherwise might have.
Which of the above explanations is most credible is a matter of 
opinion, no doubt, but elements of all three may have been present in 
the Government's decision not to give any singular emphasis to the 
treaty aspect of its relationship with India. That the Government 
feared public criticism, especially since the Khondakar faction had 
strong reservations about it, seems to have been an important factor 
indeed. That the Government had numerous other affairs of state to 
attend to was also true. And that the Government did not view the 
treaty as anything specially significant, in view of the already 
existing 'eternal f r i e n d s h i p 1, may also have been the case as e v i ­
dence suggests. Whatever the most likely explanation, it is clear
39» Interview in Dhaka on 2 June 1985 
kO. Interview in New York on 26 March 1985
that the Government failed to gauge properly the depth of anti- 
Indian sentiments prevailing within the party and among certain 
sections of the politically active public.
Why was the Treaty s i g n e d ? : A number of reasons why the friend­
ship treaty came about have been offered by political observers. A c ­
cording to one source close to the League, the signing of the treaty 
was linked to the withdrawal of the Indian Army from Bangladesh. With 
a large number of countries, particularly China and certain Muslim 
countries like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and 
Jordan, withholding their recognition of Bangladesh because of the 
presence of Indian troops, the need was felt to effect a quick w i t h ­
drawal of the troops from Bangladesh soil. "Consequently, at the end, 
an arrangement was made to sign a Treaty and as a bargain Mujib was 
able to effect the withdrawal of the Indian army. Accordingly, by 
a prior arrangement, the Indian army was formally withdrawn on March
12, 1972.. .and in return, just a week later, Bangladesh received Mrs.
Gandhi on its soil and signed the Joint Declaration and the Friend- 
41
ship Treaty."
Another observer cites unnamed sources close to Mujib who sug­
gest that "rather than being pressured, Sheikh was the one who a p ­
proached Mrs. Gandhi on such a treaty". This observer offered two 
explanations for Mujib's alleged insistence on signing the treaty. 
First, signing the treaty with India would demonstrate Bangladesh's 
sovereign and independent status, indicating further its capability
123.
41. Moudud Ahmed, Bangladesh: Era of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, op.cit. 
pp. 185-186
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allegedly saw the treaty as an insurance against his own political
fall. The treaty was to provide Indian support in any political up-
42
heaval against his party.
A third explanation, based on an assertion by an Indian j o u r ­
nalist suggests that Mrs. Gandhi needed the treaty to show her people 
that there was a ‘pay o f f 1 for all that India had done for the people
of Bangladesh. The treaty had been done in haste, lest relations be-
43
tween New Delhi and Dhaka turn sour.
Yet a fourth explanation starts with the assumption that there 
was a secret wartime treaty between the Indian Government and the 
Provisional Government, and the clauses of this treaty dictated the 
nature of relationship between the two Governments during the war 
period as well as in the post-independence period. The argument 
goes that "India was conscious of her inability to bind down Bangla­
desh with this treaty in the changed circumstances of independence. 
Therefore, in order to legalize it, she had necessarily to come for­
ward with an open treaty of similar nature. Given the existence of 
an anti-Indian lobby within the Awami League and the rapid disenchant­
ment with India among the Bangladesh people, India had also to ensure
44
the conclusion of this treaty in the minimum possible time".
to m a n a g e  its own a f f a i r s  and m a k e  its own d e c i s i o n s .  Second, Mujib
42. Ishtiaq Hossain, "Bang 1adesh-India Relations: Issues and Pro­
blems", in Emajuddin Ahamed, e d . Foreign Policy of Bangladesh 
Dhaka: The University Press L t d ., 1984, p. 35 ~~
43. A1i , op.ci t . ,  p. 145; cited in Siddiqui, op.ci t . ,  p. 16
44. Siddiqui, o p . c i t . ,  pp. 16-17
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Of these interpretations, the first one would be very att r a c ­
tive to the pro-islamic and the pro-Chinese lobby in Bangladesh.
They had all along suspected India of having ulterior motives in 
assisting Bangladesh and viewed the treaty as a form of exaction 
for services rendered. This interpretation does imply a certain 
degree of arm twisting by India, in the sense that the treaty was 
a quid pro quo for the withdrawal of the Indian military from Bangla­
desh's soil. However, if one subscribes to the view, as does Presi­
dent Chowdhury, that India desired to promote the image of a b ene­
factor among the people of Bangladesh, then it is difficult to accept 
the notion that it would put such a steep price on the withdrawing 
of its Army. One has to concede that friendship between countries 
requires a strong foundation of mutual trust and if the Indian lea­
dership genuinely desired that the people and government of Bangla­
desh should be favourably disposed towards India, then this e x p lana­
tion is suspect. According to Foreign Secretary Karim:
Various forms of cooperation had been discussed 
during Sheikh M u j i b 's visit to Calcutta a month 
before the signing of the treaty. At that time 
we went through the whole gamut of various types 
of cooperation that could take place...It was 
I n d M  who made these proposals. They were well 
prepared. They came practically with texts of 
framework for discussion. Practically everything 
was initiated from their side. We reacted rather 
than Initiated anything. If the friendship 
treaty was their idea they would have had a 
draft with them like other texts. But they 
d i d n ' t . , -
45
It Is possible that the issue of the treaty may have been discussed 
privately by Mujib and Indira Gandhi and no member of either delega­
tion was privy to it.
45. Interview, op.ci t. (40)
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The second interpretation, that Mujib insisted on such a treaty 
to demonstrate Bangladesh's sovereignty and also to benefit from Indian 
military intervention on his behalf, is also quite untenable. When 
securing recognition from as many countries as possible would confer 
greater legitimacy on Bangladesh's statehood, why would Bangladesh 
sign a treaty with India and undermine its recognition from the Muslim 
bloc and China? It is also inconceivable that Mujib who was known to 
his people as Bangabandhu ('friend of Bengal') would deem it necessary 
to depend on Indian military power for his political survival. It 
may be mentioned here that the Defence Forces Intelligence had on a 
number of occasions informed Mujib of a certain senior Bangladeshi 
Army officer's activities that were prejudicial to the Prime Minister's 
political and physical survival, to which he is supposed to have re­
plied that his political power emanated from the people, not from
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the Army. If the Prime Minister did not feel the need to depend
on the Bangladesh Army for his political survival, it is all the
more ridiculous to think that he would consider the Indian Army his
political guarantor. Given M u j i b 's universal image at home of being
a fierce nationalist and a patriot, it is difficult to comprehend
that he would sign a treaty with India against Bangladesh's interests.
As Inder Molhotra, the editor of the Times of India, observed:
Mujib wouldn't tolerate an affront. If the 
Indo-Bangla treaty infringed on Bangladesh's 
sovereignty, Mujib would have thrown it o v e r ­
board . ^
46. Confidential interview with a senior Bangladeshi Army officer 
who served in a sensitive post during the League Government. 
Dhaka, 9 July 1985
47. Interview in New Delhi on 26 April 1985
As to the other two interpretations, that the treaty was a pay 
off needed by Mrs. Gandhi and that it was a public legalization of 
the wartime pact, these probably contain certain elements of truth.
It is plausible that a treaty with Bangladesh would be a feather in 
Mrs. Gandhi's cap and would also serve the additional purpose of 
making public a confidential agreement reached duringtthe war period.
Given Mujib's tremendous emotional appeal among the people of 
Bangladesh, it is reasonable to expect that he would not need to 
agree to a treaty under duress. If one assumes that he would not 
sign a treaty with India under duress, that he would never barter 
away Bangladesh's national interests, and that the Indian leaders 
would be politically sagacious enough not to negotiate Indian troop 
withdrawal in the form of a treaty - all of these assumptions being 
quite realistic - then the only plausible interpretation would be 
that Mujib did not attach much significance to the treaty when he 
signed it, and certainly did not feel that Bangladesh's sovereignty 
would in any way be vitiated by it. The treaty was perhaps an o b ­
liging gesture to Mrs. Gandhi for whom it became a great political 
dividend. Mujib probably felt that given the extent of Indian a s ­
sistance to the liberation struggle, the Bangladeshis would not be 
offended by such a treaty. But despite his keen political percep­
tions, what he failed to appreciate was that it would not be the 
masses but a particular section of the Bangladeshi elite that would 
be agitated by the treaty. The stirrings against the treaty came 
to his notice only later.
It is perhaps for the same reasons that there was such neglect 
in making public the negotiations leading to the signing of the
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treaty. It appears that except for M u j i b , the pro-Moscow Foreign 
Minister Abdus Samad Azad and the pro-Indian Foreign Secretary (ad­
ministrative) S.A.M.S. Kibria, no one was really aware of it. Even 
the most senior officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had no 
advance knowledge of it. One of them later complained:
If the officials of India and the Soviet Union 
had two years to prepare for a similar treaty 
between their countries, the Sheikh might have 
given us at least two months to work on our 
treaty.48
And the former President himself recalled:
When Bangabandhu and Mrs. Gandhi walked to my 
room and when Sheikh Mujib gave me a copy of 
the treaty, Mrs. Gandhi realized that I had 
not been told of it, and s-he was visibly su r ­
prised. I had never been told of this treaty.
I first heard of it at a press c o n f e r e n c e .
In fact it was not even tabled for discussion when the Bangladesh 
Parliament convened, one month after the treaty was signed, whereas 
Mrs. Gandhi submitted it to the Indian Parliament the following day. 
The treaty came up for discussion in the Bangladesh Parliament on
13 April 1973, almost thirteen months after the actual signing.
Conflicting Interpretations of Treaty P r o v i s i o n s : As stated 
earlier the Awami League, with the exception of the Khondakar group, 
viewed the treaty as beneficial to Bangladesh, since it provided a 
basic framework of cooperation and collaboration between the two 
Governments - an important cornerstone of the League's foreign policy. 
But most other parties and certain sections of the informed public,
48. Quoted in A 1 i, o p .ci t . p. 144 
49* Interview, op.cit. (39)
which did not share its benign image of India, considered the treaty 
inimical to Bangladesh's interests.
The root cause of this diverse view was their conflicting per­
ceptions of India. Since the League viewed India asthe benefactor, 
a treaty with it was seen to strengthen Bangladesh's sovereign e x i s ­
tence. But the NAP-B, the CPB(M-L) and the JSD, to name a few, su s ­
pected India of aspiring to regional hegemony and saw the development 
of closer ties with e x t r a - r e g i o n a 1 centres of power as a greater 
guarantee of security against the regional behemoth. In such a s i ­
tuation, even if the treaty were renegotiated to dispel all possible 
fears of India, one suspects that it would still be unacceptable to 
the opposition, simply because it would establish a sort of institu­
tionalized link between the two countries, a development to which 
most non-Awami Leaguers seemed to be adverse.
The treaty as it stood gave scope for considerable criticism. 
Though Article 1 offered a solemn pledge to "refrain from interfer­
ing in the internal affairs of the other side", it was a small c o n ­
solation in the face of certain other articles that, one could argue, 
legitimized interference in the affairs of Bangladesh. According to 
Article 4 the signatories were required to "maintain regular c o n ­
tacts with each other on major international problems affecting the 
interests of both States". While on the surface it appeared innocu­
ous enough, stripped to the bone it could mean two things: Bangladesh 
had to keep India informed of its foreign policy pursuits; and 
Bangladesh was not at liberty to conduct its foreign policy without 
taking into account repercussions on India's interests, according to 
a strict interpretation of the clause. Though Article 4 alluded to
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reciprocal concern for each other's interests, one had to contend 
with the possibility that sooner or later Bangladesh's external p o ­
licies might be subject to revision to keep the Indian Ministry of 
External Affairs happy. The wording of this article was disturbing 
also for another reason; it reminded one of Nepal, whose foreign and 
defence policies stood effectively circumscribed by its friendship 
treaty with India.
Article 6 seemed to increase Bangladesh's insecurity by requir- 
ing it to commit itself to India's regional plans in the Eastern half 
of the subcontinent with regard to flood control, river basin d e v elop­
ment, pow e r a n d  irrigation, without any reference to Bangladesh's s o ­
vereign status. While a common approach regarding these issues could 
greatly benefit Bangladesh, given India's relatively considerable 
economic, scientific, technical and industrial resources, the need 
for sovereign assertion by the Bangladeshi elite seemed to undermine 
that. A commitment to solve the perennial problem of the equitable 
sharing of the Ganges waters between the two countries would have 
been a healthier first step; instead, the pr e -1971 Indian proposal 
to build a barrage at Farakka, a few miles upstream from the Bangla­
desh border, to divert water from the international river Ganges to 
the local Hooghly, without guaranteeing Bangladesh the unobstructed 
flow of its equitable share, was already of great concern to Bangla­
desh. Once India's regional plans for the river basin development 
were accepted, India would then be in a position to control all the 
54 rivers including the major ones - Ganges, Brahmaputra, Teesta,
Gumti, Karnaphuli - that flowed from its territory, thereby securing 
a stranglehold on Bangladesh's riverine economy. Thus acceding to
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Article 6 could mean allowing India formally to establish a hold 
over Bangladesh.
Article 8, which required each party to abstain from entering 
or participating in any military alliance directed against the other, 
was seen by the anti-Indian lobby as restricting Bangladesh's secu­
rity options. Since, in its estimation, India was the adversary, a 
logical step would be to seek security arrangements with those who 
could guarantee Bangladesh's territorial integrity against a possi­
ble Indian threat. It is doubtful whether the anti-Indian lobby 
ever considered the fact that reaching a security understanding with 
I ndia c o u 1d perhaps bring for Bang 1adesh the best territorial security 
possible under the circumstances. Convinced that India was the real 
enemy, the anti-India lobby took particular exception to this treaty, 
because it foreclosed the option to seek security or defence arrange­
ments with China or the United States.
Article 9, which required mutual consultations in order to take 
appropriate effective steps to eliminate any threat to either country, 
was seen as laying the legal basis for the use of Bangladesh terri­
tory in the event of a war between India and C h i n a . ^  And under A r t i ­
cle 10 Bangladesh was prevented from undertaking any commitment with 
a third party "which may be incompatible with the present Treaty".
This could be seen as not only restricting Bangladesh's political 
options but also raising the question of who would decide what was 
incompatible. Though Article 12 laid down bilateral negotiation "in 
a spirit of mutual respect and understanding" as the basis for
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50. Siddiqui, op.ci t . , pp. 17“18
resolving any differences in the interpretation of the treaty, it 
was quite possible that Bangladesh would not be able to escape 
the O r w e l 1ian dilemma of facing a 'more equal' India in such situa­
tions.*^ Since interpretations of treaty clauses occasionally led 
to conflictual situations, critics were all the more uncomfortable 
with the treaty.
Regional Implications: The full significance of the friend­
ship treaty cannot be understood solely in the context of Indo-Bangla 
relations, for it has important implications in the regional context 
as w e l 1.
The overriding factor in South Asian politics would seem to be 
the 'tyranny of geography', which placed India in a predominant posi­
tion in the subcontinent, thus forcing it to reconcile a series of 
interconnected security implications. Indian security and defence 
perceptions had undergone a thorough overhaul after the 1962 Sino- 
Indian war. India had realized then that the Panch SHeel ('five prin­
ciples' of interstate relations) first enunciated in the Nehru-Chou 
talks of 1954 had little relevance in the clash of state interests.
One important lesson it learned was that its ultimate security rested 
on the proper military defence of the whole of the subcontinent. This of 
course would require cooperation from its regional neighbours.
In the light of these observations the friendship treaty would 
have several implications. First, it was a step towards India's a t ­
tempts to build a system of security in the subcontinent so that
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51. Holi d a y ,  26 M a r c h  1972, p. 1
forces external to this area could be effectively excluded from 
having any say whatsoever in the affairs of the region. There has 
always been the unspoken assumption in the minds of the Indian lea­
ders that the main responsibility of underwriting the defence and 
security of the South Asian region was India's. Therefore foreign 
intrusion, in the form of defence arrangements between regional c o u n ­
tries and external powers, has always been of vital concern to India, 
as it was seen to support political forces that worked to subvert 
regional unity and cooperation. India had tried to foreclose the 
need among its regional neighbours to turn outwards for the gua r a n ­
tee of their respective territorial integrity by offering no-war 
pacts or entering into treaties of friendship with them, out the 
results had been disappointing.
Second, the treaty was a step towards the promotion of politi­
cal stability in the region, as it was an essential prerequisite to 
regional security. It considerably stabilized the politics in the 
Eastern region on three counts: communal disturbances were checked;
Naxalites and other leftist extremists were either routed or deci-
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mated; and the insurgency in India's Eastern states was contained 
if not permanently undermined. These developments were in keeping 
with India's basic desire to maintain the status quo in the region 
so that leftist adventurism and rightist fanaticism would remain 
c o n t a I n e d .
Third, it guaranteed India a stake in Bangladesh's domestic 
and external politics. The provision of the treaty not only required
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52. Ibid., 2 April 1972
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India to defend Bangladesh against external threats, they also left
open the possibility of Indian intervention in Bangladesh's internal
53
affairs under extenuating circumstances.
Fourth, it created for Bangladesh certain obligations towards
the subcontinent, thus assuring Bangladesh a regional role. This
was of no small benefit to India, because with a high coincidence of
interests between New Delhi and Dhaka India was assured of political
support in its regional undertakings. Bangladesh's acquiescence in
India's annexation of Sikkim and the explosion of a nuclear device
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are cases in point. In addition, the treaty also assured India 
of joint studies and integrative approaches to regional development 
i s s u e s .
The net effect of the treaty has been greatly beneficial to 
India because it was able to realize at least three important re­
gional objectives: (1) India was able to convince Bangladesh that 
it did not require any defence arrangement with external powers, nor 
a strong army since, in both cases, India would assume the responsi­
bility for Bangladesh's defence; (2) India's influence and 'guidance' 
in Bangladesh's affairs were guaranteed by several treaty provisions, 
particularly Article 4; and (3) the economic 'salvation' of Eastern
53- There have been several reports of Indian Army concentrations
along Bangladesh's Western border immediately after the fall of 
the Mujib Government. Some reports suggested that the Indian 
Army had actually penetrated several miles into Bangladesh, 
but withdrew upon learning that 'pro-Indian' Brigadier Khaled 
Musharraf had come to power through a counter-coup on 3 Novem­
ber 1975. Confidential interviews, o p .c i t . (2) and (46). It 
was also alleged that Musharraf was toppled and killed on 7 
November just when he was going to invoke the treaty. Ishtiaq 
Hossain, op.c i t . (42)
54. Foreign Minister Kamal Hossain's comment on the nuclear test is 
noteworthy: "Other countries may have an opinion of their own, 
but I do not think India's nuclear explosion for peaceful pur­
poses will create any tension in the subcontinent." Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 8 July 1974, p. 14
India was assured by the economic understandings across the "border 
of peace and friendship". With the high coincidence of interests 
between the Indira Government and the Mujib Government, India could 
feel secure in the.knowledge that the Eastern part of the subcontinent 
had been effectively insulated from outside interference.
But it was precisely for these reasons that the opposition par­
ties were vehemently against the treaty. Seeing a denudation of Bang­
ladesh's political, economic and defence options, they feared 'en­
capsulation* by India. Not only did they oppose the treaty provisions 
they simply rejected the notion of a treaty with India because they 
were aware of the fact that in all such treaty arrangements, "between 
a strong and a weak power, the latter implicitly surrenders part of 
its independence of policy in exchange for security, which is direct­
ly or indirectly guaranteed by the stronger p o w e r " . ^
Cone 1 us i ons: The Indo-Bang1adesh friendship treaty had sought 
to lay down a long-term framework for bilateral cooperation and peace, 
but the affair was mishandled by the League Government due to what 
appears to have been a gross political miscalculation. The failure 
on both sides t o g r a s p t h e  consequences of the treaty for Indo-Bangla- 
desh relations would suggest a certain degree of complacency on the 
part of both Governments. It would seem that neither side seriously 
thought that there would be any noticeable degree of public displea­
sure in the signing of the treaty if too much was not made of it.
This was a costly misjudgement.
55- J.D. Sethi, "Indo-Soviet Treaty and Nonalignment", India Q u a r ­
terly, vol. 27, no. k, (Oct -Dec 1971), p. 330
At the heart of the disagreement were the diverging views of 
the League and those opposing it. While the League saw it as merely 
the institutionalization of the actual relations obtaining at the 
time between India and Bangladesh, the detractors of the treaty saw 
a more sinister picture in which India's influence and interference 
in Bangladesh's affairs, both internal and external, were assured. 
While the League did not see the treaty as infringing on Bangla­
desh's sovereignty, those opposing it saw it as severely restric­
ting Bangladesh's political and security options, and also as a 
means to stifle nationalist sentiments. The Mujib Government saw 
the friendship treaty as essentially a diplomatic instrument, w h e r e ­
as the opposition saw It as a military instrument.
Ironically, it would seem that to India the treaty had greater 
significance as a security arrangement In the region than as a diplo­
matic one. In fact, most observers within the region and outside
it gave greater emphasis to its security clauses than to any other
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aspect of the treaty. Unfortunately for Bangladesh, these se­
curity clauses had negative political ramifications; the treaty was 
no longer simply a friendship treaty, but had come to be seen as a 
security arrangement aimed at countries internal and external to 
the region. Bangladesh's chances for quick recognition from the 
pro-Pakistan Muslim countries and from China were undermined; re­
cognition from the former was delayed till the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference summit in Lahore in February 1974, and recogni­
tion from the latter came only after the League Government's
56. For instance, Nicole Ball, Regional Conflicts and the Inter­
national System: A Case Study of B a n g l a d e s h , Institute for 
the Study of International Organization, University of Sussex, 
first series, number nine, 1974, p. 48
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Since the timing of the treaty was politically unwise because 
it created an unncessary obstacle to recognition by certain impor­
tant countries, one can only speculate to what extent secret under­
standings between the Indira Government and the Provisional Govern­
ment influenced it. But the high coincidence of interests between 
New Delhi and Dhaka, as reflected by the treaty, no doubt paved the 
way for Dhaka's political support in India's regional undertakings; 
in other words, on specific issues, India's influence over Dhaka 
became highly probable.
If the League leadership had been wise, the treaty could have 
been used to Bangladesh's advantage. The security clauses in the 
treaty would suggest the Government's desire to obviate the ne c e s ­
sity of maintaining a large defence force. With India guaranteeing 
Bangladesh's security, the Government was in an enviable position 
to keep the country's defence budget at a minimum while concentra­
ting the bulk of its resources on much-needed socio-economic 
developments. The economic and other benefits accruing from such 
a policy would have blunted any criticism the League's detractors 
would have had regarding the limitations on sovereign prerogative 
inherent in the treaty. But due to conflicting interests within 
the party hierarchy, the Government was unable to realize any of 
these essential goals. The result was an alienated army and co n ­
fused economic policies. In the next two chapters, these two 
issues will be dealt with in detail.
It is also clear that the influence theory was in operation.
137.
downfall in A u g u s t  1975-
The Provisional Government sought to influence the Indira Govern­
ment into speedily recognizing it so that it could establish itself 
as the legitimate government of the future Bangladesh, and it did 
so by holding up the promise of pursuing pro-Indian policies. Thus, 
in exchange for India's recognition of Bangladesh and its assistance 
in installing the League Government in power in Dhaka, Prime M i n i s ­
ter Tajuddin Ahmed was willing to pursue a policy of acquiescence 
towards India. The Interests of both the ruling elites were served.
Mujib's decision to sign the treaty with India indicated a 
shift in his previous position that a friendship treaty between 
the two countries was not necessary because "our treaty of friend­
ship is in our hearts". According to our first criterion - shifts 
in the position of the actor influenced - this is an example of 
inf1uence.
Whatever reason Mujib may have had for signing the treaty with 
India, it not only enhanced India's strategic position in South 
Asia - an influence manifestation according to the sixth criterion 
- it also distanced whatever influence the Chinese and the co n ­
servative Muslim states might have had on Bangladesh's internal 
and external policies. The latter improved sharply India's ability 
to carry out political transactions vis-a-vis Dhaka - which is our 
second criterion of influence manifestation. In short, the treaty 
was generally seen in India as a rare example in history of a close 
relationship between two countries; from this, the implications of 
an influence relationship are obvious.
C h a p t e r  5
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As already stated in Chapter Three, one of the Indian Government's 
motives for militarily assisting East Pakistan in its war against West 
Pakistan in 1971 was the expectation that the former's independence 
would bring an economic windfall to India. Particularly in the state 
of West Bengal, there was a universal assumption that better days were 
ahead because the volume of trade with Bangladesh would now exceed 
even that achieved in 1965, in the September of which year all trade 
between East Pakistan and the neighbouring Indian states had been 
banned on account of the Indo-Pakistan war.
In the first two years after Bangladesh's independence, India 
was the country's most important trading partner because India was 
the only country willing to underwrite Bangladesh's economic viability 
and because trading with a neighbouring country made good economic 
sense. But while Indian assistance substantially contributed to 
Bangladesh's economic survival during those formative years, it also 
conjured up memories of pre-partition days when the Muslim majority 
in then East Bengal was relegated to a subservient economic role; 
the revival of that relationship was widely feared in Bangladesh.
This chapter is an examination of the complexities of the e c o ­
nomic relations between the two countries during those initial years, 
and their political ramifications.
INITIAL SETBACK: P R O B L E M S  IN ECONO MI C  REL A TI O N S
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If one traces the roots of Indo-Bang1adesh economic alienation, 
one is likely to be led to certain intellectual conclusions arrived 
at by important sections of the Indian elite during the Pakistan crisis 
of 1971 that were patently false. The primary motive for the seces­
sion of East Pakistan from Pakistan was the desire among the East 
Bengalis for economic self-determination. A section of the Indian 
elite chose to give a greater meaning to this act of secession than 
was warranted. It asserted that in seeking independent statehood, 
the people of East Pakistan had rejected the 'Two Nation' theory and 
had opted to restore their former economic links with India.^ In re­
trospect, while the former assertion was patently wrong, the latter 
was a distortion of the truth. The issue of the 'Two Nation' theory 
has been discussed in Chapter Three and needs no recapitulation here, 
but the issue of the restoration of economic links with India requires 
c 1 ar i f i cat ion.
In 1971, Pran Chopra, an eminent Indian political commentator
and former editor of The Statesman (Calcutta and New Delhi) summed
up the Indian view thus:
The people of East Bengal have long desired 
closer economic cooperation with India...with 
such cooperation India and East Bengal can 
find much better answers to the grave e cono­
mic and political problems of the area than 
either can by itself.^
1. See the arguments in Chapter 3
2. Pran Chopra ed. The Challenge of Bangladesh: A Special D e b a t e , 
Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1971, P- 9
While it is true that Bangladesh wanted trading relations with India, 
what was overlooked in India was that this would have to be on Bangla­
desh's terms; that is, there would be no going back to the pattern of 
trade that existed in pre-partition days when East Bengal served as 
the hinterland of Calcutta, where all manufacturing was concentrated. 
Such an expectation was unsound in the changed circumstances of the 
1970s, no matter how reasonable it may have appeared to some Indian 
economic planners. This important qualification on which hinged the 
future of Indo-Bang1adesh economic relations, as events later proved, 
was a costly oversight by the economic planners in India. D.P. Dhar, 
chairman of the Policy Planning Commission of the Indian Ministry of 
External Affairs and described at the time as eminence grise of Mrs. 
Gandhi, himself seems to have been guilty of it. According to Peter 
Gill, the Daily Telegraph's South Asia correspondent in New Delhi 
from June 1971 to 1975:
Dhar saw the opportunity for economic and co m ­
mercial relations. To him Bangladesh was a 
vast market for Indian goods. He saw Bangla­
desh in mercantile and economic terms. He 
talked of resumption of pre-partition e c o n o ­
mic relations between East Bengal and West 
B e n g a 1.^
Without serious consideration of how Bangladesh's already war-ravaged
economy would be affected, Indian economists argued for the integration
of the economy of Bangladesh with the economy of Eastern India:
A Jute Community, Tea Community, a Customs and 
a Payments Union, total Inter-Governmental State 
Trading, a single Electricity and a single Water 
Resources grid for the whole of Eastern India and 
Bangladesh can...lay the foundations of a long 
term perspective plan based on the immense water
3. Interview in London, 5 April 1985
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and mineral resources of the entire Lower 
Ganges-Brahmaputra Basin...^
It was further argued that not only would India remain Bangla­
desh's "chief and dominant trading partner", but that "India is about 
the only country whose aid Bangladesh can requite with little cost to 
itself and in fact at much benefit, and with whom by the same means 
it can balance its trade".^ Thus, the theme of mutual benefit through 
economic cooperation between the two countries was constantly invoked 
in certain vested quarters in India.
It was equally in the Indian interest that Bangladesh's ec o n o ­
mic recovery should be swift for at least two compelling reasons. 
Having speeded up Bangladesh's political independence and assisted 
the League Government to come to power, India had to guarantee the 
new Government's economic viability. Second, a delayed economic re­
covery in Bangladesh would also delay the economic windfall to India 
that many Indians, including Dhar, eagerly waited for.
The Indian Government was aware of the economic exigency in 
Bangladesh and confident of tackling it successfully. Mrs. Gandhi 
admitted in a press conference that the rehabilitation of the Bangla­
desh economy "is a very big task, but it certainly is manageable 
[because it] is not as bad as we f e a r e d ... part 1y due to the rapid 
advance of the Indian armed forces which had been able to prevent 
destruction on a large scale". And P.N. Haksar, Mrs. Gandhi's
4. See for instance, Boudhayan C h a t t o p a d h y a y , "Impact of Bangla­
desh: Economic Dimensions", Seminar #150> February 1972, p. 27
5. Pran Chopra, "Bangla Desh in Search of a Role" India Q u a r t e r l y , 
vol. xxviii, no. 2 (April-June 1972), p. 124
6. The Hindu, 1 January 1972, p. 9
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Principal Secretary, remembered:
Immediately after the war, India's overriding 
concern was to help Bangladesh in its economy, 
transport and food situation. India had then 
nine million tons of surplus foodstock. Up to 
1973 our concern was dictated by the needs in 
the aftermath of the war.^
The first expression of I n d o - B a n g 1adesh economic cooperation 
came in the form of a trade agreement, signed on 28 March 1972. It 
envisaged two types of trade: a border trade between the two countries 
whereby permits would be issued to people living up to sixteen k ilo­
metres on either side of the border to dispose of their goods on a 
day to day basis; and a balanced rupee trade worth R s . 250 million 
(US $35 m) each way. The border trade was to be free of customs and 
currency regulations and restricted to specified commodities only,
while the rupee trade was to be in goods of special interest to the
8
two countries and on a balanced basis.
Under the latter provision, among the important commodities 
that India agreed to export to Bangladesh were cement (Rs 45m), raw 
tobacco (Rs 100m), cotton textiles (Rs 2.5m), cotton yarn (Rs 15m), 
coal (Rs 4 0 m ) , asphalt (Rs 10m), chemicals and pharmaceuticals 
(RS 2.5m) and machinery and spare parts (Rs 5m). In return, Bangla­
desh agreed to export to India fresh fish (Rs 90m), semi-tanned c o w ­
hides (Rs 10m), raw jute (Rs 75m), furnace oil, batching oil and
7- Interview in New Delhi, 28 April 1985
8. For the text of the trade agreement see, Government of India, 
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Publications Divi­
sion, Bangladesh D o c u m e n t s , vol. 11, May 1972, pp. 648-656; 
also given in Appendix 2.
naphtha (Rs 15m), and newsprint and low grammage writing paper 
(Rs 30m).9
Within months these trade arrangements precipitated undesira­
ble political repercussions in Bangladesh because the economic effect 
on the people was anything but beneficial. The export to India of 
fish, eggs and poultry, to name just a few, greatly reduced domestic 
supply causing considerable hardship particularly to the poorer sec­
tions comprising the peasantry, the working class and the lower m i d ­
dle class. India was blamed for the scarcity and the resulting price
10
r i se.
But smuggling across the border did considerable damage to 
Indo-Bangladesh economic relations. It had existed even before 
Bangladesh's independence, but the daring and the scale it reached 
immediately after independence was uniike anything seen before. The 
2,600 kilometers of border cutting through swampland, dense jungles 
and winding rivers of the Bengal delta already made border policing 
impossible. To this, two new factors were added: the inter-state 
cordiality of the period brought about a corr e s p o n d i n g 1y relaxed 
border vigilance, thus allowing a drastic rise in smuggling; and 
some members of the Awami League itself, in the aftermath of the 
League's control over the country's economy were not averse to 
making quick money while the opportunity presented itself.  ^ As a
9. Ibid. , pp. 650-651
10. Economic and Political Weekly (Bombay), vol. v i i , no. 24, 10 
June 1972, p"! TT52
11. When Mujib deployed the Army to curb smuggling, many of the 
smugglers caught were found to be operating under the direct 
supervision and protection of some Awami League leaders. When 
the Army arrested the Awami League members involved in
144.
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result, Bangladeshi jute, rice and fish were being smuggled to India 
thereby pushing their domestic prices up and adversely affecting no r ­
mal trade. The border trade agreement was thus doomed even before it 
could be properly implemented; between March and June 1972 border
1 2
trade between the two countries was valued at only US$ 13-7 million.
While the Bangladeshis saw smuggling as its primary cause, the League
Government blamed it on the disruption of trans p o r t a t i o n , the absence
of formalized banking arrangements and procedural administrative in- 
1 3
efficiencies. The Government's arguments were to a certain extent 
valid, but it was these same reasons that provided a fillip to the 
unprecedented scale of smuggling.
Independent observers held smuggling to be the main cause of
the disruption of the country's nascent economy. Tony Hagen, one
time chief of the United Nations Relief Operations in Dhaka (UNROD),
remarked early in 1972 that "Bangladesh is like a sieve suspended in 
1 4
India". This was in fact so because of the League Government's 
pricing policy which made smuggling across the border to India a 
highly lucrative b u s i n e s s . ^  An England-based independent study of
smuggling, Mujib was under tremendous party pressure to have 
them released and the Army recalled to the barracks. This,
Mujib did, causing an i r revocable fa 11 ing-out between him and the 
Armed Forces. Sources: interviews with Army officers who were 
involved in a n t i - s m u g g 1 ing operations. M u j i b 's close relatives 
were also involved in smuggling, see, Far Eastern Economic Re­
v i e w , 4 February 1974, p. 20
12. New York T i m e s , 12 June 1972; cited in Iftekhar Chowdhury, 
"Strategy of a Small Power in a Subsystem: Bangladesh's Exter­
nal Relations" Australian O u t l o o k , vol. 34, no. 1, 1980, p.86
13. Ibid.
14. The Sunday Times, (London), 19 March 1972
15. Ibid.
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the problem came to the conclusion that "food prices are soaring in 
Bangladesh chiefly because supplies sent in from abroad to relieve 
widespread hunger are being smuggled out to the Indian market by 
Bangladeshi traders aided by corrupt government o f f i c i a l s " . ^
Increasingly, it became politically expedient for Bangladeshis 
to blame India for their economic i l l s , ^  and Muj i b and his col l e a ­
gues, whose Government was also to be blamed for doing very little to 
stop smuggling, reacted no differently. Anthony Mascarenhas, an 
astute observer of the Indo-Bang1adesh scene, wrote:
While Mujib and his ministers publicly extolled 
the close ties with India, they also privately 
made it the scapegoat for their own inadequacies.
The Indians cannot be absolved of blame for some 
of the incidents that have vexed relations b e ­
tween the two countries, and it is a fact that 
Indian merchants benefited enormously from the 
clandestine trade with Bangladesh. But it is 
also a fact that the Bangladeshis themselves did 
the actual smuggling and had a proportionate 
share of the loot.  ^g
This is of course true as is evident from the Bangladeshi n e w s ­
paper reports of the period; not a week went by without reports of
16. Quoted in The Observer (London), 15 October 1972 from a study by 
K.H. Ahmed, a Bangladeshi lecturer in Brunei University, United 
Ki ngdom.
17* Anthony Mascarenhas, the journalist who defected from Pakistan 
to tell the world of the massacre in East Pakistan in early 
April 1971, narrates an interesting anecdote in his book: 
Bangladesh: A Legacy of B l o o d , London: Hodder and Stoughton, 
1986, p. 28. At a cocktail party given by a Western 
diplomat in Dhaka in February 1974 there were some local e d i ­
tors and journalists. "One of the latter was waxing hot about 
how the Indians were 'bleeding the c o u n t r y 1. Finally our host 
had had enough. 'Tell me', he asked this man, 'do the Indians 
come all the way into Bangladesh and carry off the jute and 
rice or do the Bangladeshis carry it out to them?' That was 
the end of the argument."
18. Ibid., pp. 27-28
smuggling, some of which could be ultimately traced to the Awami 
League. The smugglers were quite willing to dispense a percentage 
of their profit in exchange for official protection whether at the 
district or the central level. Since the smugglers operated with 
relative impunity, sometimes under local Awami League patronage, 
and would sometimes go free after arrests because of intervention
19
from the highest levels of government, the attitude of the 
Bangladeshis towards the League leadership began to change for 
the worse. And since the smuggled goods went to India, causing 
domestic economic hardship, it was easy for the people to paint 
India as their enemy.
This was reinforced by the failure of the Indian states b or­
dering on Bangladesh to curb smuggling. It was widely felt in 
Bangladesh that the beneficiaries of smuggling were the bordering 
Indian states, because, had smuggling gone against their economic 
interests, there would have been a hue and cry from across the bor­
der. But that was hardly the case. On the contrary, it seems that 
the bordering states were mentally geared towards deriving as much 
economic benefit from the independence of East Pakistan as possible. 
This seemed to be particularly true of the state of West Bengal whose 
attitude towards Bangladesh was more proprietary than the Union 
Government's. This is better explained by a glance at history.
After the secession of East Bengal in 1947, West Bengalis had 
suffered a terrible psychological blow. They had lost two-thirds of 
Bengal and the majority population. This contributed to their loss
19- Interview, op.c i t . (11). For further details of the Army's 
crackdown on smuggling and the Awami League's cover-up, see 
Far Eastern Economic Review, 29 August 1975, pp. 10-13
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of the political and economic control of India. Earlier on, the 
capital of the British Raj had been transferred to New Delhi from 
Calcutta and, what was worse, political leadership of India had 
also slipped away from the hands of metropolitan Calcatians to the 
hands of the Kashmiri Brahmins. Where once the Calcutta bhadrolok 
(gentlemen) proudly proclaimed that "What Bengal thinks of today, 
the rest of India thinks of tomorrow", West Bengalis were now lag­
ging in many aspects of national endeavour. The alleged neglect of
the state by the Union Government only increased their suspicion
20
and bitterness. The independence of Bangladesh was therefore a 
powerful psychological phenomenon as it held the promise of Bengal's 
rena i s s a n c e .
But this view of renaissance was parochial, only self-aggran­
dizing. West Bengal had its own specific interests vis-a-vis Bangla­
desh which do not seem to have coincided with the Union interests. 
While the Union Government's interests regarding Bangladesh were 
long-range and couched in subcontinental terms, West Bengal's inter- 
rests were short-term and affected by the nature of its relationship 
with theUnion Government. It could perhaps be argued that while 
India saw Bangladesh as a subcontinental neighbour, to be carefully 
handled in order to maximize its long-range interests, West Bengal 
more than likely saw Bangladesh in its pre-partition perspective, as 
a hinterland that could once again be manipulated to regain m e t r o p o ­
litan Calcutta's lost glory and to bolster its status vis-a-vis New 
Delh i .
20. See, Ranajit Roy, The Agony of West Bengal: a Study in Union- 
State R e l a t i o n s , Calcutta: New Age, 1971; Sankar Ghosh, The 
Disinherited State: A Study of West Bengal, 1967-70, Calcutta: 
Orient Longmans, 1971; A.K. Sen, West Bengal: An Analytical 
Study, Calcutta: Oxford Publishing Company, 1971.
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Seen in this perspective, it is easy to understand the e x t r a ­
ordinary pressure the West Bengal Government brought upon the Union 
Government in 1971 to commit itself to the political independence of 
East Pakistan. The West Bengalis were convinced of an economic w i n d ­
fall for them from the independence of East Pakistan, though this con­
viction was not shared elsewhere in India. According to one source:
On the issue of Indian support for Bangladesh 
there were many lobbies - regional and Union.
The powerful North Indian industrial and b usi­
ness bourgeoisie had strong reservation about 
India going to war against Pakistan. They 
wished to keep the Tashkent spirit alive and 
wanted continued collaboration with West Paki­
stan in business and i n d ustry...They were not 
sure of Bengali opinion. Would aggressive 
Bengali nationalism jeopardize India's own 
economic interests?...There were many worries.
The West Bengalis were primarily concerned with the economic - 
and political - future of their own state. With the restoration of 
trade relations with Bangladesh, contradictions began to surface 
which they seemed willing to overlook. But outside West Bengal these
did not go unnoticed. The influential Economic and Political Weekly
(Bombay) cautioned:
Rising prices, the result mainly of the o p e r a ­
tions of smugglers and black marketeers of both 
India and Bangladesh, have started giving rise 
to anti-Indian feel i ng... They [smugglers] o p e r ­
ate with the active patronage and connivance of 
social elites in both c o u n t r i e s . ^
An important contradiction that surfaced fairly early was the 
emergence in Bangladesh of a new entrepreneuria 1/business class that 
sought to replace the Pakistani mercantile and business interests.
14$.
21. Interview with Amirul Islam who did liaison work for the Mujib- 
nagar Government in Calcutta. Dhaka, 15 June 1985.
22. Economic and Political Weekly op.cit. vol. v i i , no. 24, 10 June 
1372, p. 1142
The military-industrial oligarchy of Pakistan had suppressed the 
growth of an indigenous industrial and business bourgeoisie in East 
Pakistan. After the latter's independence, the emerging new en t r e ­
preneurial class saw itself as the inheritors of that interest and 
was loth to play second fiddle to the Indian business bourgeoisie.
It genuinely feared that the Indians who were given ample access to 
the new country's economy would, like the West Pakistanis before 
them, deny it the economic opportunities brought forth by indepen­
dence. This conflict of interest directly affected Indo-Bang1adesh 
economic relations and significantly contributed to the growing anti- 
Indianism within the country.
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Besides smuggling, there were allegations that trade and other
economic understandings with various countries required the tacit
approval of India before they could be signed. There was also the
widespread feeling that the terms of trade with India were unfair to
Bangladesh because Indian goods were being bought at prices more than
23
30 to bO percent higher than the international market prices. B a n g ­
ladeshis watched with alarm the constant stream of Indian merchants, 
businessmen, politicians and officials visiting Dhaka to conclude this 
deal or that, or to advise members of the League Government or to 
discuss joint policies and options; the perception among the Bangla­
deshis was one of expanding Indian economic hegemony. This went 
against the interests of the new entrepreneurial and business community.
23. Ibid. A l so  the Times of India, 19 N o v e m b e r  1972
In this situation it is the duty of both the 
governments, particularly of the Indian govern­
ment, to drive out the suspicion and remove the 
ill-feelings by taking corrective measures. This 
should not be difficult if we value friendship 
more than fish or poultry, kerosene or petrol.
To begin with, both governments should brush 
aside criticisms of India in Bangladesh as the 
work of anti-Indian quarters.
There appeared to be a lack of realization that the prospects 
of trade between the two countries were in fact circumscribed by o p ­
posite sets of forces. On the positive side were the qeoqraphic 
proximity, the political coordination between the two Governments 
(as specifically laid down In Article 4 of the Indo-Bang1adesh friend­
ship treaty), a disposition towards economic cooperation, and the ban 
in Bangladesh on trade with Pakistan (its largest pre-1971 trading 
partner). All these, no doubt, laid open the possibility of huge 
increases in the volume of Indo-Bang1adesh trade. But the n ega­
tive factors were no less important. The lack of economic c o m ­
plementarity, the difficulties in substituting the inter-wing e x ­
ports of former East Pakistan by additional exports to India, the 
possibility of a diversion of exports from chird market (or re­
exports) and the related foreign excnange costs, the ineffectiveness 
of state-to-state trade consequent on large-scale smuggling, and 
the p o s s I b i 1 ity of trade disputes between the two countries, all 
of these went largely unrecognised. The Indians, particularly the
West Bengalis, failed to realize that the actual turnover would
25
depend on the relative strengths of these opposing forces.
24. I b id .
25. Sunanda Sen, 111 ndo-Bangl adesh Trade: Problems and Prospects11, 
Economic and Political Weekly, vol. vii, no. 15, 8 April 1972,
p. 767
P e r s p e c t i v e l y , the Economic and Political Weekly wrote:
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Mrs. Gandhi herself seems to have been well aware of the pos­
sibility of setbacks in Indo-Bang1adesh relations. As early as in 
May 1972, a senior Indian journalist observed:
We think the question of India imposing her do­
mination over Bangladesh is still hypothetical.
But, as far as I understand, Mrs. Gandhi recog­
nizes the danger that unless her government is 
very careful, the question may suddenly become 
a real one. She has told everyone that we must 
avoid the danger at all costs. In other words,
India must not do anything which turns the hypo­
thetical question about her domination over the 
new state into a valid subject for discussion, 
anywhere in the world, including Peking. ^
The journalist went on to say:
We are no longer dealing with Tajuddin Ahmed, 
the Prime Minister of the government-in-exi1e , 
who could be often told quite bluntly what was 
good for his country and what was not; we are 
dealing with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman who will 
have our advice only when he asks for i t .
The then Bangladesh President, Justice Abu Sayeed Chowdhury, also
confirms Mrs. Gandhi's concerns:
Nurul Hasan, India's Minister of Education... 
was apologetic when I raised the issue of smug­
gling. During his second visit he informed me 
that my sentiments were conveyed to Mrs. Gandhi.
Mrs. Gandhi told him to convey to me that the 
[Indian] smugglers were her enemies, out to 
make her unpopular. They were Marwaries [ruth­
less merchant class in West Bengal and Bihar] 
and West Bengalis. We should take stern mea­
sures and it would have her support. Nurul 
Hasan also said that she asked the West Bengal 
government to be vigilent, apart from the Cus­
toms Department.^g
26. Bangladeshi journalist, S.M. Ali's interview with an Indian jour­
nalist in May 1972, quoted in Ali, After the Dark Night: Problems 
of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Delhi: Thomson Press (India) Ltd. , ~~
1973, PP. 1 3 5 ^
27. Ibid.
28. Interview in Dhaka, 2 June 1985
Thus it is clear that Mrs. Gandhi saw I ndo-Bang1adesh relations 
in a long-term perspective and was averse to any inter-state activity 
that could undo a politically promising relationship. This concern 
was written into the first inter-state trade agreement signed after 
her state visit to Bangladesh in mid-March 1972. Article 2 of the 
agreement described it as only “an interim trade arrangement“. Arti­
cle 4, clause 7 provided for review of these arrangements after six 
months to consider whether they should be extended or amended in any 
manner. It had further laid down: “if even before the expiry of this 
period of six months either country feels the need to vvthdraw or mo­
dify the facilities under this Agreement, it would enter into imme­
diate consultations with the other country taking such measures as it
29
may consider necessary“.
IV
When Bangladesh started accusing India of causing domestic
scarcity, an official statement was issued in New Delhi in early
June 1972 stating that India would “accept only those commodities
30
which are considered surplus by the Government of Bangladesh“. 
Additionally, the West Bengal Chief Minister Si'ddharta Shankar Roy 
was sent to Dhaka where he held talks with the President, the Prime 
Minister, the Foreign Minister and the Home Minister on the appro­
priate steps to be taken regarding “the problems of border smuggling, 
inflow of undesirable elements in the border areas and infiltration 
of extremists to and from Bangladesh“. After the talks, Bangladesh
153.
29. Qp.ci t . (8), pp. 652-3
30. The Hindu, 7 June 1972, p. 7
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Foreign Minister Abdus Samad Azad told newsmen that a 
consensus was reached and "the decisions would be sent to the re­
spective governments in the form of recommendations for final ap- 
prova 1". ^
Soon after, the magistrates and district commissioners of all 
eight border districts of West Bengal were ordered to maintain con­
stant contact with their counterparts in Bangladesh, and to hold 
joint meetings as and when necessary to stop smuggling and dacoities
in border areas. Checkpoints on the Indian side were reportedly
32
strengthened. On 1 September 1972, India reacted strongly to al­
legations by certain Bangladeshi political parties about India's lack 
of effort in curbing smuggling by stating that if the League Government
so desired, India would be willing to seal the borders between the two
33
countries in cooperation with Bangladesh. The Bangladesh Commerce
Minister, M.R. Siddiqui, while addressing a conference of exporters
at the Bangladesh Secretariat, replied that Bangladesh was indeed
seriously considering sealing the borders completely and postponing
the Indo-Bang1adesh border trade, but any decision would be withheld
until after the Government discussed the matter with the Indian trade
34
delegation that was due to visit Bangladesh on 3 October.
The public charges of smuggling, scarcity and higher domestic 
prices, and higher prices and coarse quality of imports from India
31. Ibid., 11 June 1972, p. 7; 13 June 1972, pp. 7,9
32. Ibid., 15 June 1972, p. 7 
33- Ibid., 2 September 1972, p. 1
34. Ibid., 24 September 1972, p. 9
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In late September, Bhashani, while addressing the National Conven­
tion of Revo 1utionary Students, harangued:
India cannot purchase Bengalis with the support 
of a few Bangladesh leaders like the Sheikh and 
Tajuddin...By helping us in our days of distress,
India is now getting the benefit from us 70 
times...India has captured our market by expor­
ting low quality goods and by interfering in our 
interna1 affa i rs. ^
The words of the maulana (religious leader), perhaps Bangladesh's 
most respected political watchdog, caused concern among Government 
officials and ministers. The result was the frequent imposition of 
curfews in border areas and stepped-up vigilance and restrictions by 
the Bangladesh Rifles guarding the borders, causing virtual stoppage 
of legal border trade.
continued to take its toll on the League Government's credibility.
The political reverberations were also felt in India. The 
Times of India regretted that the two Governments continued to be
36
indifferent towards the actual cause of anti- Indianism in Bangladesh.
And the Economio and Political Weekly enquired:
For how long are we going to maintain this fiction 
that the ruling tide of ill-will in Bangladesh to­
wards India and Indians is exclusively the conse­
quence of Maulana Bhashani and the handful of pro- 
Pakistani elements? Why not admit that the problem 
has deeper r o o t s ? ^
During the talks between the visiting Indian trade delegation 
and the Bangladesh Government in the first week of October 1972, 
border trade issues were discussed extensively. Bangladesh suggested
35- Ibid. 30 September 1972, p. 5 
36. Issue of 28 June 1972
37- Quoted in the Times of India, 29 September 1972
suspension of border trade temporarily. India suggested that the 
items under barter trade be shifted to normal trade arrangements. 
Bangladesh countered that this would create further imbalance in 
the already adverse balance of trade for Bangladesh. The Indian 
delegation argued that the barter trade across the border had not 
had a fair trial so far, and proposed that border trade be suspen­
ded only in those sectors of the border where there was reportedly 
large-scale smuggling. It also suggested that a better scrutiny of 
exporters holding permits in border trade areas would considerably 
curb smuggling. But the Bangladesh Government countered that it 
did not have the necessary machinery to implement the trade in the 
desired manner, and until it could establish adequate checks and 
controls along the border, the border trade should be suspended.
India remonstrated that border trade was essential to the economic 
well-being of a large number of people living on both sides of the 
border, particularly in remote areas without adequate communication 
facilities. The Indian delegation seemed to be prepared to accept 
any suggestion short of suspension of border trade. The discussion 
headed towards deadlock, until Muj i b intervened to ask the Indian 
High Commissioner, Subimal Dutt , to convey to Mrs. Gandhi his de­
sire to scrap the border trade agreement. Dutt talked to Mrs.
Gandhi, and in the following meeting India agreed to suspend the
border trade "in deference to Bangladesh's request“. With that an
38
unseemly episode in Indo-Bangla trade relations came to an end.
156.
3 8 . Interview with Mujib's private secretary in Dhaka, 15 July 
1985. For details of the negotiations, see The Hindu, 7“11 
October 1972
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But this certainly did not mean a total cessation of inter­
state economic activity. In May 1972, just two months after the 
first trade agreement was signed, India and Bang 1 adesh had signed 
three credit agreements covering the costs of rehabilitation of the 
Bangladesh Railway System and the supply of railway stores, tele­
communication equipment, two ships, two F-27 aircraft and 500,000 
tons of crude oil. The total Indian loan of Rs.241 million (about 
US$ 34m) was repayable in equal semi-annual instalments over a
39
twenty-five year period that included a grace period of seven years.
In July 1973, India and Bangladesh signed a new three-year 
trade agreement. Effective from 28 September, it allowed for R s . 
305m(US$ 42m) worth of exports each way during the first year, with 
Bangladesh importing coal, tobacco, raw cotton, cotton yarn, cotton 
textiles and movies in exchange for raw jute, fresh fish, newsprint, 
skins, pharmaceutica1 products, ayurvedic medicine, spices, movies 
and b o o k s . ^
Among other economic understandings, in October 1972, India 
waived import duty on fish from Bangladesh in exchange for the latter
41
not imposing export duty on the commodity. On 1 November 1972, the 
two Governments signed a protocol on inland water transport providing 
trade and transport facilities between the two countries. Valid for 
a period of five years, it revived the waterway facilities suspended
39- The Hindu, 17 May 1972, p. 7
40. Ibid. , 7 July 1973, p. 5. See also Jatiyo Sangsad, Official Pro­
ceed i n g s , 2nd Session, 23rd Sitting, 30 June 1973, pp. 1050-1061; 
2nd Session, 28th Sitting, 6 July 1973, p. 1662
41. Ibid., 7 October 1972, p. 1
V
in 1965. The two Governments also agreed in principle to resume 
goods traffic from Tripura (Eastern India) to West Bengal across
43
Bangladesh via the Bangladesh railway.
During the summit meeting in May 1974, an economic pact was 
signed. India agreed to provide money and technical knowhow in four 
joint industrial ventures in Bangladesh: a sponge iron plant in 
Shantaul, a clinker mill at Chittagong, a gas-based fertilizer plant 
near Dhaka and a new cement plant in Chattak. India undertook to pro­
vide the clinker and the raw materials (limestone and sponge iron),
and also to buy the excess products from these industries after Bangla-
44
desh's needs were met. The League Government also continued to ex­
pect Indian assistance for its Five Year Plan and during the Foreign
Ministers' meeting in Dhaka in February 1974, this was an important
45
topic on the agenda.
VI
But these economic transactions, far from bolstering Indo- 
Bangladesh friendship, could hardly tide over the setbacks discussed 
above. There were a few other difficulties worth noting. The case 
of jute sales to India was one of them. The Indian jute industry, 
long in competition with the Pakistan jute industry, immensely bene­
fited from the Bangladesh crisis in 1971, during which manufacture of
42. Bang 1adesh (Washington D.C.: Embassy of Bangladesh), vol.2, 
no. 23, 17 November 1972, p. 4
43. Bangladesh Times, 26 July 1974, p. 8
44. Amrita Bazar Patrika (Bengali daily from Calcutta), 16 May
1974, p. 5 and 17 May 1974, pp. 1,5
45. The Hindu, 13 February 1974, p. 7
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jute goods in then East Pakistan came to a halt, while the export of 
jute goods and raw jute virtually ceased. The Indian industry was 
able to procure the un-exported raw jute at extremely low prices and 
then re-export it as manufactured goods at higher prices. Domestically 
in India, a number of jute mills out of production for years came to 
life, and internationa11y India captured East Pakistan's market. The 
Indian jute industry, concentrated around Calcutta, was eager to pre­
serve this advantage by promoting a jute community of India and Bangla­
desh. As the Economic and Political Weekly explained:
As the Indian jute industry sees it, its 
future lies in the export market for carpet 
backing and the burgeoning internal market 
for sacking. For protecting the first the 
production of carpet backing by the Bangla­
desh industry has to be curbed; and for ex­
ploiting the latter the Indian industry needs 
Bangladesh's cheap raw jute. This, in sum, 
is the rationale of the jute 'community' as 
perceived by those who preside over our jute 
industry.^
Immediately following the surrender of the Pakistan Army on 
16 December 1971, it was announced in New Delhi that India would pro­
vide Bangladesh with two helicopters to locate and lift the huge amount 
of jute scattered in various parts of Bangladesh, and would provide
shipping and re-insurance facilities for the immediate export of
47
200,000 bales of raw jute lying at Chalna and Chittagong ports.
Within days the League Government made an announcement that 
was a godsend for West Bengal. First, the ban (imposed in 1965) on 
the sale of raw jute and jute goods to India was removed with immediate
46. Vol. vii, no. 4, 22 January 1972, p. 133
47. The Hindu, 28 December 1971, p. 7
effect. Second, it declared null and void all foreign contracts for
raw jute and jute goods entered into by exporters and mills before
and during the Bangladesh crisis. All new shipments were required
to have fresh contracts at current prices posted by the Bangladesh
Bank. This released a large quantity of jute for export to India.
Third, export bonus on raw jute and jute goods, which had made jute
exports from Pakistan too competitive for the Indian jute exporters
48
and thus crippled their export capability was abolished.
This I 11-conceived announcement greatly damaged Bangladesh's
reputation in foreign jute markets, and considerably enhanced India's
access to Bangladeshi jute, though it still did not satisfy the
Indian jute barons who were eager to control their largest single
rival and secure its jute for their mills. The Economic Times (India)
in its editorial of 28 January 1972 grumbled about Bangladeshis being
allowed to sell their jute to foreign buyers without first fulfilling
India's needs: "India has reason to expect Bangladesh to meet our raw
jute needs as a reciprocal gesture to what we have done to [sic] our
neighbour". With such an attitude pervading jute circles in West
Bengal, it is not difficult to understand why smuggling of jute could
not be curbed. According to the Fccr Eastern Economic Review, in the
period between March and June 1972, jute worth US$ 65 million was
49
smuggled into India. Not only were Indian jute mills operating 
increased shifts, a new jute mill was built in Agartala (Eastern India) 
in addition to the one hundred-odd mills in West Bengal.^
48. Ibid., 2 January 1972, p. 9; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 
February 19“26, 1972, p. 25113
49. Quoted in Chowdhury, op.ci t . (12)
50. Holiday (Dhaka), 4 November 1973
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Formal trading also picked up. According to a statement in 
the Jatiyo Sangsad (Bangladesh National Assembly) in September 1973, 
barter trade in jute with India amounted to Taka 200 million (600,000 
bales), followed by trade with Yugoslavia (106,320 bales), Egypt 
(94,809 bales), Poland (67,200 bales, and Bulgaria (8,400 bales).^
The League Government was charged with undermining the coun­
try's jute business. For instance, in January 1974, the State Minis­
ter for Jute, Moslemuddin Khan, had to defend the charges against his 
Government that it had sold 200,000 bales of raw jute to India at less 
than the prevailing international market price, thereby causing Bangla­
desh a loss of TK 20 million (US 2.7m). The Government was also
charged with driving the jute price down in Indo-Bang1adesh trade
52
at a net loss for Bangladesh. Thus the League Government continued 
to be plagued with charges of failing to protect the country's greatest 
foreign exchange earning resource.
VI I
The inter-state relations experienced attack from another di­
rection, this time regarding the printing of Bangladeshi currency 
notes in India. In the first week of the League Government's acces­
sion to power in Dhaka, S. Doha, Manager of the Dhaka branch of the 
State Bank of Pakistan (now renamed the Bangladesh Bank) announced 
that the Bank had already made arrangements with the Government of 
India Security Press at Nasik to print new currency notes worth
51. Official Proceedings, o p .c i t . (40) , 3rd Session, 7th Sitting,
22 September 1973, p. 259
52. Ibid., 4th Session, 4th Sitting, 21 January 1974, pp. 145“151
161 .
R s . 3,000 million (US $416 m ) . The first currency notes of Bangla-
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desh came into circulation in the first week of March 1972.
Within a few months there were widespread rumours in the coun­
try that the Indian Government was circulating counterfeit currency 
notes to undermine Bangladesh's economy. On the eve of the first 
parliamentary elections in Bangladesh in March 1973, Bhashani's pro- 
China National Awami Party (NAP-B) launched a massive anti-Indian 
tirade through election leaflets and posters. One such leaflet 
carried a picture purporting to show two currency notes bearing the 
same serial number, claiming that such notes were printed by the 
Indian Government in collusion with "its puppet regime in Bangladesh". 
A month later, the leader of the Opposition, Ataur Rahman Khan, took 
up the issue in Parliament:
We do not know how much money has been 
printed in India because many have seen 
two or three notes with the same number 
on them. I myself have seen two notes 
with identical numbers...It is necessary 
to have an official declaration of how 
much money has been printed. The people 
would like to know
The first response, however, came from the Indian Rajya Sabha 
(Upper House) a month later. K.P. Ganesh, Indian Minister of Revenue 
and Expenditure, in a reply to a member's query stated that at the
53. The Hindu, 5 January 1972, p. 7
54. Ibid., 4 March 1972, p. 1 
55- Ibid. , 5 March 1972, p. 6
56. Official Proceedings, 1st Session, 3rd Sitting, 12 April 1973, 
p. 92
53
request of the League Government Tk 4,216 million (US $585 m) were 
printed and supplied from the Nasik Press during the period Febru- 
ary-August 1972. The Minister conceded that although the notes 
printed in India had several security features, they were not fool­
proof for want of regular watermarked paper. He explained that at 
the time it was not technically feasible to incorporate portrait 
watermark on the paper because of the short time and the urgency 
with which Bangladesh's initial requirements of currency notes 
had to be met. The Minister noted that Bangladesh had withdrawn 
the currency notes printed in India, except Tk 1 notes, with the 
receipt of alternative notes printed in the United Kingdom on stan­
dard watermarked paper. ^  Verifying the above, a month later, the 
Bangladesh Finance Minister Tajuddin Ahmed explained that he had to 
request the Indian Government to print the notes because these were 
needed soon after Bangladesh's independence, when no other country 
except India had recognized it. The agreement with the Indian Se­
curity Printing Press was signed on 29 December 1971, about two
weeks after the war had ended, and since the notes "had to be de-
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livered in less than two months, the watermark was dropped". The
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debate, however, continued in the Jatiyo Sangsad. The upshot was 
an increased suspicion of India in Bangladesh.
VIII
Summary: Both Governments had expressed quite early in their 
relationship the desire to prevent private trade between the two
163.
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countries and to implement state-to-state trading, in keeping with 
their professed socialistic orientation. Ruhul Quddus, Mujib1s Prin­
cipal Secretary, recalled that
in December 1971, there was an unwritten 
agreement between the Mujibnagar govern­
ment and India that no private Indians 
would be allowed to do business in Bangla­
desh because Marwari capital would go 
against Bangladesh's interests.
But this was not formalized in the trade agreement in March 1972. On 
this issue, the preamble merely stated that economic relations "can 
best be secured by organizing trade between the two countries on a 
State-to-State basis as far as possible". Perhaps as a check, Arti­
cle 4 in the treaty called for regular meetings at all levels between 
the two Governments. This in fact meant coordination in policy plan­
ning and implementation. One example of this was given by P.N. Haksar, 
Mrs. Gandhi's Principal Secretary:
The Planning Commissions of India and Bangla­
desh endeavoured to work in unison to identify 
common problems and policies and to coordinate 
studies such as the rationalization of jute 
production and use; also the trading of Indian 
iron ore, coal and fertilizer for Bangladesh's 
gas, fish and river navigation facilities.^
After independence, the League Government found itself beholden 
to Mrs. Gandhi's Government for aid and advice. To balance India off, 
but without committinga volte-face in its basic secular-socialistic, 
nonaligned orientation, Mujib tried to enlist Soviet assistance. But 
the Soviet leaders demurred. The then Foreign Secretary, S.A. Karim, 
recal1s :
60. Interview in Dhaka, 7 July 1985
61. Interview in New Delhi, 28 April 1985
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We realized pretty early that the Soviet 
Union was not going to give us much economic 
assistance. The Soviet leaders made it quite 
clear to us in Moscow during our very first 
visit there that they were not in a position 
to help us substantially. They said that 
when they came to power in 1917 the country 
was totally devastated and nobody came to 
their assistance. So we too can make it on 
our own.
So, much of the support in the initial phase of reconstruction came
from India, which donated US$142.7 million in cash and commodities
6 3
up to May 1972, followed by the United States with $119 million.
By March 1973, the United States became the largest donor with $318 
million, compared to $262 million from India and $136 million from 
the Soviet Union.^
Despite this initial assistance from India, the loss of wealth 
from Bangladesh in the form of smuggling undermined its image among 
the Bangladeshi elites. The League Government was also tarred. Home 
Minister Abdul Malek Ukil declared in Parliament his Government's in­
ability to police the river and land borders effectively because of a
6 5
lack of equipment, facility, manpower and trained personnel. And
Mujib publicly lamented:
Who takes bribes? Who indulges in smuggling?
Who becomes a foreign agent? Who transfers 
money abroad? Who resorts to hoarding? It is 
being done by us - the five percent of the 
people who are educated. We are the bribe 
takers, the corrupt elements... 11 seems that 
society is worm infested. ^
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The Awami League's defence of its Government was unconvincing 
in the face of domestic scarcity, spiralling costs and shoddy Indian
67
imports. Regarding the latter, the Indian Union Commerce Minister, 
D.P. Chattopadhyay, exculpated his Government, claiming that a 
large portion of the textile imports to Bangladesh from India was 
handled by private trade on the basis of open general licences is­
sued by the Bangladesh Government. He urged his Bangladeshi coun­
terpart to issue higher specifications for the textiles to be 
imported from Indi a . ^
The increasingly widespread anti-Indian reactions to all these
were to be expected. Bhashani, India's bete noire, not only kept
his anti-Indian tirade alive, he also threatened to send batches
of a trained volunteer force to every market in the country to
69
effect a blockade of Indian goods. Emotions ran so high that
even twelve years later when the former editor of Holiday was asked
to recall those times, he did not mince words:
It was a re-enactment of colonial trade. We 
were to supply primary goods and they would 
process it. The League Government's ceiling 
of Tk 25,000 [jJS$3,400] on investment, border 
trade agreement and smuggling, all these con­
tributed to this colonial pattern. Our indus­
try was not allowed to develop because of this 
ceiling, thus allowing Calcutta capital to 
domi nate.^
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Cone 1 us i o n : It was not lost on Mrs. Gandhi's Government, 
barring a few members, that the grievances of the people of East 
Pakistan against West Pakistan were mainly economic. It is also 
equally likely that Mrs. Gandhi remembered that economic subser­
vience of the Muslims of undivided Bengal was a powerful factor 
in their decision to vote for a separate Muslim state. There­
fore it is reasonable to assume that Mrs. Gandhi would have been 
doubly cautious about allowing a relapse of economic arrangements 
that would overtly discriminate against the Bangladeshis and under 
mine Indo-Bang1adesh relations. This seems to be borne out by 
various top-level interviews, and by Articles 2 and 4 of the trade 
agreement.
In the context of influence re 1 ationship, .these two Articles 
can be seen as influence attempts on the part of India. It was 
quite obvious to both Governments that after Bangladesh's inde­
pendence, trade relations between the two countries would be an 
important component of their bilateral relations. The wording of 
the Articles suggests that Bangladesh had considerable flexibility 
to amend or withdraw from the arrangement. Thus, this would sug­
gest an Indian attempt to reinforce the desire between the two 
Governments for close economic relations - which falls within our 
definition of 'influence1.
Despite Mrs. Gandhi's caution, she was unable to prevent de­
terioration of India's image in Bangladesh, mainly because of West 
Bengal's proprietary attitude towards the latter. The ineptitude
IX
of the League Government was also to be blamed. If good relations 
existed at the Governmental level, that was certainly not the case 
between the two peoples.
Mrs. Gandhi appears to have been quite receptive to Mujib's 
needs. Despite India's long-awaited hope of restoration of border 
trade, and the strong disinclination of the Indian trade team to 
repeal the agreement only six months after it was signed, Mrs.
Gandhi responded affirmatively to Mujib's request to suspend it.
This was done both as a political gesture to the League Govern­
ment under fire on that issue, and in full recognition of India's 
long-term interests. It is less clear whether influence operated 
in this case. It is quite likely that India realized that its in­
fluence would disappear if it seemed unbending on this relatively 
minor issue; in other words, it may have been a case of not so 
much Mujib's influence over Mrs. Gandhi as Indian self-interest 
at work.
It is reasonable to assume that India wanted to guide, and 
where possible control, the direction of Bangladesh's economy; 
for instance, to prevent its total dependence on capitalist coun­
tries. Convincing the League Government to coordinate its economic 
policies and plans with those of India (Arti’cle k) was one such 
example. But its substantive effects gradually diminished as 
Bangladesh's economy transferred its dependence on India to in­
ternational aid giving agencies, and later to the West. As one 
observer noted:
In Bangladesh, where charges against Indian 
control were most often made in the period 
following secession from Pakistan, these
168.
could be partly supported by examining the re­
cord of loans and credits India gave Bangladesh 
in the period 1972-75 ...Following Mujib's assas­
sination, as Bangladesh successfully switched 
to total dependence on the West, the Gulf States, 
and to China, India's real ability to control 
events there was seen to be very small.
Bangladesh's initial dependence on India for economic aid resulted 
from the unavailability of alternative sources, and not from Indian 
influence. From late 1973 onwards Mujib managed gradually to switch 
over to western sources, thus confirming that little, if any,
Indian influence operated on him.
The context for influence theory to operate was, however, pre­
sent. It was in the Indian perception that an independent Bangla­
desh would be amenable to vigorous trade links with the bordering 
states of India, this being a repeatedly stated goal of many East 
Bengali political leaders. Since this was also the desire of the 
Indian Government, and given the responsiveness of the League Govern­
ment, it is little wonder that one of the first official acts of 
the two Governments was to enter upon a trade agreement between them.
However, it was not so much the trade agreement per se as much 
as the increased scope for economic influence that spilled over out 
of this agreement, that widened the scope for the operation of the 
influence theory. Bangladesh's pricing policy which encouraged smug­
gling to India to the great benefit to the economies of the border­
ing Indian states, the likelihood of tying the taka to the Indian 
rupee, the removal of the competitive edge that Bangladeshi jute 
exporters enjoyed over Indian jute exporters before 1972, and the
71. Srikant Dutt, India and the Third World, London: Zed Books 
Ltd., 1984, p.~i55
lifting of restrictions on export of jute to India, are cases in 
point. But, these same factors were responsible for the souring 
of relations between the two countries, thereby reducing the op­
tions for the influence theory to operate.
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Chapter 6 
DIFFERING PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY
It seems that the primary motivation behind India's support 
for Bangladesh in 1971 was to enhance India's security in the sub­
continent by re-defining the pre-1971 balance of power that had been 
artificially sustained by Pakistan with the help of extra-regiona1 
powers since the fifties. With the independence of Bangladesh the 
fruition of that hope was nearer than ever. While the subsequent 
Simla Talks between India and Pakistan sought to take care of the 
outstanding issues in the western part of the subcontinent, in the 
eastern half new opportunities raised new questions that required 
favourable resolution for the Indian leadership. Given the nature 
of interaction between the two countries during the Bangladesh crisis, 
what security obligations did each have towards the other? Would a 
formal security and defence arrangement between the two countries be 
necessary? Did Bangladesh need a professional standing army, and if 
so, what would be its aim, orientation and strength? There were also 
the issues of Islamic revivalism and leftist adventurism and how 
either would affect Bangladesh's internal politics and also India's 
regional interests.
These were some of the immediate security concerns that the 
Indian leadership had in the aftermath of Bangladesh's independence, 
and Indian policies towards Bangladesh seemed to have been guided 
accordingly. We have discussed in Chapter Four the formal security
and defence arrangement in the form of a treaty and its effects on 
Indo-Bangladesh relations. In this Chapter we shall turn our atten­
tion towards other defence and security aspects of that relationship.
I
Bangladesh in India's Security Perception: By 1972, the Indo- 
Soviet treaty and the destruction of the artificial military parity 
between India and Pakistan had considerably enhanced India's security 
posture in the subcontinent. Having established its supremacy in re­
gional affairs, New Delhi now felt that it "should go all out to con­
vert and convince the neighbouring countries... about India's bona 
fid.es and friendly intentions towards them and its genuine desire to 
join them in building up the defence security of the region", and this 
was to be done by "a fine synthesis of friendliness and firmness".^
This seems to have been the logic of India's initial high profile in 
Bangladesh's affairs, particularly in the areas of defence and secu­
rity, since it was recognized quite early in New Delhi that Bangladesh's
2
potential value in regional security would be an important factor.
The Indian leadership was also aware that by virtue of its 
historical experience, religious orientation and geographic location, 
Bangladesh could be a potential threat to the stability of the eastern 
half of the subcontinent and perhaps also to the integrity of the 
Indian Union. While the independence of Bangladesh brought about the
1. D.R. Mankekar, "Defence Security of South Asia", India Quarter- 
1y , vol. xxix, #3, J u 1y-September 1973, pp. 196-197
2. The Hindustan Times (Delhi), 1 April 1971
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initial suppression of overtly anti- independence forces such as the 
fanatic Islamic parties, it had also released a myriad of other feel­
ings among the Bangladeshis, not all of which were favourable to 
India or to Indo-Bang1adesh amity. A careful segregation of these 
potentially harmful elements was in the interest of both parties, 
as was the need to identify and contain all negative tendencies 
that would be contrary to regional interests, particularly as per­
ceived by India. Specifically, it was to be th« measure of India's 
Bangladesh policy to prevent the recidivism of those forces that had 
alienated the Bangladeshis first from the Hindu overlords of Bengal 
and then from Pakistan; to reduce the significance of religion in 
politics so that Indo-Bang1adesh relations could be built on solid 
ground; to neutralize the advantages of geographic location accruing 
to Bangladesh; and to steer Bangladesh away from external defence 
concerns as much as possible.
I I
Advantages and Disadvantages of Bangladesh's Independence for 
I ndi a : From the military point of view Bangladesh's geographic lo­
cation was of immense strategic value to India. As noted earlier, 
in the event of a major Sino-lndian military conflagration, the Chinese 
could easily strike southward from the Tibetan Chumbi valley separa­
ting the Indian protectorates of Bhutan and Sikkim. The territory of 
Bangladesh totally cuts off India's eastern states from its main body 
except for the narrow Siliguri Corridor (also known as
the 'chicken neck' in military colloquialism) that separates Nepal 
and Bangladesh only by ‘\'\ miles. A determined Chinese southward
173.
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corridor and totally cut off the Indian protectorate of Bhutan, the
northern part of West Bengal, all of Assam and the NEFA (North East
Frontier Areas) from the rest of India. As Inder Malhotra, editor
of Times of India, admitted:
The narrow Siliguri Corridor could be taken 
in a couple of hours and we would be in a 
precarious position. So the independence 
of Bangladesh has provided India with stra­
tegic security on the eastern sector.^
India's only access to those beleaguered areas would be through the 
territory of Bangaldesh, and, therefore, a Bangladesh friendly to­
wards India and willing to appreciate India's security dilemma would 
be the aim of India's eastern regional policy.
Further, by virtue of its location, Bangladesh retained the
ability to abet insurgency that had been rampant in NEFA since India's
independence. It had been the policy of the Pakistan Government to
fuel insurgency against the Indian Union by providing the Mlzo and
Naga rebels with sanctuary, training and arms. As. S.A. Karim, who
served in the Pakistan Foreign Service and later became Bangladesh's
Foreign Secretary In the Mujib Government, recalled:
The training etc. was provided by Pakistan 
in the secret camps which were in the Chit­
tagong Hill Tracts. To what extent the 
Chinese were Involved I do not know. The 
Pakistan Army was doing it directly and it 
had nothing to do with the then East Paki­
stan Government...it was treated as a com­
pletely separate operation.^
advance of less than eighty miles would sever this vital Indian land
3. Interview in New Delhi on 26 April 1985
4. Interview in New York in March 1985- Mr. Karim subseqently
became Bangladesh's Permanent Representative to the United 
Nations until his retirement.
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Tied to this was also thepcssibilityof the mass i ve amount 
of unrecovered arms in Bangladesh finding their way into these sen­
sitive areas and also into the hands of the Naxalites in West Bengal. 
These unrecovered arms came from three sources: those captured by 
the Mukti Bahini from the Pakistan Army; those given by the Indian 
Army to the Mukti Bahini and the Mujib Bahini; and those the Pakis­
tan Army gave to the anti- independence forces such as the razakars 
(members of minority, non-Bengali, Bihari community) during the war 
and to the fanatic religious groups such as the Al-Badr and Al-Shams 
at the time of surrender to create a fifth column for possible fu­
ture use. Despite repeated appeals by the League Government to re­
turn these arms, much of these remained unrecovered. It was not lost 
on the Indian leaders that the recovery of these arms was essential 
to law and order in Bangladesh, the ultimate viability of the League 
regime, the emasculation of the still extant anti- independence forces, 
and the preservation of the status quo in Bangladesh's periphery.
Indian and Bangladeshi leaders also had to take into account 
the radicalizing effect of the war on the Mukti Bahini which was a 
heterogeneous mixture of students, teachers, peasants, blue-collar 
workers, day labourers and the unemployed. With the exception of 
certain student leaders, these disparate elements had no clear-cut 
political ideology or commitment, the sole motivating factor being 
Bengali nationalism. In the course of the nine-month struggle against 
Pakistan various groups received various types of political exposure;^
5. See Talukdar Maniruzzaman, Radical Politics and the Emergence 
of Bangladesh, Dhaka: Bangladesh Books International Ltd.,
1975; also M.A.W. Bhuiyan, Emergence of Bangladesh and 
Role of Awami League, New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House,
1982, pp. 247-253
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picked up class-conscious rhetoric; those fighting in the Mujib
Bahini were swayed by notions of popular dictatorship; and those
serving under the direct command of certain military officers (such
as the 'Z' force under the command of Major Ziaur Rahman) acquired
their commanders' views that it was the Bangladesh Army which brought
independence to the country and that no political party, least of
all the Awami League, had any role in this struggle. As a senior
Army officer who served in a sensitive command during the League
Government explained:
Most of the professional military officers 
who fought in the independence war were 
against the Awami League. Zia [ur Rahman] 
was the architect of this anti-Awami League 
sentiment. He believed that it was their 
physical involvement against the Pakistan 
military that finally brought independence 
to the country. The Awami League's his­
torical role of continued struggle against 
the m i 1 itary-bureaucracy of Pakistan that 
had forced the confrontation between the 
Pakistan military and Bengali nationalism 
in 1970-71 was unrecognized by Zia and his 
fol1owers. ^
While many members of the Mukti Bahini returned to their jobs 
or vocations after independence, there was a significant flotsam that 
needed to be absorbed in the society. Given its haphazard political 
exposure, failure to deal swiftly with it could create a potentially 
disgruntled and estranged section of society, which could easily up­
set the desired status quo.
for instance, those fighting under the banner of leftist parties
5  ^ Confidential interview in Dhaka in July 1985. While Zia's 
anti-Awami League stance has been verified by other confi­
dential sources, the assertion that most of the professional 
military officers were against the Awami League has not been 
verified, and therefore it must be accepted with caution.
Indian leaders, perhaps more so than their Bangladeshi coun­
terparts, had also to take into account the roles of those political 
parties and groups in Bangladesh not keen on friendship with India. 
Maulana Bhashani, who represented a curious mixture of Islam and 
Chinese socialism, was the ultimate bete noire to the Indian leaders. 
Speaking before the National Convention of Revolutionary Students, 
Bhashani offered support to the "freedom movement" of the Bengalis 
living in the eastern states of India.^ A month later, on 1 Novem­
ber 1972, at a press conference he spoke of the movement for a "Great­
er Socialist Bengal" comprising West Bengal, Bangladesh and those
g
parts of Assam where people spoke Bengali. These constant revolu­
tionary pricks aimed at areas already under considerable leftist sway 
and where the Congress Party had had repeated political and electoral 
setbacks made the Indian leadership extremely queasy, a development 
not unnoticed by the League Government which was quick to condemn the 
"agents of China1s yel low imperialism" who had joined forces with re­
actionary elements to conspire against Bangladesh's friendship with
9
India and the Soviet Union. As President of the Assam Muslim League 
in pre-partition India, Bhashani had represented peasant interests 
in Assam and Bengal and, after partition, in East Pakistan. His 
appeal in Bangladesh was such that during the precarious twenty days 
between 22 December 1971 when the Government-in-Exi1e was flown to 
Dhaka by India to take over governmental responsibility of the new 
country and 10 January 1972 when Mujib returned home after his release
7. The Hindu, 30 September 1972, p. 8
8. Ibid., 1 November 1972; see also issue of 26 August 1972, p. 7
9. Ibid., 9 May 1972, p. 5 and 2 September 1972, p. 1
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from Pakistan, the Indira Government kept Bhashani under house arrest 
during his post-operative 'convalescence' in a New Delhi hospital for 
fear of losing political control of Bangladesh to leftist forces in 
Muj i b 1s absence.  ^^
Besides Bhashani's NAP, Mohammad Toaha's Bangladesh Communist
Party (Marxist-Leninist), whose forces had fought both the Pakistan
Army and the Indian-supported Mujib Bahini as a rejection of Indian
hegemony over Bangladesh,^ publicly vilified India:
The establishment of Bangladesh, now under 
the control of India, has given complete 
shape to the anti-China bulwark which the 
superpowers have long since been trying to 
build up.i^
The fanatic Muslim groups, Al-Badr and Al-Shcans, raised and 
armed by the Pakistan Army also could not be overlooked by the two 
leaderships, even though they were now banned. As members of the 
Islamic Chattra Sangha (Islamic Student Organisation), the fanatical 
student wing of the Jama'at i Islam, these two groups were responsi­
ble for the cold-blooded extermination of a section of the anti-
Pakistan Bangladeshi elite in the last week before the surrender of
1 3
the Pakistan Army, and were diehard anti-Indian.
• A new political challenge to the Awami League was the Ja.tiyo
10. Kamal S iddi qui, The Political Economy of Indo-Bang1adesh Rela­
tions, Unpublished MA Thesis, SOAS, University of London, 1975, 
pT HT. Also see The Red Mole (London), September 1971
11. Bhuiyan, o p .c i t . , pp. 251~252 ; Far Eastern Economic Review, 
k March 1972, p. 20
12. S.M. Ali, After the Dark Night: Problems of Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman, Delhi: Thomson Press ( I nd i a) Ltd. , 1973, p. 65
13. D a inik Bang la (Bengali daily from Dhaka), 22 December 1971; 
also Bhuiyan, o p .c i t . p. 262
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Sccmajtantrik Dal (JSD - National Socialist Party). Composed of the
dissident and militant factions of the Awami League's own student and
labour fronts, the JSD emphasized youth, nationalism and authoritari-
1 4
anism and was quite unconcerned about parliamentary democracy. The 
party's ability to attract the disillusioned youth and other alienated 
segments of the society, including sections of the Army, by its call 
for scientific socialism in Bangladesh caused concern in New Delhi and 
Dhaka.
These, then, were the main political forces arrayed against 
Indo-Bangla interests visible on the political landscape of Bangla­
desh in the years immediately following independence. India was con­
cerned by both Islamic and leftist elements. The first threatened 
the resurgence of communal ism, which would adversely affect the Hindu 
minority in Bangladesh and, by emphasizing ties with Pakistan, could 
work against Indo-Bang1adesh interests. The second could reinstate 
Chinese influence in Bangladesh and also incite autonomy struggles 
in the sensitive border states of West Bengal, Assam and NEFA.
Another potentially dangerous development for the Indian lea­
dership was the possibility of 'demographic aggression' from densely 
populated Bangladesh against the surrounding sparsely-populated Indian 
territories in the northwest, north and the e a s t . ^  One of the reasons 
for India's military confrontation with Pakistan in 1971 was to restore 
the status quo ante bellum so that the refugees could return home.
14. Rounaq Jahan, "Bangladesh in 1972: Nation Building in a New State" 
Aslan Survey, vol xiii, #2, February 1973, p. 207
15* For an excellent historical discussion of this problem, see
Marcus Franda, Bangladesh: The First Decade, New Delhi: South 
Asian Pub 1i shers Pvt. Ltd., 19 8 2, pp. 77”124
180.
Therefore any political instability in Bangladesh whether due to com­
munal ism or other factors could cause forced migration and throw into 
imbalance the already delicate balance among the ethnic and religious 
communities of the neighbouring Indian states; this would not only 
have adverse social consequences, but the economic and political re­
percussions would also have far-reaching effects for the Indian Union. 
Therefore political stability and status quo under the League adminis­
tration were imperative in Bangladesh as far as the Indian decision­
making elite was concerned.
The economic content of the Indo-Bang1adesh relationship was 
also of great strategic concern to the Indian leaders. As noted in 
the previous chapter, long-term friendly relations between the two 
countries not only held the promise of an economic boon for the re­
latively inaccessible and undeveloped Eastern states of India, but 
more important to the political health of the Union, it stood to un­
dermine the insurgency in the area, due in no small measure to the 
economic and political deprivations there.
And, finally, both the leaderships had to be specially aware
of the psychological dimension of the new relationship - namely, what
M u j i b 1 s Principal Secretary, Ruhul Quddus, called 'negative sustenance'.
As Quddus explained:
Mentally we are still communal and anti-Indian 
and this is maintained by our Establishment's 
posture of negative sustenance. This negative 
sustenance is to establish our separateness, 
since we are basically the same people with the 
same history and culture. Because we desire a 
separate political homeland, negative suste­
nance becomes absolutely neces s a r y . ^
16. Interview in Dhaka on 7 July 1985
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This ‘negative sustenance1 had been a subtle but constant un­
dercurrent of the state philosophy of Pakistan, and the East Pakistanis 
had been constantly exhorted to maintain their religio-cu1tura1 se­
parateness from the Hindus of West Bengal by rejecting Tagore's works, 
Hindu literature and films, etc. Since pro-Pakistan forces were banned 
but not necessarily eliminated from the political fabric of the coun­
try, it was incumbent on the League Government to maintain a constant 
vigil over any untoward development that could strengthen the forces 
of negative sustenance.
Members of the Indian elites were equally aware of this. As
Inder Mai hotra explained:
The problem of identity is unfortunately a 
reality to some degree in every neighbour.
Even Nepal with separate existence for the 
last three hundred years feels it needs to 
assert its separateness from the common Hindu 
identity...our neighbourhood is unique. Even 
though the Soviet Union has more neighbours 
than us, it doesn't have the same problems as 
we do. The Soviet Union's neighbours were not 
carved up from Soviet territory. But India's 
neighbours have been. Therefore, identity 
crisis - to assert oneself - will c o n t i n u e . ^
And P.N. Haksar, recalling the events fifteen years later, said:
I told Mujib that he could be as anti-Indian 
as he wished if it was politically expedient 
for him. It would not bother India because 
India had learnt to live with it. After all,
Bangladesh's anti- Indianism could not be any 
more virulent than the Pakistani anti-lndian- 
ism that we survived the past thirty years.
We are not the least bothered by
Although Haksar may have personally felt that way, it was
17.
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Interview, op.ci t ., (3)
Interview in New Delhi, on 28 April 1985
perhaps an exaggeration to say that the Indian Government was "not 
the least bothered by it". Nonetheless, it does suggest that the 
Indian leadership was aware of potential anti- Indianism in Bangla­
desh, whether occasioned by a sense of insecurity among the people 
or as a reflection of the power struggle within the country.
Thus, given Bangladesh's acquired role in regional security, 
it was all the more important to the Indian leadership that all the 
potentially negative tendencies that could arise out of the country's 
new status be kept in check so that regional interests, and particu­
larly regional security as perceived by India, were well served.
Having discussed the various security concerns arising out of 
Bangladesh's independence, we now turn to three specific security re­
lated developments in Bangladesh's domestic politics and India's role 
in each: the development of a professional army; the establishment of 
an internal security force; and, Bangladesh's accession to the Organ­
isation of the Islamic Conference.
I I I
The Development of a Professional A r m y : The dominant Indian 
thinking on defence had always been that the mainresponsibI 1ity of un­
derwriting the defence and security of the subcontinent must fall on
India, and that the security of regional neighbours cannot be detached
19
from the security of the region. Therefore, like all its neighbours,
19- See K.M. Panikkar, The Future of South East Asia: An Indian 
View, New York, 19^8 and Problem of Indian Defence, Bombay,
1969; William Dunbar, I nd i a In T rans11 ion , The Washington 
Papers 31» vol. Ill, London: Sage Publications, 1976; Mankekar, 
o p .c 11. (1)
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Bangladesh too was vitally important to India's external and internal 
secur i t y .
This was made clear by India's leading defence analyst, K. 
Subrahmanyam, within five months of Bangladesh's independence. In 
his 'Security of Bangladesh' he made two important observations that 
reflected Indian perceptions of Bangladesh at the time, and which 
are perhaps still valid: Bangladesh had no external security con­
cerns; and its only concern would be internal security. Elaborating 
his views, Subrahmanyam claimed that Bangladesh was "fortunate" be­
cause "a threat to Bangladesh will be considered a threat to India, 
treaty or no treaty" and that "the main responsibility for ensuring
the security of the countries on the shores of the Bay of Bengal
20
from external maritime intervention will be India's".
On the "theoretical" possiblity that serious differences could 
develop between India and Bangladesh, he cautioned that "those differ­
ences will have implications for the security of Bangladesh... [and] 
the problem for Bangladesh will be unmanageable".
He then raised the issue of whether Bangladesh should have a
professional standing army or a militia. On the issue of militia,
he observed that
militias are most suited to nations which run 
the risk of being overrun and occupied. To 
continue resistance after occupation, militias 
fully rooted in the local population are ideal.
But Bangladesh does not have such a security 
problem.
20. Economic and Political Weekly (Bombay), vol. v i i , #19, 6 May 
1972, p. 946
21. Ibid., p. 947
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Besides, "militias can be properly organized only in countries where
there is a high degree of political indoctrination and a one-party
state", which was not the case in Bangladesh. Therefore, Bangladesh
needed a small professional standing army, even though militarism
could become a problem. Subrahmanyam observed that
Militarism in third world countries very 
often arises from the 'guardianship' role 
the armed forces attempt to play and the 
elitist self-image they have of themselves 
...Nations like Libya, (JAR, Syria, Iraq,
Sudan and above all, Pakistan, have suffer­
ed from the intervention of the armed forces 
in politics... the threat of militarism arises 
only from professional standing armies and 
not from mil i t i a s .^
But since states have on occasions found it necessary to employ the 
regular army against local militias, as was the case with the employ­
ment of the Chinese People's Liberation Army against the Red Guards 
to restore order, the dilemma Bangladesh faced was that it was
in a situation where a small standing army 
is inescapable, yet the issue is how to re­
duce the risk of militarism while raising 
and maintaining such a standing a r m y . ^
This line of thinking was also prevalent in the Indian defence
establishment, which also seemed to have had a solution for "the risk
of militarism". According to Major General D.K. Pal it, Director of
Military Operations during the 1971 war:
Bangladesh had no enemies, and since provi­
sioning of the army would come from India, 
it was felt that Bangladesh need not have a 
large standing army. It was suggested that 
three infantry brigades with scaled down 
allotment of heavy arms would be enough. ^
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Interview in New Delhi on 27 April 1985
This was confirmed by Lieutenant General J.S. Aurora, Chief of the
Indo-Bang1adesh Joint Command:
It was suggested that Bangladesh might have 
a series of brigades since its economy was in 
shambles and the requirement would be only for 
internal stability. [Defence Secretary] K.B.
Lai was the man who suggested it. But [Muj i b ' s 
Defence Advisor, General] Osmani rejected it.oc
It is interesting to note that even before the League Gov­
ernment had identified its policies on important national issues, 
influential members in the Indian defence estab1ishment and civil 
bureaucracy had already sought to formulate Bangladesh's defence 
policy on the basis of a number of assumptions. For instance, it 
was assumed that Bangladesh, out of its own security consideration, 
would not allow any serious difficulties to arise between the two 
countries because it would be "unmanageable" for the Bang 1 adesh.i s .
It was assumed that Bangladesh would not need to concern itself with 
external security because that was properly an Indian concern. It 
was further assumed that the size and strength of the army could be 
dictated by India. It was also assumed that the army would be to­
tally reliant on India for its wherewithal.
On the Bangladesh side, it appears that the League Government
26
had given only cursory thought to defence and security matters as 
it was preoccupied with pressing national issues such as the framing 
of the Constitution, economic reconstruction, internal law and order 
and external political recognition. These tasks were so daunting that 
defence and security issues did not gain national prominence during
185.
25. Interview in New Delhi on 1 May 1985
26. The Hindu, 28 December 1971, p. 9
the entire period when the League was in power. As Mujib's Foreign 
Minister, Dr. Kamal Hossain, explained:
[Defence and security] were undeveloped ideas.
We were not there long enough for these ideas 
to begin to be worked out.^y
The Awami League's only known position regarding the defence
and security of Bangladesh was envisaged in its famous 'Six-Point
Formula' that was drawn up in the context of united Pakistan on 23
March 1966. Point six of that 'formula for autonomy1 called for the
2
setting up of a militia or a para-military force for East Pakistan. 
After independence, and in the absence of any revision of the 1966 
manifesto, the League Government's security posture continued to be 
guided by the broad principles - abstaining from military alliances 
and joining the Nonaligned Forum - laid down in the 1966 party mani­
festo. Besides the Government was also secure in the belief that 
Bangladesh was surrounded by a friendly country and thus there was 
no threat to its territorial integrity. Nor, it must be added, did 
India give any cause for concern in this regard. Both Governments
had sought to identify the areas of potential tension and conflict
29
and resolve them through friendly bilateral negotiations. There 
was therefore no urgency for the League Government to identify a 
specific defence policy for the c o u n t r y . ^
27. Interviews in Dhaka in July-August 1985
28. For the full text of the Six-Point Formula, see Government of 
India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Bang 1adesh 
Documents, vol. I, New Delhi, undated, pp. 23-33
29. Interview with Foreign Minister Kamal Hossain, o p .c i t . (26)
30. Dr. Hossain, however, reca11s that on 6 August 1975 General 
Zia (Deputy Chief of Army at the time) "called on me at the 
Foreign Office and expressed his concern that do we really 
think enough of our national security". Dr. Hossain remem­
bers asking General Zia to seek the assistance of other like- 
minded officers to prepare a study on Bangladesh's security 
needs and submit it to him. Interview, Dhaka, August 1985
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There were, however, general ideas of what Bangladesh's de­
fence arrangement should look like. As Dr. Hossain tried to recon­
struct his Government's thoughts on the matter:
I think we certainly thought in terms of hav­
ing a good, we 11-equipped professional force 
as the core. We did not have wholly develop­
ed ideas about military requirements for our 
security...We did think of how best we can in­
volve the populat ion... because we cannot think 
of the security of Bangladesh as being separa­
ted from the task of every single citizen play­
ing his part in defending our sovereignty...We 
saw the repatriates coming back and taking 
their rightful place in that set-up and we 
hoped we could work out between them and the 
freedom fighters a cohesive relationship.^
In retrospect, however, the repatriates were not allowed to take 
“their rightful place in that set-up"; therefore, how much of this 
recollection has been influenced by post - 19 75 events is really aca­
demic. Be that as it may, even though there was no defence policy 
as such, there is evidence of strong undercurrents of conflicting 
sentiments at the time regarding the idea of an army. While many 
influential members of the AwamI League and the rank and file were 
barely in favour of an army because of their experience in Pakistan, 
three important exceptions were Mujib himself; the leader of the 
rightist faction in the League, Khondakar Mostaque A hmed; and the 
Defence Advisor to the Prime Minister, Colonel (promoted to General 
after independence) Osmani. Both Osmani and Khondakar wished for a 
strong professional standing army, and Mujib certainly did riot wish 
to rely on the Indian Army for his country's security needs.
31. Ibid.
32. This was gathered from interviews with two private secretaries 
to Mujib who wish to remain anonymous since they are still in 
government service:and from some retired army officers.
But Mujib was torn between the desire for pomp and fanfare 
that a national army would provide and the fear that there could 
be a repeat of the Pakistan experience. While he acquiesced in 
the decision to form a strong internal security force answerable 
only to him instead of investing in a large army, he was also aware 
that it would not be the answer to the problem of national defence. 
While he realized that no Bangladesh Army would be a match for India 
and that a large army would be wasteful, he nonetheless desired an 
army commensurate with the dignity of a sovereign nation; and at the 
same time he was concerned that India must not be allowed to mis­
understand his desire for a proper military for Bangladesh. While 
he delighted in being present at passing out ceremonies and parades
in military academies and cadet colleges, he was also sensitive to
33
what his senior party colleagues thought of him.
In that fluid state obtaining in the country, a position 
paper was prepared at the General Head Quarters in 1974 under the 
guidance of the Director of Military Operations. The paper argued 
for the augmentation of the Bangladesh Army along divisional lines 
in order to accommodate the interests of the Mukti Bahirii and the 
repatriated personnel. After considerable discussion (under Mujib's 
chairmanship since he was also the Defence Minister), Mujib gave 
his assent to the paper and asked it to be implemented. But when 
it became known within party circles, the pro-Indian faction led 
by Tajuddin Ahmed and Abdus Samad Azad was able to tap the anti- 
military sentiment within the party to demand that the decision to
33- Ibid. Also from interview with Shamsur Rahman, Mujib's am­
bassador to Moscow and then New Delhi. Dhaka, 9 July 1985
189.
augment the Army must be rescinded unless he wished to see a repeat
of the Pakistan experience; Mujib succumbed to its pressure and over-
34
turned his directive. Thus, as Lieutenant General Khwaja Wasiuddin 
confirmed, the view that prevailed within the League and the Govern­
ment was that
there was no need to have a large army or even 
a very organized army. I was told there would 
be no formation higher than a brigade, or even 
that. The idea was to completely align our de­
fence service with India. One way the Govern­
ment did that was, having found that there may 
be a certain amount of resistance to this, to 
come into agreement [with India] that the border 
force in Bangladesh would be similarly armed, 
similarly uniformed [Tike the Indian borde_r] 
force and no one would know the difference.^
Thus the League's paranoia at the possibility of military re­
surgence in Bangladesh tallied with the Indian desire to keep the 
Bangladesh military at an inchoate state and the end result was a 
weak army. But a weak army did not mean that Mujib would kowtow to 
the wishes of the Indian leaders regarding security matters. For in­
stance, during the counter-insurgency operations in Nagaland and 
Mizoram around mid-1974, the Indian Government suggested that Bangla­
desh send a brigade to the Chittagong Hill Tracts border to prevent 
insurgents from escaping to Bangladesh, and requested that this bri­
gade be placed under the operational command of India. A Joint Secre 
tary in the Ministry of Defence informed the GHQ of the Prime Minis­
ter's consent to allow the Bangladesh brigade to operate under Indian
34. Interview, op.ci t . (6). This officer participated in the dis­
cussion on the position paper.
35. Interview in New York on 29 March 1985. Wasiuddin was the only 
Bengali general in the Pakistan Army and had refused to partici­
pate in the war. At the time of this interview, he was Bangla­
desh's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, having 
taken the post after Karim's retirement.
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command. The GHQ sought confirmation directly from the Prime Minis­
ter. Upon learning of this, the Prime Minister dismissed the Joint 
Secretary and all others in the Ministry connected with this episode.
Mujib refused to allow any Bangladeshi troops to be placed under
36
Indian command. So no troops were sent.
There was another conflict of interest between the Indian
leadership and Mujib. To the extent that Mujib entertained doubts
about the Army, these seemed to have been directed mainly against
the resident Army personnel who had fought in the war. He was aware
of many of these officers' lack of allegiance to the League Govern-
37
ment and of latent political ambition among some of them. At
times he even vented his frustration; referring to Army Chief Shafiullah
and Deputy Chief Zia, Mujib once told his secretary:
Just look, yesterday I made them colonel , 
today they want to be brigadier. How can 
this country improve if everybody wants to 
become big overnight.^g
While Mujib did indulge the resident Army because it was com­
posed of freedom fighters and had a powerful lobby in the country, 
the Government and the party, he desired the speedy re­
turn of the non-repatriated Bengali military personnel from Pakistan
39
to man the three Services. And when they did get repatriated, start­
ing from late 1973, many of the senior officers were retained in
3 6 . Confidential military source, corroborated by one of Mujib's 
private secretaries. Interviews in Dhaka in July 1985
37- Interviews, op.ci t . (30) and (31)
38. Interview with Abdur Rahim who was Inspector General of Police 
and then Secretary to the Prime Minister from 1 January 1974 
till Mujib's assassination on 15 August 1975* Dhaka, 11 July 
1985
39- Interview, o p .ci t . (30)
service even against the advice of the hastily convened Army screen­
ing board - a brainchild of Ziaur Rahman to eliminate seniority and 
all obstacles to accelerated promotion of freedom fighters like him 
who were majors and colonels - and given important postings. Mujib 
also rejected the Board's recommendations that those Bengali offi­
cers in the Pakistan Army promoted during the 1971 crisis should not
4o
be allowed to retain their new ranks or given pensions.
As stated earlier, Mujib's desire to repatriate the stranded 
Bengali military personnel and retain them in service was contrary 
to the assumptions and expectations of the Indian decision-making 
elite. The Indian leaders specifically feared the repatriates' m i ­
litary indoctrination under Pakistan and doubted their allegiance 
to the League Government. The fear of another 'Pakistan' in the 
east was very much present. This fear had been voiced by Mrs. Gandhi 
even before Bangladesh's Independence, during her meeting with Bangla­
desh's then roving ambassador and later President Abu Sayeed Chowdhury
41
in London in October 1971. It was also the desire of the Indian
Congress that the repatriates from Pakistan should not be given the
upper hand in the military, intelligence and the country's adminis-
42
tration.
These Indian concerns were laid down before Mujib at various 
times, but Mujib was unwilling to take them seriously. According to
40. Ibid.
41. Interview with ex-President Chowdhury in Dhaka on 2 June 1985
42. Discussion with Dr. Bhabani Sen Gupta, Center for Policy Re­
search, New Delhi, 19 April 1985
192.
Shamsur Rahman who served as Mujib1s ambassador first in Moscow
and then in New Delhi:
P.N. Haksar told me that Mujib had several 
times mentioned his stranded soldiers in 
Pakistan. Haksar said that he had tried 
to convince Mujib that even Mao didn't take 
back the 1.8 million Chinese Army, but Mujib 
ignored the suggestion. Haksar had also ar­
gued that the freedom fighters raised during 
his absence had proved their loyalty to Mujib 
and the Awami League... [but thej] were suspect 
i n Muj i b ' s eyes. ^
Failing to prevail upon Mujib on this issue, India did the next best thing
possible, and that was to try to influence the promotion of junior
44
officers in the resident Army to senior positions, though that 
was not necessarily to Indian advantage, as events later proved.
The Indian pressure was also felt on a related issue, the 
taking away by the Indian Army of arms surrendered by the Pakistan 
Army in the 1971 war. This was a very sensitive issue among the 
anti-Indian elite, not to mention the Bangladesh Army. It was felt 
that the huge quantities of sophisticated arms surrendered by the
45
Pakistan Army properly belonged to Bangladesh for at least two 
reasons: because most of Pakistan's defence needs were financed by 
exports from East Pakistan, these arms could be seen as East Pakis­
tan's belated acquisition of its share; and the arms were surrendered 
within the territory of Bangladesh. If India insisted on a share of 
the booty, then at least half of it should be returned to Bangladesh.
According to one newspaper report, however, these captured 
weapons were removed to India at the request of the Bangladesh
43- Interview, o p .ci t . (31)
44. Interview, o p .ci t . (33)
45- The Hindu, 24 December 1971, P* 9
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Government which feared that in the state of flux that prevailed 
immediately after the war, these weapons could fall into the hands
46
of extremists, a situation neither Government desired. Whatever
the truth of the matter, there was overwhelming sentiment in the
Government and among the Bangladesh elite that these weapons should
be returned, and the Indian Government was equally adamant against
returning them. According to General Wasiuddin:
I asked Mr. Dixit that while on 16 December 
1971 when the Pakistan Army surrendered the 
Indian Army was received well, why by 1974 
there was complete hatred towards them. He 
said the reason was the taking away of the 
weapons. He said that he had wanted the wea­
pons to be returned and then shared between 
the two forces, but Dhar ruled him out.^y
Initially there were negotiations between the two Armies for the re­
turn of these captured arms, but the Indian Army was unreceptive.
India refused to hand over a complete list of the captured arms and 
to return the captured Chinese-made weaponry. Recalled Dr. A.R. Mai lick, 
Bangladesh's High Commissioner to India at the time:
I met the Defence Minister, Jagjivan Ram, 
and asked him why they were keeping the 
Chinese arms. Haksar called and told me 
not to get excited over it; they would be 
returned. Mrs. Gandhi intervened on our 
beha1f
It was not until the summit meeting between the two Prime Minis­
ters in mid-May 1974 that this issue was finally resolved. A month 
later, the Bangladesh Minister of State for Information, Taheruddin
46. Amrita Bazar Patrika, (Bengali Daily from Calcutta) 12 May 1974
47. Interview op.ci t . (33)* Mr. Jyotindranath Dixit was the second 
ranking Indian diplomat in Dhaka and is said to have had links 
with the underground. D.P. Dhar was Mrs. Gandhi's liaison man 
in Calcutta during the war and subsequently her personal emis­
sary to MujIb.
48. Interview in Dhaka on 31 July 1985
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ammunition left by the Pakistan Army after the war.
Thakur, announced that India had started returning the arms and
IV
The Establishment of an Internal Security Force: This issue 
gained greater prominence among the people of Bangladesh than did the 
Army issue not only because of the League Government's mishandling of 
it, but also because the people suffered tremendously from it. Cer­
tain sections in the Bangladesh elite have always seen, and continue 
to see, an 'Indian hand* in all adverse developments within Bangla­
desh, and this issue was no exception. But, in this case, the Govern 
ment unwittingly contributed to the widespread misconception of the 
intention behind the creation of this force.
The issue of the Mukti Bahini was of great concern to the 
Indian and Bangladesh leaders, because once the Bahini had served 
its purpose in the war, the question was what to do with it after 
the war. With a constant eye on post-1371 security and stability 
in the eastern part of the subcontinent, the Indian leaders had de­
vised a plan regarding its role and place in the new country. As 
General Aurora explained:
In any country that goes through a liberation 
war, the problem after independence is what to 
do with the armed scallywags. It requires care­
ful thought...The Pakistanis had armed many ir­
regulars and we had done the same. But after 
the war...we said that in every district town 
these people would be told to work in nation- 
building activity. They should come with their 
weapons, put them in the armoury, and work for
43. Bangladesh Times, 13 June 1374; Amrita Bazar Patrika, 18 June'
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the country. They would be paid a small sti­
pend by India and fed by the Bangladesh Gov­
ernment. The administrator of the region 
would supervise them.^g
The Tajuddin Government, however, had different plans. On 6 January 
1972, four days before the return of Mujib, Prime Minister Tajuddin 
Ahmed in his address to the newly formed Central Board of National 
Militia announced that every member of the Mukti Bahini would be en­
rolled in the National Militia and given food, shelter and minimum 
wages by the Government. They would be deployed in the nation's re­
building work and organized under subdivisions.^
But it appears that after Mujib's return and the reconstitu­
tion of the Cabinet, this issue was extensively discussed in a Cabinet
meeting, and “the first Cabinet decision was not to set up a parallel
52
force" to the Bangladesh Army. According to the accounts provided 
by Kamal Hossain, Law Minister in Mujib's first Cabinet, and Ruhul 
Quddus, the Prime Minister's Principal Secretary, among several pro­
posals discussed in the Cabinet meeting one found general acceptance.^ 
The freedom fighters were categorized into two groups: university 
graduates and students; and the less educated and those from the 
villages. It was decided that since large part of the Bahini com­
prised students, they should return to their studies and also be 
given credit for the time they had lost. Regarding the second group, 
which came predominent1y from the villages, it was decided that they
50. Interview, o p .ci t . (24)
51. Bangladesh Observer, 7 January 1972, p. 1
52. Interview with Dr. Kamal Hossain, o p .ci t . (26)
53. Interviews, o p .c i t . (15) and (50)
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should be encouraged to return to their agricultural pursuits. But 
for those who wished to offer their services to the Government on 
account of their para-military training and discipline, two options 
were suggested. The less educated group could be recruited for the 
border security force because, it was felt, being freedom fighters 
their patriotic sentiments would help in curbing border problems 
and smuggling activities; this would take care of ten to fifteen 
thousand of them. The second option was that "those who had given 
better accounts of themselves in the war" could be taken into the 
Army.
According to Hossain, General Osmani raised objection to 
the effect that the training received by the Mukti Bahini was not 
qualitatively adequate for them to join the regular forces and that 
it would create tensions within the Army. His objection was accep­
ted and it was decided that all of them would be recruited into the 
border force.
Following this Cabinet decision, the students were effectively 
absorbed within Bangladesh's universities, colleges and schools. But 
the second group with its slightly political bent could not be inte­
grated into the border force, which was more disc Ip1ined and organized. 
Soon dissension between this group and the border force led to feud­
ing, requiring Mujib to intervene personally. The Home Secretary, 
whose job it was to resolve the crisis, suggested a separate para­
military force to be called the Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini (National Se-
54
curity Force) and charged with internal security.
54. Ibid., (50)
At the time there were a lot of miscreants armed with sophis­
ticated weapons that were used in political assassinations, internal 
hijackings, bank robberies and the seizing of police armouries. The 
Police with its simple .303 rifles was totally stymied in its attempts 
to restore law and order. So it was felt that the Jatiyo Rakkhi 
Bahini (JRB) could assist the Police in restoring internal security. 
Thus, the JRB came into being on President's Order no. 21 of 1972.
But there was still the question of proper training of this 
force. Since the Bangladesh Army was ill-equipped for this task and 
the repatriates had not yet arrived, and given the political orien­
tation of the League Government, the best available source of train­
ing and technical assistance was considered to be India. India 
readily accepted. It is possible that having failed to convince 
Mujib not to take the repatriated soldiers back into service, India 
saw the JRB (with the wartime Indian-trained Mujib Bahini forming 
its core leadership) as the counter to them and agreed to train the 
new para-mi1 itary force accordingly. Inder Malhotra shed some light 
on it:
Any help Mujib asked we gave. The more tne 
Army factionalism became evident... the g r e a t ­
er the need was felt for security. The 
feeling that these Army returnees were pro- 
Pakistan was pervasive in India.^
Thus the JRB was initially trained by India. According to General 
Aurora,
assistance to Rakkhi Bahini was given by Major 
General Obund who was advisor to the intelli­
gence branch. He had retired from the Army and
197.
55- Interview, op.ci t. (3)
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was re-employed. The Army was not involved, 
it was done by RAW [^Research and Analysis 
Wing] and Obund was the commandant.
There were actually two Indian officers involved and the 
training was for six months, with an extension of an additional 
three months upon the Bangladesh Government's r e q u e s t . ^  Subse­
quent training was taken over by Bangladeshi officers under the
guidance of the Home Ministry, first under Abdul Malek Ukil and
eg
later Abdul Mannan.
But in the chaotic political environment of 1972-75, this 
had important political ramifications. First, being a new force, 
the JRB was given brand new weaponry and uniforms, whereas the Army 
was saddled with a few inherited weapons and all the sophisticated 
weapons surrendered by Pakistan were still in India. This gave 
vested interests within the Army the opportunity to foment anti- 
establishment views within its ranks, thereby considerably souring 
the Army's relationship with the JRB and the League Government.
Second, not only was the Rakkhi Bahini trained by Indian 
intelligence personnel, it was also uniformed like the Indian Bor­
der Police. This was of tremendous propaganda value to the anti- 
Indian forces within the country, especially at a time when the 
looting of industrial assets and military hardware by the Indian 
Army and also the smuggling of jute, fish and foodgrains across the 
border to India had become widely known among the people of Bangladesh.
56. Interview, o p .ci t . (2h)
57. This was told to the author by General Wasiuddin who had gather­
ed the information from his conversation with Mr. Dixit. Inter­
view, op.ci t . (33)
58. Interviews, op.cit. (36) and (15)
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Maulana Bhashani repeatedly and publicly claimed that the similarity 
in appearance of the two forces was deliberate and was a cover for 
the use of Indian forces in Bangladesh if and when Mujib required
59
them. And the Holiday editor, Enayetullah Khan, under the caption
'The Face of Terror1 labelled the JRB as
an instrument of counter-revolution on which 
even the indigent ruling group has no control.
It is an extension of the CRP (Central Reserve 
Police of India) [Intended] to safeguard an 
obliging government of the Indian ruling class 
and the expansionist interests of Indian sub­
imperial ism \^ sic\ .
The Bahini was also described as being "controlled and directed by 
the Indian Estab 1ishment...for the purpose of the containment of a 
national democratic revolution".
Third, by 1974, people had started spontaneously to resist the 
JRB's abuse of power that resulted in many deaths on both sides. The 
League Government chose to overlook the excesses committed by the JRB 
and condemned the general deterioration of law and order in the coun­
try as the work of anti-Bang 1adesh elements. Instead of curbing the 
Bahini's powers that would have gone a long way in restoring public 
confidence in the Government, the President's Order no. 21 that had
established the Bahini was further amended in 1974 giving it extensive 
61
arbitrary powers. What followed next were confiscation of property 
of anyone under suspicion; arrests without warrants; kipnappings; 
arbitrary killings in the name of law and order; thuggery of all 
sorts; and so on. The final result was a force that was above the
59- The Hindu, 8 March 1973, p. 9
60. The Hoiiday, 13 May 1973
61. See Jatiyo Sangsad, Official Proceedings, 4th Session, 10th 
Sitting, 28 January 1974, pp. 515”541
200.
law and that often presented itself as a virtual parallel govern­
ment answerable to no one. The country's internal security deteri­
orated to such an extent that it greatly contributed to Mujlb's 
decision in January 1975 to amend the 1972 Constitution and insti­
tute a one-party dictatorship under his direct control. But the 
Bahini was not disbanded.
Among the casualties was the Indo-Bangla relationship. Al­
though the people had become wise to the fact that the JRB was not 
an Indian para-military force or composed of Indian- personnel as was 
preached by certain sections of the anti-Awami League forces in the 
country, it was, however, not possible for them to decouple the ac­
tivities of the JRB from its initial training in the hands of Indian
62
security personnel; and the Army was convinced that the Bahini
63
was set up deliberately to control and contain it. Though the Rakkhi 
Bahini had turned into a Frankenstein's monster as a consequence of 
distortions within the political system, the Indian Government's 
original brief association with it was enough for certain sections 
of the society to fault I ndo-Bang1adesh relations.
62. Similar views were expressed by many of the former League of­
ficials interviewed: Ruhul Quddus, S.A. Karim, Abdur Rahim, 
private secretaries to Mujib etc.
6 3 . Credibility was lent to this Army belief by Brigadier Nuruzza- 
man, commander of the Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini who reportedly ar­
gued against the acceptance of several tanks that Anwar Sadat 
wanted to give Mujib as a tokenof Egypt's friendship for 
Bangladesh. Nuruzzaman argued that those tanks would destroy 
the power balance between the Bahini and the Army. But Mujib 
had to accept the gift. Ironically, these same tanks were 
used in the coup that slaughtered Mujib, his family and the 
top echelon of the Awami League. Source: confidential Army 
source and one of Mujib's secretaries.
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Another issue, alluded to before, that appeared considerably 
to affect the security perceptions of the Indian leaders, was the 
possibility of the resurgence of religious forces in Bangladesh. 
Immediately after independence, a primary foreign policy goal of 
the League Government was to seek the country's rightful place in 
the comity of nations through securing wide and swift recognition 
of its sovereign existence. Since the objective conditions prevail­
ing at the time placed the country in the Indo-Soviet axis, the lead­
ership was all the more aware of the need to gain early recognition 
from the Muslim bloc. Being itself a Muslim nation, it was as much 
a psychological and emotional necessity as a political and diploma­
tic one, and therefore it was politically inevitable that the Govern­
ment would at some time have to take a stand on the issue of member­
ship in the Organization of the Islamic Conference.
According to then Foreign Secretary Karim, the Indian leaders
were against this:
When initially the question came up of join­
ing the Islamic Conference they made a special 
plea to us that we should not try to join it.
The reasoning was that...this would give en­
couragement to the reactionary forces within 
the country. My personal view was different.
In fact I told Prime Minister Mujib that India 
herself tried to become a member of the Islamic 
Conference, but she could not get in because 
of her tactical mistake of sending a Sikh as 
representative to the Conference, which gave 
Pakistan a very good opportunity to point out 
that India was not only not a Muslim country, 
the Qluslim] minority had no say...^^
64. Interview, op.ci t . (4)
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As pointed out earlier, the Indian concern was quite under­
standable s i nee the resurgence of religious forces could tilt Bangla­
desh towards Pakistan and tilt the balance of forces within the 
country towards a rejection of secularism. But Indian concerns did 
not deter Bangladesh from seeking recognition from the conservative 
Muslim states like Saudi Arabia. By late 1973 Bangladesh sent spe­
cial emissaries to Muslim countries to secure its recognition. For 
instance, President Chowdhury, after he resigned from the Presidency 
in December 1973, was made M u jib1s personal emissary to Egypt, Lebanon, 
Syria and Saudi Arabia. As a result of these intensive diplomatic 
activities, Pakistan, which hosted the Second Islamic Summit Confer­
ence in Lahore in February 1974, was forced to send an invitation to 
Bangladesh to participate in the Conference.
While the diplomatic activity and the negotiations (through 
Foreign Ministers of Muslim countries) leading up to Bangladesh's 
participation in the Conference would be a separate study in itself, 
suffice it to say here that those opposing Bangladesh's formal mem­
bership in the Conference, namely the. pro-Indian Tajuddin group, in­
sisted that Mujib should first consult with India and also stop in 
New Delhi on his way to Lahore. Mujib upheld the views of those in 
the Cabinet who rejected this line of thinking. After the Cabinet 
decision to go to Lahore, a telegram was handed over to Mr. Dixit 
of the Indian High Commission informing India of Bangladesh's deci-
£ C
sion. And, according to one Indian newspaper, "The Sheikh had
65. This account was gathered from interviews with two private 
secretaries, Secretary Abdur Rahim, Foreign Minister Kamal 
Hossain, and the then Director, South Asia, Ministry of For­
eign Affairs. Dhaka, 1985- Some insight into this debate is 
provided by the Far Eastern Economic Review, 25 March 1974 
p. 26
talks with Mrs. Gandhi on the telephone last night soon after he
66
decided to go to Lahore". This was of course seen as a great 
victory by certain political forces in Bangladesh, who interpreted 
it as an indication that Mujib was frustrated with India and there­
fore Indo-Bang1adesh relations would no longer dictate Bangladesh's 
other external relations.^
VI
Conclus ion: The purpose of this chapter has been to high­
light India's awareness regarding the defence and security of the 
eastern half of the subcontinent. Though Indian leaders had always 
asserted a preeminent right in the subcontinent's defence and se­
curity affairs, it was not until 1971 that India was able, for the 
first time, to force the issue and effect a realignment of power 
within the region to its advantage. A consolidation of that 
changed balance of power was indispensable to India's acquired 
preeminence in the region, and it was this need that dicated India's 
Bang 1adesh policy.
The Indian leaders not only made it possible for a smooth 
transition to power for the Awami League, they were also prepared 
to deal with the postwar security contingencies in Bangladesh.
Their plan for the Mukti Bahini called for the latter's surrender 
of weapons and immediate involvement in national restoration ac­
tivities. This had important implications for the country's law 
and order situation and the League's economic reconstruction
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66. The Hindu, 24 February 1974, p. 1 
67- Interview, op.cit. (3 6)
programme. Their plan for the Bangladesh Army called for a token 
force, capable only of meeting internal security threats. They 
also tried to deny the repatriated Army personnel any role in the 
new country as a precautionary measure against military dictator­
ship. They preferred to keep Bangladesh from joining the Islamic 
Conference in order to avoid the resurgence of religion-based poli­
tics in Bangladesh. While there are indications that the Tajuddin 
Cabinet would probably have gone along with these, upon his return 
Mujib took a more assertive position.
Given India's involvement in the war, it was perhaps natural 
that the Indian leaders would try to 'guide' the defence and secu­
rity policies of the new Government in a direction best suited to 
their interests. The logic of their new position in the subcon­
tinent required stable, status quo governments in their periphery. 
Their ideal preference would have been a government totally respon­
sive to India's foreign policy and defence policy needs, but given 
the evolution of political forces within Bangladesh, they were 
willing to settle for an independent and militarily secure Bangla­
desh. At the least, they favoured a viable democratic government.
Nevertheless, from the very beginning there were limits to 
India's influence. Its leaders had anticipated the post-natal se­
curity problems that Bangladesh would face and had worked out their 
solutions, but were unable to influence the League Government to 
implement them. For instance, P.N. Haksar, in keeping with the 
Indian defence establishment's solution for "the risk of militar­
ism" in Bangladesh, had urged Mujib not to reinstate the repatriated 
Bengali military personnel into the Bangladesh armed services, but
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If the size of the Bangladesh armed forces was kept in check, 
it was primarily because the prevailing sentiment within the govern­
ing party desired so. That this was also the desire of the Indian 
Government merely suggests interests in tandem but not Indian in­
fluence. If the Mukti Bahini officers gained control of the Bangla­
desh Army, which was what the Indian Government also desired, it 
was because of the support they mustered from within the governing 
party, the opposition parties and other urban interest groups; this, 
again, had little to do with India influencing the outcome.
When Indian interest required that a Bangladeshi brigade be 
placed under Indian command to assist India in its counter-insurgency 
operations in the eastern states, Mujib refused to oblige. Yet, 
Bangladesh was able to regain from the Indian Army the Chinese-made 
weapons surrendered by the Pakistan Army, despite D.P. Dhar's ob­
jections and the unwillingness of the Indian defence establishment. 
India also failed to prevent Bangladesh from joining the Organiza­
tion of the Islamic Conference. Mujib did not consult Indira Gandhi 
prior to his decision to attend the Lahore Summit as was assumed 
under Article h of the treaty. Kujib also decided not to stop in 
New Delhi on his way to Lahore, though the Tajuddin lobby strongly 
argued for the necessity of such a gesture to the Indian Government.
All these would suggest that India failed noticeably to influ­
ence Bangladesh on matters important to Indian national interests. 
Bangladesh seems to have been able to assert its position, even 
though on a number of occasions it was contrary to Indian interests.
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Mujib did not oblige the Indian Government.
Ironically, Bangladesh's overriding significance in India's regional 
security policy gave Mujib a considerable latitude in asserting his 
country's interests. Thus, India's perceptions of its long-term 
goals had much to do with Mrs. Gandhi's 'soft' attitude towards the 
League Government.
From the standpoint of influence theory, a number of important 
determinants were present. Since a realignment of power in the sub­
continent was the ultimate goal of the Indian Government, it could 
not remain complacent about Bangladesh's defence and security poli­
cies, lest these negated that goal. The Indian Government could 
not predict with any degree of certainty what the security policy 
of a sovereign Bangladeshi Government might be, because, while the 
political elites of Bangladesh had consistently fought against the 
military dictatorships in Pakistan, it did not necessarily follow 
that they would be against a strong professional standing army of 
their own. To obviate this latter possibility, it became necessary 
for the Indian Government to try to influence the size, shape and 
goal of the Bangladesh military.
In addition, to preserve the League Government in power, it 
felt the need to train a Mujib Bahini that could in future be used 
by the pro-Indian ruling party; to reduce the damage potential of 
the anti-Indian forces in the country, it took away the surrendered 
weapons, as well as tried to stop Bangladesh from joining the OIC; 
and to reduce the chances of a military dictatorship in Bangladesh, 
it tried to persuade Mujib not to take back into the Bangladesh 
Army the repatriated military personnel.
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On the other hand, the need to defend sovereign prerogatives 
required the Bangladesr. Government to attempt to minimize as much 
as possible the effects of India's attempts to influence preferred 
outcomes in Bangladesh. Since the issue of national security and 
its wider manifestations were equally crucial to both countries, 
the operation of an influence process became extremely likely, 
thereby validating the influence theory.
207.
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Chapter 7 
DEFINING THE BORDERS
It may be assumed that after a country obtains independence, 
a primary consideration of its leaders is to have secure frontiers 
with its neighbours. In the case of Bangladesh, though its border 
delimitation was incomplete, the League Government nonetheless felt 
its territorial sovereignty to be secure because Bangladesh was sur­
rounded by friendly India. The League Government was in no hurry 
to raise it for discussion because it was not seen as an issue of 
immediate importance.
The signing of the Indo-Bang1adesh friendship treaty had for­
malized the existing relations between the two Governments. The 
League Government was aware that for the friendship treaty to be 
meaningful, Indo-Bang1adesh relations would have to be free of ten­
sion and conflict, and a primary task, then, would be to identify 
all areas of outstanding dispute between the two countries. It ap­
pears that the boundary delimitation did not fall into this category; 
rather, it was more of an area of potential conflict, not requiring 
urgent attention.
The negotiations on land border delimitation, maritime border 
delimination and oil exploration in the Bay of Bengal are the subjects 
of this chapter, at the end of which some tentative conclusions on 
influence relationship will be attempted.
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Land Border Delimitation: While the land border agreement be­
tween India and Pakistan followed largely the Radcliffe Award of 19^7, 
some areas of the boundary between India and East Pakistan remained 
undemarcated from as far back as 1952. It would be reasonable to ex­
pect that after Bangladesh's independence, an early resolution of the 
undemarcated border areas, which would have politically benefited 
both Governments, would have been attempted, but no mention was made 
of the border issues either in the jointcommuniques issued at the end 
of Mujib's visit to Calcutta in February 1972 and Mrs. Gandhi's visit 
to Dhaka in March 1972, or in the communiques issued at the end of 
several foreign ministerial visits in 1972 and 1973 -
It is not exactly clear when the border talks started, but the 
first official acknowledgement of mutual effort to resolve this out­
standing issue was made in June 1973. Then Foreign Minister Kamal 
Hossain declared in Parliament that
work has started on the delimination of the 
West Benga1-Bang 1adesh border. Already the 
Indian Government has given us full coopera­
tion in this undertaking and has promised us 
full cooperation even in future.^
This delimination exercise essentially consisted of defining the 
border more accurately at certain points and of completing the de­
marcation of the land boundary in areas left undemarcated. By the 
beginning of 1974, this exercise ran into difficulty over the issue
1. Jatiyo Sangsad, Official Proceedings, 2nd Session, Ibth Sit­
ting, 22 June 1973, p. 590
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of enclaves, thus requiring the direct intervention of the two 
Pr i me Mi n i s ters.
The issues were finally resolved with considerable difficulty 
during the Prime Ministers' summit in May 1974 in New Delhi. Under 
the new border agreement signed on 16 May 1974, the exchange of en­
claves provided Bangladesh with 110.44 sq. km. of territory and India 
with 49.17 sq. km., with a net gain for Bangladesh of over 61 sq.km.
The difficulty was with the Berubari enclave in the northwestern border 
of Bangladesh. It had a majority Hindu population, while the Dahagram 
and Angarpota enclaves on the adjacent Indian side had a majority of 
Muslims. According to the agreement, the southern half of Berubari 
and the adjacent enclaves were given to India in exchange for the 
Dahagram and Angarpota enclaves that were given to Bangladesh. India 
also agreed to "lease in perpetuity to Bangladesh an area of 178 metres 
x 85 metres near 'Tin Bigha' to connect Dahagram with Panbari Mouza of 
Bangladesh". This upheld the general rationale of the Radeiiffe 
Award in which border areas with predominantly Hindu population were 
ceded to India and areas with predominantly Muslim population were 
awarded to Pakistan.
Perhaps the most important gain for Bangladesh was that the 
Indian enclaves in Bangladesh and the Bangladesh enclaves in India
2. Though the Indo-Bang1adesh border agreement gave no specific 
figures, according to one estimate, there were 129 Indian en­
claves in Bangladesh and 80 Bangladesh enclaves in India.
Amrita Bazar Patrika (Calcutta Bengali daily), 16 May 1974
P. 5
3. Ibid. , 23 May 1974, p. 5
4. Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Exter­
nal Publicity Division, Bangladesh Documents, vol. 2, no. 4, 
(April-June 1974), p. 15
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were exchanged "without claim to compensation for the additional 
areas going to Bangladesh".^ Article 2 of the agreement provided 
that the "territories in adverse possession in areas already de­
marcated ...sha11 be exchanged within six months of the signing of 
the boundarystrip maps by the plenipotentiaries", and Article 3 
provided that "when areas are transferred, the people in these 
areas shall be given the right of staying where they are, as na­
tionals of the State to which the areas are transferred". Article 
5 required that the Instruments of Ratification should be exchanged 
as early as possible.
Though Bangladesh emerged as the beneficiary in the border 
talks with India, these negotiations were in fact so difficult that 
they almost stymied the success of the summit itself. While it was 
relatively easy to reach other agreements on transportai ion, com­
mercial relations and economic and technical cooperation, the more 
important issues of water sharing and border delimitation at first 
proved particularly elusive. But both the Prime Ministers were 
painfully aware of the need to break the stalemate on these impor­
tant issues, since failure to resolve them would be construed as 
failure of the summit, which would add to their failure in handling 
the volatile domestic political situations that obtained in both 
the countries at the time. The Ganges water sharing issue was re­
legated to the Joint Rivers Commission as a temporary face-saving 
measure. When the border issue continued to prove intractable, 
Mujib, finding no way out of this quagmire, made an extraordinary
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., p. 16
gesture. According to a Bangladesh Foreign Ministry official who
participated in these discussions:
He told Mrs. Gandhi that Bangladesh was only
55,000 sq. mis. in area while her country was 
vast. Bangabandhu then picked up his pen and 
gave it to Mrs. Gandhi asking her to go ahead 
and draw the border as it pleased her. Mrs.
Gandhi just sat there. We got what we wanted.^
Kamal Hossain, who participated in that meeting, put it slightly
di fferent1y :
In the land boundary talks, he Qluj i b] got his 
points accepted on the three key sticky points 
by taking the stand that you have so much ter­
ritory and we are so squeezed in terms of land 
space that when it is a matter of a few square 
miles, the benefit of the doubt should be to 
Bang 1adesh...indeed that is how those points 
were resolved in our favour.g
The members of the Bangladesh delegation were understandably 
pleased with the bilateral agreement on the boundary issue. One 
senior Foreign Ministry official recalled with a sense of accomplish­
ment :
Some of these undemarcated areas had precipi­
tated military incidents in '65, '68 and '69 
...Many disputed areas were given to us. The 
famous Asalong Mouza came to us without firing 
a pop gun.g
The then Bangladesh High Commissioner to India remembered: "we were 
able to secure the Pathoria hilltop which our Army wanted for stra­
tegic reaso n s " . ^  And the Director General of Survey was emboldened
7. This account was given to the author by a Foreign Ministry of 
ficial who had been part of the negotiating team during the 
summit in May 1974 in New Delhi. It was further corroborated 
by other officials in the Ministry and by one of Mujib's pri­
vate secretaries. Confidential interviews in New Delhi (May 
1985), Dhaka, (July-August 1985). and Canberra (June 1986)
8. Interview in Dhaka, July 1985
9. Confidential interview in Dhaka, 22 July 1985
10. Interview in Dhaka, 31 July 1985
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enough to remark, "we could have gotten more because Mrs. Gandhi 
was soft towards u s " . ^
If the League Government was pleased with the outcome of the 
summit meeting, the reaction in the Opposition benches in Parliament 
was less than happy. The territorial gains registered in the boundary 
agreement with India were not sufficient to overshadow the concern 
in the Opposition benches at the Government's decision to hand over 
South Berubari to India. It appears that the League Government did 
not take any early initiative to brief the leaders of the Opposition 
on the details of the negotiation, particularly on the issue of the 
transfer of South Berubari. Given the Awami League's overwhelming 
majority in Parliament, it is quite likely that the Government did 
not give any serious thought to briefing the Opposition on the issue, 
since there was no chance of the agreement not being ratified.
There may be two possible explanations for this, both histori­
cal. Arrogance of the majority party has been part of Bangladesh's 
legacy. Almost all governing parties in Pakistan and Bangladesh had 
come to power with overwhelming mandates, popularly acquired or other­
wise, which gave them an ersatz sense of power over all other parties. 
The resulting arrogance tended towards the disregard of elementary 
standards of par 1iamentary courtesy and decency, and, at times bor­
dered on pariiamentary tyranny.
The second factor has been the tendency among all governing 
parties to view the opposition parties as enemies of the state and
11. Told to the author by the then Bangladesh High Commissioner
to I nd i a . Ibid.
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therefore incapable of desiring anything good for the country. This 
self-arrogated monopoly over patriotism, more often than not, scuttled 
all possibilities for inter-party dialogue, and the opposition parties 
were never taken into confidence unless the very survival of the 
governing party necessitated it. On both scores, the League appeared 
to be no different from its predecessors.
Th leader of the Opposition, completely in the dark about the 
nature of the negotiations, argued that not even the anti-Bengali Paki­
stan Government had yielded an inch of East Pakistan's territory to 
India. In general, the Opposition members attacked the League Govern­
ment for betraying Bangladesh's territorial sovereignty. There was 
some opposition to the border agreement outside of Parliament also. 
Maulana Bhashani , while addressing a political rally by the United
Front that comprised several parties, condemned the transfer of South
12
Berubari to India. The National Socialist Party, describing the
agreement as an infringement of Bangladesh's sovereignty, argued that
1 3
since South Berubari was not a disputed area, the League Govern­
ment had no right to include it in the negotiations or to transfer
14
it to India without a referendum on the issue. The Jatvyo Gono 
Mukti Union comprising dissenting factions of various parties and 
groupings also urged the Government to rescind its decision regarding 
South Berubari.  ^^
12. Amrita Bazar Patrika, 14 June 1974, p. 5
13- India had earlier agreed with Pakistan to turn Berubari enclave 
over to it. Iftekhar A. Chowdhury, "Strategy of a Small Power 
in a Subsystem: Bangladesh's External Relations" Austra1ian 
Outlook v o l . 34, no. 1, 1980, p. 88
14. Bangladesh Times (Dhaka), 19 May 1974, p. 1
1 5 . Ibid. , p . 8
While the League Government could afford to disregard the 
latter's condemnation because of its relative political ineffec­
tiveness, it could not remain complacent in the face of the con­
demnation by the JSD and NAP-B, because of their growing political 
appeal to the people at the time when the League Government was 
being universally discredited for the massive political, economic 
and social disharmony in Bangladesh. This lack of confidence in 
the Government tended to diminish its achievements at the summit 
meeting, particu1 a r 1y on the border talks, and even lent some cre­
dibility to the Opposition's accusation that the country's terri­
torial sovereignty had been tampered with.
If the Opposition accused the League Government of bad faith, 
there is some indication that it may have been justified, for the
I
transfer of South Berubari to India may have been more than purely
a quid pro quo in the negotiations. It seems that Muj ib may have
also had a political motive in this territorial transaction. Noted
the Bangladesh High Commissioner to India at the time:
I asked Mujib about Berubari. He said Beru­
bari is very dangerous because there are many 
communists there and they are all Hindus.
They are politically subversive and contrary 
to our national interests. Against that, 
said Mujib, I want Dahagram where 80 percent 
are M u s 1ims.^
It is not clear whether this was the centrist, anti-communist Mujib 
speaking, or merely a post facto rationalization by Mujib to soothe ruffled 
nationalist feeling, but the willingness to transfer an undisputed 
area to India did put the Government in a bad light. It was compounded
215.
16. Interview, op.cit. (10)
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further by the failure of the Indian Parliament to ratify the agree­
ment, although the Union Cabinet had ratified it on 31 May 1974. ^
The ratification of the agreement by Bangladesh was a fore­
gone conclusion, given the overwhelming majority of the Awami League 
in the Parliament. The process of ratification was expedited by a 
suit filed against the League Government by a Bangladeshi citizen,
questioning the Government's authority to transfer South Berubari
18
to India. The Bangladesh High Court held the view that it was 
well within the Government's constitutional prerogatives to nego­
tiate on the country's territory, and advised the Government to put 
it through as a constitutional amendment. The agreement was finally 
ratified and South Berubari duly transferred to India.
Various reasons have been given to explain India's failure to
ratify the border agreement. One Foreign Ministry source explained
that the difficulty was with the 'Tin Bigha' corridor that would
connect Dahagram with Bangladesh. The Indian Parliament was not
convinced that transit rights would be necessary or that an under-
19
pass or an overpass would do. Another Foreign Ministry official
pinned the reason on M u j i b 's downfall; ratification did not come
about because of the Indian Government's displeasure with the mili-
20
tary takeover in Bangladesh. And Foreign Minister Hossain's view is: 
17* Amrita Bazar Patrika, 1 June 1974, p. 1
18. According to one inside source in the Foreign Ministry, the suit 
was the brainchild of the League Government itself to force India 
to ratify the agreement as soon as possible. But this could not 
be corroborated.
19- Confidential interview in Dhaka, July 1985
20. Confidential interview in Dhaka, July 1985
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The land boundary agreement was favourable 
to us and that is why it has been difficult 
for India to move towards implementation.
You do also run into certain constitutional 
and administrative snags...If there was no 
discontinuity in the Government in Bangladesh 
then we could have probably achieved imple­
mentation of that agreement within six months 
to a year.
Since Mujib had secured a border agreement favourable to Bang­
ladesh by insisting on Mrs. Gandhi's magnanimity, there is little rea­
son to doubt that implementation woul dhave followed soon thereafter. 
The fact that the border agreement to this day has not been ratified 
by India speaks convincingly of the special sensitivity Mrs. Gandhi 
displayed towards Mujib's concerns. On the maritime boundary nego­
tiation, it was however a different story.
Maritime Boundary Negotiation: The first official pronounce­
ment of the limits of Bangladesh's jurisdiction over territorial 
waters was made on the day the Pakistan Army surrendered in East 
Pakistan, 16 December 1971. The Home Minister in the Government- 
in-Exile, A.H.M. Kamaruzzaman, announced that the "territorial
waters of Bangla Desh extend into the sea to a distance of 12 nau-
22
tical miles measured from the appropriate baseline". But what was 
the "appropriate baseline" was left unannounced.
The issue of maritime boundary delimitation was not seriously 
discussed in the League Government until early 1974. One reason for
21. Interview, op.ci t . (8)
22. The Hindu, 17 December 1971, p. 9
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this delay may be that it was not yet an issue of contention between 
India and Bangladesh, because Bangladesh had not made its claims known. 
It should be remembered that this was the time when global negotiations 
on the law of the sea were taking place, and no universal declaration 
had as yet emerged. Thus, as a part of the law of the sea negotiations, 
the issue of maritime boundary delimitation was in a state of flux.
The League Government sought the advice of a maritme law ex­
pert from Stanford University regarding Bangladesh's jurisdictional 
claim. The Law professor was of the opinion that the Bangladesh 
coastline was unstable and that the low water mark, which usually 
indicates a country's baseline, was totally unrecognizable. He sug­
gested that due to the presence of these unique coastal features, 
Bangladesh should adopt the argument presented in the A n g 1o-Norwegian 
Fisheries Case and declare the ten fathom line on the Admiralty Chart 
as its natural baseline. On the basis of this recommendation, the 
League Government enacted legislation declaring the ten fathom line
as the country's natural baseline and published it in the official
23
gazette.
Soon thereafter, in November 1974» the Indian Government sent
a protest note to the Bangladesh Government saying that the latter's
claim of jurisdiction over territorial waters cut into twenty-one
24
miles of Indian territory. What followed next were five rounds of
23. This account was given by the Foreign Ministry official who 
was in charge of the spadework leading to the Government's 
announcement of its maritime legislation. Interview, o p .c i t .
(9)
24. Financial Times (London), 22 November 1974. Also, interview, 
ibid.
negotiations, much of them technical, between November 1974 and May 
1975 to resolve this conflicting claim.
The dispute involved three aspects. First, the Indian Govern­
ment was in favour of the equidistance principle which called for cer­
tain types of base points from which the median line would be drawn. 
Such an approach denied Bangladesh a large portion of what it consi­
dered to be its territorial waters. Bangladesh found to its advan­
tage the principle laid down in the North Sea Continental Shelf (NSCS) 
case, the principle of equitable delimitation. In the NSCS case in­
volving Holland, Denmark and West Germany, the equidistance principle 
was rejected as the basis for delimiting the continental shelf because 
the terrain was such that it acted unduly to the detriment of West 
Germany, cutting off a very large part of what West Germany might 
legitimately expect, given its conception of an equitable basis for 
delimiting the continental shelf of the three states.
The West German Government had done a global exercise identi­
fying situations where a territory would be disadvantaged by peculiar 
geographical configurations and where the equidistance principle would 
be prejudicial to that territory. In its memorial to the International 
Courst of Justice, the West German Government had identified twelve 
situations similar to the one faced by it, and, interestingly, one was 
the case of East Pakistan vis-a-vis India. The Bangladesh Government, 
arguing that long before Bangladesh had come into being this difficu­
lty had been anticipated, pressed from the start the principle of
25
equitable delimitation in contrast to the equidistance principle.
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25. This account was detailed by Foreign Minister Kamal Hossain. 
Interview, op.ci t . (8)
The second issue was the question of base points, and the 
method of defining a baseline. Whereas internationally the low 
water mark along the coastline is normally taken to be the base­
line, the League Government argued that this was inappropriate for 
Bangladesh because its coastline constantly shifted on account of 
the continuous formations at the mouth of the two rivers that emp­
tied into the Bay of Bengal. In the absence of identifiable fixed 
land points, the Government argued for the ten fathom line on the 
Admiralty Chart as the baseline. If the Indian Government could be 
made to accept this, it would greatly enhance Bangladesh's terri­
torial waters.
The third issue was the question of sovereignty over the is­
land of Talpatti, or New Moore Island as the Indians call it. This 
was one of those formations that was emerging from the water and was 
first noticed in 1 9 7 1 ; it was submerged for part of each year.
Talpatti is located directly south of the Hariabanga River 
that forms the southernmost boundary between the Indian state of 
West Bengal and Bangladesh. The mainstream of the Hariabanga River, 
as it empties into the Bay, splits into several currents and the 
crux of the problem was agreeing on which of these currents was the 
continuation of the mainstream. The current which the Bangladesh 
Government claimed to be the mainstream flowed southward in the Bay 
and passed west of the island, thus suggesting Bangladesh's sovereignty. 
The current claimed by India to be the continuation of the mainstream 
passed east of the island, suggesting Indian sovereignty. The issue 
could be resolved only by a complicated hydrological exercise, and 
this resulted in highly technical discussions.
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period, substantial progress was made. The Indian Government accepted
the Bangladiesh Government's dynamic coastline argument and the ten
fathom line on the Admiralty Chart as the appropriate base-line of
26
Bangladesh, though the reason for this change of position is un­
known. One can only conjecture that Mrs. Gandhi may have appreciated 
the merit of Bangladesh's case. Be that as it may, the initial grey 
area of over three thousand square miles was reduced to an area of 
about two hundred square miles over which discussion continued un­
til an impasse was reached. As Foreign Minister Hossain recalls it:
You know how these boundary negotiations take 
place. You have a line, the other side gives 
a line, and in between is the triangle of dis­
agreement and the whole effort of the negotia­
tion is to narrow down the area of disagreement 
... [^At the last stage^] we were beginning to 
think in terms of friendly arbitration as has 
been done between Britain and France for the 
Channel Islands and Canada and the US in the 
Gulf of Maine...Neutral arbitration gets both 
sides off the hook and that is where we were 
going. We were making progress, tangible pro­
gress, from month to m o n t h l y
Another round of talks was scheduled for the second half of August
when Bangladesh officials hoped to cut the Gordian knot, but by then
the League Government had fallen.
In the course of the five rounds of discussions over a six month
Oil Exploration in the Bay of Bengal: The right to explore 
for oil in a certain area in the Bay of Bengal also became a bone of 
contention between the two Governments. A paper on Bangladesh's pe­
troleum resources and its exploitation was prepared under the guidance 
of Kamal Hossain and discussed in a Cabinet subcommittee sometime in
2 6 . Ibid.
2 7 . Ibid.
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late 1973* The recommendations in the paper were adopted as Govern­
ment policy and Hossain was given the additional portfolio of Petro- 
28
leum Minister. Once the League Government decided to go ahead with 
oil exploration in its territorial waters, it became necessary to 
enact legislation regarding those waters and to declare the limits 
of the economic zone. Thus it was the desire for petroleum explora­
tion in the Bay that triggered the need to enact maritime legislation.
While this process was underway, the Government began negotia­
tion with foreign oil companies. Exploration contracts were awarded 
to six companies: three American (Union Oil, Atlantic Richfield, and 
Ashland Oil); a Canadian subsidiary of an American company (Canadian 
Superior); a Japanese consortium (Japan Petroleum Development Corpo­
ration); and a Yugos 1 av company that got a very small share. The en­
actment of legislation on territorial waters was followed by India's 
protest note mentioned earlier. The area of contention straddled
India's eastern maritime boundary, the same zone that was apportioned
29
to Ashland Oil by Bangladesh.
While the other oil companies proceeded with their work, Ash­
land Oil, acting under the advice of the US State Department, opted 
to delay its preliminary work of shooting the seismic lines until the 
dispute between India and Bangladesh over this zone was satisfactorily 
resolved. The decision was powerfully reinforced by the intervention 
of an Indian naval ship in the a r e a . ^
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
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According to Mujib's private secretary at the time, Mujib 
was annoyed at this Indian naval flag-showing. He was equally up­
set at Ashland Oil's decision not to start work because, as he 
argued, this in itself weakened Bangladesh's claim over the terri­
tory. Mujib wanted Ashland Oil to commence work immediately and
31
was prepared to show the Bangladesh naval flag if necessary.
According to the then Bangladesh High Commissioner to India:
[jxternal Affairs Minis t e ^  Swaran Singh 
called me to his office and said you have 
leased out areas to US companies without 
negotiating the maritime boundary...I came 
to Dhaka and went to Mujib's office in 
Gonobhaban where there was a map. When I 
raised the issue, Mujib showed me the vari­
ous seas around India with a stick in his 
hand and asked why Mrs. Gandhi wanted so 
much. He admitted that the boundary was 
unresolved. He asked me to explain it to 
Mrs. Gandhi that we have already taken money 
from the oil companies and now we could not 
possibly back out of the contracts...When I 
told Mrs. Gandhi about it, she exclaimed: 
imagine my position in Parliament!^
The issue could not be resolved without settling the border dispute
because, as Swaran Singh pointed out: "if oil is struck then the two
countries might fight over it in the event that the boundary remains
33
unresolved".
But it appears that both Governments were aware of the fact 
that if an oil discovery was part of some continuous geological fea­
ture that straddled an international boundary or a defined grey area, 
then precedents for maritime agreements on joint exploration or
31. Confidential interview in Dhaka, 15 July 1985
32. Interview, o p .c i t . (10)
3 3- Ibid.
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sharing of the resource between contiguous countries existed.
Such was the case between Britain and Norway, Australia and 
Indonesia, and Japan and South Korea. According to Kamal Hossain, 
an "embryo of this idea was being floated on the Indian side", and 
"around July [ 9;5]  or so there might have been an informal indica­
tion from the Indian side that this could be an option". The League 
Government was also open to this suggestion, but since the issue 
was intimately linked to the maritime border dispute, the Govern­
ment was rapidly moving towards the option of a third party deter­
mination on the maritime boundary delimitation issue. The next 
round of negotiations scheduled for 18 August 1975 never took 
place, as all negotiations came to a standstill with the collapse 
of the League Government.
IV
Conclus ion: It cannot be said with any degree of certainty 
whether raising the issue of border delimitation in the halcyon 
days of Indo-Bang1adesh relations would have brought different 
results, though it can be said that the years 1974 and 1975, when 
this issue was discussed, were hardly propitious. By then, the 
banned religious parties had resurfaced under different labels 
and repatriation of stranded Bangladeshis in Pakistan had been 
completed. These two developments, inter alia> strengthened the
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anti-Indian forces within the country, and from then on politics
34. Even as early as November 1972, Pakistan had released a large 
number of religious fanatics and members of the Jama'at i Islam 
from among the stranded East Pakistanis to create a fifth 
column in Bangladesh. Also, the advance delegation sent to 
Bangladesh to prepare for Bhutto's visit there was headed by 
the Chief of Pakistan's national intelligence service. At
was far more vocalized than ever before. Under these circumstances, 
the League Government could not be seen to be yielding to India on 
any b i1atera1 i ssue.
But Mrs. Gandhi had better options. Since, at the time, India's 
internal political developments had little reference to its external 
relations, Mrs. Gandhi had a relatively free hand in foreign policy, 
and could have chosen to be tough on Bangladesh. But she adopted 
a flexible stand in the border negotiations because a successful 
conclusion of the summit, even at the expense of certain concessions, 
was to her immediate political benefit and to India's long-term gain.
On the land boundary, basic agreements had been reached in the 
earlier negotiations between the Pakistan and Indian Governments, 
and the difficulty was mostly with Bangladesh's insistence on get­
ting the benefit of the doubt. But in the case of the maritime 
boundary, the formation of the Island of Talpatti and the complex 
technical exercise regarding the mainstream of the Hariabanga River 
were relatively recent phenomena which complicated the Issue. Nor 
was it helped by the Bangladesh Government's unilateral decision 
to hand out exploration contracts to foreign companies before the 
maritime boundary was defined bilaterally.
Mujib seemed to be less concerned with legal arguments and 
emphasized more the principle of equitable distribution. In both 
cases, Mujib's stand was that India had so much land and seas that
the conclusion of Bhutto's visit, the Pakistan Government sought 
an extension of stay for its intelligence chief. Both these 
developments contributed to the strengthening of the anti- 
Indian forces in the country. The Bangladesh Government was 
annoyed on all counts. Interview, op.ci t . (9)
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it should be magnanimous towards Bangladesh. Mujib quite success­
fully played the role of a dejected ally, and, by doing so, elicited 
the desired response from Mrs. Gandhi. Mrs. Gandhi had not only 
yielded to Mujib1s arguments on the land border issue, she also 
seemed to have been persuaded by Mujib's position on the oil ex­
ploration issue. it is interesting to note that her reaction to 
Mujib's stand on the oil contracts was only that she had been put 
in a tight spot in Parliament. This would suggest that India was 
willing to make concessions to maintain the friendship of an im­
portant ally, indicating perhaps an influence relationship in the 
reverse order. But this was possible only during direct dealings 
between the two Prime Ministers. The discussions on the maritime 
boundary did not reach the level of Prime Ministerial talks. This 
would indicate that while an influence relationship may have opera­
ted at the highest personal level, it did not operate at the regu­
lar government level.
One of the determinants of influence theory is "the perception 
on the part of A's decision-makers that A and B are, or will be, 
in a relationship of significant interdependence, and that B's 
future behaviour consequently could well be such as to exercise 
either a harmful or beneficial impact on A". This seems to have 
been foremost in Mrs. Gandhi's mind during her summit with Mujib 
in May 1974. By that time, relationship between the two countries 
had become considerably less intense due to a number of factors, 
the resurgence of rightist politics being one. It was necessary 
to try to accommodate Mujib, and so Mrs. Gandhi yielded ground in 
the land boundary negotiations because it was a relatively less
important issue. But where issues had greater national signifi­
cance, such as the sharing of the Ganges waters, or the delimi­
tation of the maritime boundary in an area where oil could be 
struck, the above calculation did not hold. Neither party could 
afford to compromise on important national issues, lest it lost 
electoral support.
In terms of influence theory, two points are to be noted here; 
first, the influence process tended towards becoming frigid with 
the gradual lessening of intensity in bilateral relations; and 
second, influence did not operate when the party's mandate to 
govern was at stake.
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CONFLICT OVER THE SHARING OF THE GANGES WATERS
In addition to the unresolved borders, Bangladesh inherited 
the problem of sharing the waters of the Ganges - an international 
river that traverses through India and Bangladesh and empties into 
the Bay of Bengal. Despite four experts' level meetings and five 
secretaries' level meetings held between India and Pakistan in the 
1960s, no permanent settlement on the issue was reached.^
After Bangladesh became independent, both the Indira and Mujib 
Governments had high hopes that the water issue would be finally 
laid to rest; yet, even as late as 1975 a long-lasting amicable 
solution was nowhere in sight. A final solution to the problem 
of sharing the waters of the Ganges had yet again proven elusive. 
Though there was an interim agreement of sorts in April 1975, in 
the minds of the public in Bangladesh and in India, particularly 
West Bengal, there was a widespread feeling of frustration and 
bitterness. By then the water issue had become so politicized 
that it became increasingly difficult to separate fact from fic­
tion and the people were wont to believe that their worst suspicions 
regarding the other side were confirmed.
What was at the root of the problem of water sharing? Why 
did the Indira and Mujib Governments fail to solve it? What were
1. For details of these meetings, see B.M. Abbas, The Ganges
Water Dispute, Dhaka: The University Press Ltd."] 1984,
p p . 1 6 - 2 8
Chapter 8
The examination of these queries form the substance of this chap­
ter. However, first, two things are in order: a brief description 
of the Ganges basin to provide familiarity with the geographic 
setting of the problem, and a word about the Farakka Barrage it­
self which was central to the dispute between the two countries.
The Ganges Basin
The Ganges is one of the largest rivers in the world and the 
longest and holiest in India. Its headwaters spring from the 
Gangotri glaciers some 23,000 feet high in the southern slopes of 
the Himalayas, in the northwesterly direction from New Delhi.
Known as the Bhagirathi river in its initial, short southwesterly 
run, it changes over to a southeasterly direction over half its 
course and then flows in an easterly direction across northern 
India until it reaches the border with Bangladesh.
It is fed by a number of tributaries originating in the Hima­
layan slopes of Tibet, Nepal and India. Of the major tributaries, 
the Karnali, the Gandak and the Kosi originating in Nepal together 
contribute seventy-one percent of the dry season flow of the 
Ganges and forty-one percent of its annual flow.
As the Ganges approaches the Indian state of West Bengal, the 
river swings southward towards the delta. A short distance before 
it enters Bangladesh, it splits into two channels. The smaller, 
again known as the Bhagirathi, continues southward becoming in its 
lower reaches the Hooghly on which is situated the port of Calcutta.
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The main channel enters Bangladesh and forms the boundary between 
India and Bangladesh for about 130 kilometres. Then it flows 
southeasterly for another 110 kilometres before joining the Brahma- 
putra-Jamuna and takes the name Padma. Further downstream the 
Padma joins the Meghna and continues as the lower Meghna until it 
empties its waters into the Bay of Bengal.
The Farakka Barrage
At Farakka, about 250 kilometres north of Calcutta and 18 kilo­
metres from the Indo-Bang1adesh border, the Indian Government, in
1 9 7 0 , completed the construction of a barrage with the intention 
of diverting a proportion of the flow of the Ganges down the Hooghly- 
Bhagirathi. It was the objective of the Indian Government to in­
crease the flow in the Hoogh 1 y Ri ver so that the tidal inflow of 
silt in its lower estuarine reaches could be flushed away to main­
tain access from the Port of Calcutta to the sea.
This provoked a dispute between India and Pakistan. Pakistan 
maintained that such transfers of water would be at the expense of 
the flow in the main channel, on which was dependent the agricul­
ture, ecology and economy of one-third the territory of the eastern 
province. Pakistan insisted that if the barrage were completed and 
commissioned, it would throttle East Pakistan's economy; therefore, 
India should, in advance, agree to an equitable apportioning of the 
Ganges waters so that East Pakistan's current and future water needs 
were guaranteed. India rejected these contentions.
After 1971 the Bangladesh Government became party to this 
d i spute.
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Prior to independence, the Awami League, the main opposition 
party to the Pakistan Government, had blamed not only India, for 
causing permanent damage to the ecology and economy of East Pakis­
tan by constructing a barrage across the Ganges, but also the 
Pakistan Government for its callous disregard of the concerns of 
the East Pakistanis. This was highlighted in its 1970 Election 
Man i festo:
The criminal neglect of the earl ier govern­
ment has allowed the Farakka Barrage to be­
come a fait accompli resulting in grave and 
permanent damage to the economy of East Paki­
stan. Every instrument of foreign policy 
must be immediately utilized to secure a 
just solution to this problem.^
The issue was raised for the first time between Bangladesh and
India during M u j i b 1s visit to Calcutta in February 1972. According
to the Joint Statement:
The two Prime Ministers emphasized that the 
geography of the region provided a natural 
basis for cooperation... They discussed the 
problem of flood control, Farakka Barrage 
and other problems.^
During Mrs. Gandhi's first state visit to Dhaka from 17 to 19 
March 1972, the water issue was incorporated into the friendship 
treaty signed between the two countries. Article 6 of the treaty 
stated that the two Governments "agree to make joint studies and 
take joint act ion in the fields of flood control, river basin
2. Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, Bang 1adesh 
Documents, vol. 1, 1971, p. 81
3. Satlsh Kumar e d . Documents on India's Foreign Policy 1972,
Del h i: Macmi11 a n , 1975
development and the development of hydro-electric power and i rri -
4
gation". It must be noted, however, that there is less than un­
animity that the reference in the treaty to the water issue was 
included to highlight its special significance in Indo-Bangla 
relations. In a dissenting opinion, S.A. Karim, the then Bangla­
desh Foreign Secretary, stated that
certain senior members of the Government were 
conscious of the fact that such a treaty could 
be miscontrued as a defence arrangement with 
India. The idea of injecting the water issue 
into the treaty was to dilute whatever military 
tone there was.j.
Whatever the reasons for its inclusion in the body of the treaty, 
the fact that it gained mention in the treaty and the join communi­
que - two important documents pertaining to the state visit - would 
in itself lend credence to its special significance.
It was also agreed that a Joint Rivers Commission (JRC) would 
be formed "on a permanent basis to carry out a comprehensive survey 
of the river systems shared by the two countries... so that the 
water resources of the region can be utilized on an equitable basis
£
for mutual benefit of the peoples of the two countries".
This was an important step towards the resolution of the Ganges 
water dispute because it created for the first time a formal forum 
in which bilateral technical discussion could be held that would pave 
the way for political discussions to follow. What was of greater 
significance still was that by not raising the issue of the
4. The full text of the treaty is given in Appendix I
5. Interview in New York, 27 March 1985
6. Bangladesh Documents, vol. 11, op.cit. (2), p. 644
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construction of the barrage and the purpose it was intended to serve, 
the Bangladesh Government appeared to concede the fact that India 
had the right to construct and use the barrage. In return, India 
conceded that the Bangladesh Government had the locus standi to 
negotiate the sharing of the waters with India. This was no mean 
achievement considering the fact that in 1968 the Indian Irrigation 
Minister, K.L. Rao, had declared in the Lok Sabha that "after all 
Ganga river is an Indian river".^
Eight months later, on 24 November 1972, the Statute of the 
JRC was formally signed and adopted by the two Governments. Accor-
g
ding to Article 4 of the Statute:
(1) The Commission shall have the following functions in 
part icular:
a) to maintain liaison between the participating coun­
tries in order to ensure the most effective joint 
efforts in maximizing the benefits from common river 
systems to both the countries;
b) to formulate flood control works and recommend im­
plementation of joint projects;
c) to formulate detailed proposals on advance flood 
warnings, flood forecasting and cyclone warnings;
d) to study flood control and irrigation projects so 
that the water resources of the region can be uti­
lized on an equitable basis for the mutual benefit 
of the peoples of the two countries; and
e) to formulate proposals for carrying out coordinated 
research on problems of flood control affecting both 
the countries.
(2) The Commission shall also perform such other functions as 
the two Governments may, by mutual agreement, direct it to 
do.
7. Lok Sabha Debates, 26/7/68, S4, J_8, col. 2080
8. The full text of the Statute of the JRC is given in the Indo- 
Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission, Record of Discussions of 
the Indo-Bang1adesh Joint Rivers Commission, Dhaka, May 1985» 
pp. T-TTT* also given in Appendix 4.
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It is important to note that its terms of reference did not include 
the Farakka issue, and Article 7 of the Statute stated that "all 
meetings shall be closed meetings unless the Commission desires 
otherwi se".
In the third week of January 1972, B.M. Abbas, Advisor to the 
Prime Minister, went to New Delhi to discuss the Ganges issue. Dur­
ing his talks with various senior members of the Indian Government, 
the Indian perception of things was clearly laid before him. The 
Indian External Affairs Minister, Sardar Swaran Singh
laid stress on flood control rather than irri­
gation. He wanted Bangladesh to take coal for 
setting up power stations and saw possibilities 
of our supplying power to India from the east...
He enquired about utilization of our gas and 
production of fertilizer.Q
j
Farakka was not mentioned. Principal Secretary P.N. Haksar's concerns
were more political. He tried to Impress upon Abbas the need for
joint action by India and Bangladesh to avoid 
future complications. He said outside experts 
and aid were not necessary or desirab1e . . .and 
expressed himself against any third-party in­
volvement [regarding the water question] .
While Singh and Haksar would only stress the theme of Interde­
pendence, Abbas was able to raise the Farakka issue with the Irriga­
tion and Power Minister, Rao. Though these talks resulted in a list 
of cooperative ventures that the two countries could undertake on 
water-related issues, there was no public statement on the Farakka 
issue Itself. On his return from India, Abbas told newsmen at the
9. Abbas, op.ci t . (1), p. 30
10. Ibid. , p. 31
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airport that "he was offered fullest cooperation by the Indian 
government and he was satisfied". ^
On 26 April 1972, Rao came to Dhaka to discuss with his coun­
terpart, Khondakar Mostaque Ahmed, the statute of the proposed JRC 
and the possibilities of cooperation on issues relating to water
and power sectors. During this visit, agreements on advance flood
1 2
warning and power development were signed, but the crucial issue 
of the actual amount of the Ganges water that would go to each coun­
try was again sidestepped; it was left for the two Prime Ministers
to decide. But, Rao to 1 d newsmen at Calcutta airport that "all doubts
1 3
and misgivings of the Bangladesh authorities...had been removed".
The first meeting of the JRC was held in New Delhi on 25“26 
June 1972. The main issues on the agenda were flood control, river 
training works in the border rivers and river development works in 
the Ganga-Brahmaputra-Meghna system. Nothing substantive came out 
of this meeting, but for the first time bilateral talks were held 
in which the Brahmaputra-Meghna system, which covered more than 
half of Bangladesh and was outside the purview of the Indo-Pakistan 
talks in the 1960s, was integrated with the Ganges system, giving 
the Government of India a toehold in the plans for the two major 
rivers of the eastern region of the subcontinent.
Two and a half months later, on 16 August 1972, Rao made a 
statement in the Lok Sabha on the Farakka Barrage that caused
11. Bangladesh Observer (Dhaka), 29 January 1972, p. 1
12. The Hindu (Madras), 1 May 1972, p. 7; 3 May 1972, p. 8
13. Ibid., 1 May 1972, p. 7
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considerable consternation in the Bangladesh Government. In it he 
announced "a programme of experiments on the navigational require­
ments of the Hooghly with varying discharges from the Ganges begin­
ning with a flow of 40,000 cusecs ¡^volumetric unit of flow equal 
to a cubic foot per s e c o n d Q " . ^  What caused Rao to make his state­
ment is not clear, but there are some indications from the Indian 
press that during this time political leaders of West Bengal had 
begun lobbying the Union Government over their share of the Ganges 
water. It was reported that the Chief Minister of West Bengal had 
returned to Calcutta from week-long talks in New Delhi with an 
agreement on the operation of the Farakka Barrage. According to 
this ag r e e m e n t : ^
a. the feeder canal of the barrage would be com­
pleted by December 1973;
b. for five years after that 40,000 cusecs could 
be diverted from the Hooghly and, for the fol­
lowing two years, the diversions would be 
varied experimentally;
c. at the end of seven years there would be a 
rev i ew.
Whatever the basis of this press report, it was enough for Bangla­
desh officials, particularly those who had been in the Pakistan 
negotiating team on the Ganges water talks with India, to be wary 
of the intentions of the Indian Government. The matter was raised 
by Abbas in his meeting with Rao on 13 September 1972 in New Delhi. 
R a o 1s response was: "One of your very important persons, not Sheikh 
Muj i b but near to him, had told Madam J j i r s .  GandhT] that 10,000
14. Abbas, o p .ci t . (1), p. 33
15. Times of India (New Delhi), 2 and 15 August 1972
This revelation would suggest at least two things: that cer­
tain senior members of the Bangladesh Government might have been 
predisposed to securing friendship with India, or at least remov­
ing bilateral tension, at any cost; and that Abbas did not enjoy 
the confidence of a section of the Government he served since he 
was not previously aware of what Rao told him, even though the 
Prime Minister himself had appointed him as advisor to the Govern­
ment and chairman of the JRC. A more intriguing suggestion would 
be that there were already splits in the Bangladesh Government on 
the tenor of relations with India.
The JRC met for the second time in Dhaka on 28-30 September 
1972 and again in New Delhi from the 11 to 13 December 1972. Dur­
ing these meetings, there was no mention of the Farakka issue nor 
any mention of the proportion of water that each country was enti­
tled to. In the fourth meeting held on 29”31 March 1973, Abbas 
expressed the difficulties that Bangladesh faced in planning its 
water programme in the absence of a precise knowledge of India's 
water use plan in the upper reaches of the Ganges. Abbas also 
raised the issue of augmenting the dry weather flow in the Ganges 
to meet the long-term irrigation requirements of India and Bangla­
desh by constructing dams in the head reaches of the tributaries 
feeding the Ganges. He alluded to the need for Nepal's participa­
tion in the JRC talks, on the grounds that appropriate sites for 
dams and reservoirs were to be found only on tributaries feeding
239.
cusecs will be enough for Bangladesh11. ^
16. Abbas, o p♦ci t. (1), p. 33
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the Ganges and lying in the territory of Nepal. The Indian side
J u . 1 7ignored the suggestion.
It was only in the sixth meeting held in Dhaka from 8 to 10 
November 1973 that there was some unanimity of opinion in the Com­
mission on "an inventory of storage possibilities in the upper
reaches of the Ganges and the Brahmaputra", though Nepal was not 
18
mentioned. The Commission, however, recommended that "possibi­
lities of storage dams in the upper reaches of the rivers in Sikkim
19
and Bhutan should also be examined".
In keeping with the Joint Declaration of 19 March 1972 of the
two Prime Ministers to hold regular consultations between the two
Governments, the Planning Commissions of the two countries met in
Dhaka on 22 May 1973 to review, inter alia, the work of the JRC.
In between these meetings, Mostaque raised with Dhar the issue of
Rao's statement in the Lok Sabha on the diversion of Ganges water
to the Hooghly. Dhar replied that making the statement without the
prior consent of the Bangladesh Government was "inadvertent" and
assured him "that the earlier understanding between the Governments
20
on Ganges waters stood".
But the damage to the spirit of Indo-Bangla relations was
17- Record of Discussions, o p .c 1 1 . (8), pp. 1 7~ 18
18. Ibid., p. 27. That Summer India's Irrigation Minister, K.C. 
Pant had conceded that: "8 districts of Bangladesh would be 
turned into 'desert' if the Farakka Barrage went into opera­
tion as originally planned". Far Eastern Economic Review
2 June 1974, pp. 50-51*
1 9 . Ibid.
20. Abbas, op.cit. (1), p. 34
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already done. Those in the Bangladesh Government and outside who 
took a hard line on the development of amicable relations with 
India found new grounds for suspecting India's motives on the 
sharing of the Ganges waters. For instance, two months later, 
Mostaque, one such hardliner, prior to leading a Bangladesh délé­
gation to India told a news conference in Dhaka that with the 
building of the Farakka Barrage the water flow would be "danger­
ously curbed", and warned that "a decision needs to be taken at
21
the highest political level". Judging from the general sense 
of the news conference, it would appear that Mostaque's message 
was meant as much for the Indian leadership as for Mujib and his 
pro-Indian colleagues in the Cabinet.
Mostaque's hawkish public posture did cause concern in New 
Delhi. Mrs. Gandhi appointed Swaran Singh, India's Minister for 
External Affairs, as the leader of the Indian team instead of Rao, 
who was Mostaque's counterpart in the Indian Cabinet. It signi­
fied India's willingness, for the first time, to raise the talks 
from the technical to the political level. Mrs. Gandhi herself 
granted an half-hour meeting to Mostaque.
These talks between Mostaque and the Indian Government were 
the most important to that point because of the significant poli­
tical concession that Bangladesh had won from India: "The two sides
further agreed that a mutually acceptable solution will be arrived
22
at before operating the Farakka Barrage". It was the first public
21. The Hindu, 11 July 1973, p. 6
22. Lok Sabha Debates, 31/7/73, 39, col. 127
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commitment by the Indian Government that it would not act unilater­
ally regarding the commissioning of the Farakka Barrage.
Mostaque kept up the pressure on the Indian Government. In
his statement before the Jatiyo Sccngsad he said that the
winter discharge from the Ganges is limited.
As a result, any diversion such as at Farakka 
will adversely affect our irrigation scheme, 
riverine transport, pisciculture, water con­
tent and salinity of our soil.^.
The Indian Government's commitment was reaffirmed seven months later
24
in February 1974 when Swaran Singh visited Dhaka.
From 28 February to 2 March 1974, the JRC met for the seventh 
time, but the Farakka issue was not, as usual, part of its agenda. 
Despite the pious intentions expressed in the meetings between the 
senior members of the two Governments, neither Government saw it 
fit specifically to instruct the JRC (under Article 4, Clause 2 of 
its Statute) to discuss the crucial issue of the formula for sharing 
the waters of the Ganges and make recommendations for Governmental 
consideration; thus it continued to remain outside the ambit of the 
JRC.
Understandably, the image of the JRC suffered. While there
were expressions of public dissatisfaction in Dhaka and even rum-
25
blings among some junior members of the Commission, in India the 
Times of India editoriali z e d :
*
23. Jatiyo Sangsad, Official Proceedings, 4th Session, 3rd Sitting, 
17 January 1974, p. ik
24. Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, External 
Publicity Division, Bangladesh Documents, vol. 2, #3, January- 
March 1974, p. 19
25- Confidential interviews with senior members of the JRC in Dhaka 
in July 1985
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The issue has been handled ineptly so far. 
Instead of getting the Commission to assess 
the discharge of the river in different sea 
sons and the extent of the replenishment at 
different points, another infructious \^ si(T\ 
attempt was made to evolve a solution based 
on the previous data.^^
The year 1974 turned out to be particularly crucial for Ban­
gladesh. In its early months the Government was preoccupied with a 
number of critical issues: attempts to secure UN membership in the 
face of a Chinese veto; participation at the Islamic Conference in 
Lahore even though Pakistan and the conservative Muslim states like 
Saudi Arabia had not recognized Bangladesh; negotiations on the 
prisoners of war issue and on the war crimes trial of 195 prisoners. 
Added to these was the forthcoming summit with Mrs. Gandhi at which, 
it was widely assumed, the Farakka issue would figure prominently.
From the account given by Abbas, Mujib was inclined to accept
a modest share of the Ganges water:
He told me that he was contemplating an agree­
ment on the sharing of Ganges water and mention­
ed a figure he had in mind. I strongly protested 
against this and said that the figure was too 
low. He then said that he would again discuss 
this with me after reaching New Delhi. ^
But after Mujib arrived in New Delhi, on 12 May 1974, he informed
Abbas the following day that "he had decided not to compromise on
28
the water question and he had said this to Mrs. Indira Gandhi".
26. Issue of 21 February 1974, 1 Indo-Bang1adesh Water Studies'. 
27- Abbas, o p .c i t . (1), pp. 34-35
28. Ibid.
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What made Mujib change his mind is not known. Besides, there is 
no supporting evidence to corroborate Abbas' account that suggests 
that M u j i b 1s views on water sharing actually hardened once he reach­
ed New Delhi. Be that as it may, the summit was not a disaster 
by any account. But, that an agreement on the equitable sharing 
of the Ganges water could not be reached merely drove home the 
point that there existed a genuine conflict of interest between
the two Governments on this issue. Paragraphs 17 and 18 from the
29
Joint Declaration highlight this dilemma:
The two Prime Ministers took note of the fact 
that the Farakka Barrage Project would be com­
missioned before the end of 1974. They recog­
nized that during the periods of maximum flow 
in the Ganga, there might not be enough water 
to meet the needs of the Calcutta Port and the 
full requirements of Bangladesh and, therefore, 
the fair weather flow of the Ganga in the lean 
months would have to be augmented to meet the 
requirements of the two countries...It was, 
accordingly, decided that the best means of 
such augmentation...should be studied by the 
Joint Rivers Commission.
For the first time the Indian Government publicly admitted that 
"there might not be enough v/ater to meet the needs of the Calcutta 
Port and the full requirements of Bangladesh". When in 1968 the 
Pakistan Government had made a similar claim to safeguard the in­
terests of East Pakistan, Rao had dismissed it as n o n s e n s e . ^  Six 
years later, the Joint Communique of the Prime Ministers' talks im­
plicitly recognized Bangladesh's right to an equitable claim to the 
waters of the Ganges. Also, for the first time the JRC was called 
into the picture and charged with the responsibility of studying
29- Record of Discussions, o p .ci t . (8), p. 56
30. Lok Sabha Debates, 26/7/68, S4, 18, col. 2080
"the best means of such augmentation through optimum utilization 
of the water resources of the region available to the two countries".
The JRC met a number of times in 1974. In its tenth meeting 
in Dhaka from 29 August to 2 September 1974, the Commission was able 
to agree on a formula: that the available seventy-five percent de­
pendable flow at Farakka could be taken as 55,000 cusecs. But 
there was no agreement on the water claims of the Calcutta Port
31
and of Bangladesh. On the possibilities of augmenting the Ganges 
flow, C.C. Patel, India's chief negotiator in the JRC, argued that 
Abbas' proposal of building storage facilities in the upper reaches 
of the Ganges was infeasible because "most of the existing storages 
which cover some seventy percent of the total possibilities are al­
ready built or are being built and their waters are being used or 
will be used"; further storage possibilities on the Ganges are 
limited. Instead, he proposed the building of a Ganges-Brahmaputra 
canal which would augment the Ganges flow by a minimum of "15,000
to 20,000 cusecs just by connecting the Ganga at Farakka with the
32
Brahmaputra". Abbas disagreed; he argued that there were very good 
possibilities of storage in the Ganges basin able to meet the shor­
tages in the dry weather flow in the Ganges, and that Bangaldesh would 
not be able to consider other means of augmentation until the question
33
of storage in the Ganges basin had been studied exhaustibly. These 
positions were carried through into the next two JRC meetings in 
November 1974 and January 1975- The disagreement, by then, was so
245.
31. Record of Discussions, o p .ci t . (8), p. 56
32. Ibid., pp. 41-42
33. Ibid.
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intense that whereas the Record of Discussions of each meeting 
covered on the average six pages, that of the twelfth meeting (31 
December - 7 January 1975) was only half a page.
While these and other talks were going on at various levels 
between the two Governments, it appears that they were closely 
watched by the World Bank. According to Kamal Hossain, in 1969 
the Bank had expressed its interest on the Ganges dispute to an 
East Pakistani opposition leader, and had encouraged a mutual so­
lution to the problem. Similar contact was made in 1972 with the
34
Bangladesh Government. In August 1973 Finance Minister Tajuddin 
Ahmed, after attending the meeting of the Committee of Twenty of 
the IMF in Washington.D .C ., had detailed discussions with World 
Bank president Robert McNamara about the possibility of an Indo- 
Bangla joint venture for flood control and water resources deve­
lopment along the lines of the sharing of Indus Basin water re­
sources by India and Pakistan. Talking to newsmen at the airport 
on his arrival in Dhaka, Tajuddin said that McNamara had assured
him of World Bank assistance for any project that would benefit
35
India and Bangladesh.
On its own, the World Bank had commissioned studies to evalu­
ate the total water supply of the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin 
and to examine the possibility of maintaining or even augmenting 
the low flow of the rivers during the lean period. These studies
34. Interview with Ben Crow on 3 January 1979* See, Ben Crow,
The Politics and Technology of Sharing the Ganges, Ph.D. 
Thesis at the University of Edinburgh, 1980, p . ~32
35. Bangladesh (a fortnightly news bulletin), Washington, D.C.: 
Embassy of Bangladesh, vol. 3, #15, 24 August, 1973, pp. 1 
and 4.
i
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cooperation between the countries situated in the river basins.
The final report recommended the establishment, under UN 
auspices, of a five-nation (India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sikkim and 
Bhutan) Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Coordinating Committee. Nothing 
much was heard of that report, nor did the World Bank consider in­
volving itself in the bilateral dispute. However, after the 1974 
summit between the two leaders, the resident representative of 
the World Bank in Dhaka, Leonard Weiss, conveyed to the Bangla­
desh Government a message from McNamara on the Bank's readiness
to provide technical assistance and, if necessary, even to mediate
37
between the two disputants. But Mujib, aware of India's unyield­
ing position regarding third-party involvement in bilateral dis-
38
putes, did not or could not show any interest in the message.
After the fiasco at the twelfth meeting of the JRC in Janu­
ary 1975, Mujib decided to send Rab Serneabad, Flood Control,
Power and Irrigation Minister since April 1974, to New Delhi for 
talks with Jagjivan Ram, the new Indian Irrigation and Agriculture 
Minister. But that meeting too was unfruitful.
In early April the Indian Government sent a message to the 
Bangladesh Government stating that it had become necessary to test
36. M. Maas land, Water Development Potentials of the Ganges-Brahma­
putra-Meghna River Basins, World Bank, Special Projects Depart­
ment, Washington, D.C. August 30, 1972 (with revisions February
12, 1973), p. 1; cited in Crow, op.ci t . (34), p. 132
also examined the need and the possibilities for international
36
37- Abbas, op.cit. (1), p. 38
3 8. Ibid.
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the feeder canal - linking the Farakka Barrage on the Ganges to 
the Jangipur Barrage on the Bhagirathi - during the coming dry 
season, and suggested that joint observations might be made on 
the effect of the withdrawals at Farakka on Bangladesh and on the 
Hooghly. Immediate meetings were held within the Ministry of 
Flood Control and then with Mujib. Of the seven points placed
39
before Mujib for his consideration, the three crucial ones were:
a 'test' run meant commi ss ion i ng the barrage
allocation of water would have to be agreed to 
before the feeder canal can be allowed to operate
no joint study of the effects of withdrawals 
should be agreed to as it would only mean prolong­
ing the issue of equitable share of the Ganges 
water leading to further disputes.
But the participants in that meeting were in for a surprise; after
considering those points, Mujib declared that he had already agreed
to the feeder canal operations and to the joint investigation of 
40
the effects. What remained to be settled was how much water 
would be allowed for the Hooghly,
On the next day, 16 April 1975, Jagjivan Ram arrived in Dhaka 
for talks on the issue of the withdrawals at Farakka. After much 
difficulty the two Ministers were able to agree on a figure. The 
accord announced on 18 April 1975 in the form of a joint press re­
lease stated that while discussions on the allocation of fair wea­
ther flows of the Ganga during lean months will continue, the feeder
41
canal would be test run according to the following schedule:
3 9 • Ibid. , p. 40
40. Ibid.
41. Record of Discussions, op.ci t . (8), p. 51
2kS •
Month Ten-Pay Period Wi thdrawal
Apr i 1 
May
21st to 30th 
1st to 10th 
11th to 20th 
21st to 3 1 st
11 ,000 cusecs
12.000 cusecs
15.000 cusecs
16.000 cusecs
The effects on Bangladesh and on the Calcutta Port of these with­
drawals at Farakka would be monitored by joint teams of experts of 
both Governments; and their reports would be submitted to both the 
Governments for consideration.
The salient feature of this accord was that the test run was
to conclude on 31 May 1975, after forty-one days of operation. But
India violated that agreement by continuing to withdraw water at
Farakka even after 31 May to the full capacity of the feeder canal.
Mr. Siddiqui, Bangladesh's observer at Farakka, sent his protest to
k2
New Delhi, but the Bangladesh Government took no further action. 
India's only response was to suggest a study on the possibility of
43
ill effects from the run. The matter was taken up at the experts' 
level talks and lost in the deliberations.
The JRC met in Dhaka from 19 to 21 June 1975 for the thirteenth 
time and submitted its report to the two Governments on the issue of 
augmentation of the dry season discharge of the Ganges. The Com­
mission discussed the two proposals - augmentation through storages 
in the Ganges basin proposed by Bangladesh and augmentation through 
diversion of water from the Brahmaputra to the Ganges by a link
kl. Abbas, op.ci t ., p. k2. Verified by Shamsur Rahman, Mujib ' s 
ambassador to New Delhi at the time, and by a JRC official. 
Interviews in Dhaka on 9 July 1985 and 8 July 1985 respect­
ively.
^3. Interview with a JRC official, ibid.
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canal proposed by India - but each side rejected the other's pro­
posal. The meeting ended inconclusively. No further progress was 
registered that year as domestic political crisis shook Bangladesh.
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It was the Indian contention that there was already insuffi­
cient water to irrigate the 150 million acres of irrigable land in 
44
the Ganges basin. Even if the flow in the Ganges could be aug­
mented by building storages in upper India and in Nepal, as the 
Bangladesh proposal suggested, India would not like to release 
this augmented flow because of the potential need upstream. To 
concede that storages built in the upper reaches could augment the 
flow would necessarily mean that the downstream co-riparian state 
could legally demand its share. Thus the policy was, and is, to 
deny the very fact that augmentation could be achieved to any sig­
nificant degree through storages.
On the other hand, the Indian side saw great merit in linking 
the Brahmaputra to the Ganges through a canal across northwest 
Bangladesh so that some Brahmaputra water could be transferred to 
the Ganges. If Bangladesh accepted this proposal, there would be 
a windfall for India for the following reasons. First, building a 
link canal between the two rivers across the territory of Bangla­
desh would be considerably cheaper and an easier engineering under­
taking, because, otherwise, it would have to be built against the 
natural gradient of the land and would require a complicated system
44. Record of Discussions, o p♦c i t . (8), p. 42
of locks and pump houses. Second, a link canal would allow a 
cheaper and a more efficient transportation route than that now
45
existing between West Bengal and Assam. Third, from India's 
security point of view, the canal would afford it efficient and 
fast movement of men and materiel to its northeastern and eastern 
states.
The Bangladesh Government conceded that India would in future 
require more water than is presently utilized for its irrigation 
purposes, but contended that the potential for augmenting the 
Ganges flow is so vast that the irrigation needs of India and 
Bangladesh and water needs of Calcutta Port could all be met.
However, Bangladesh also insisted that to optimize the flow in 
the Ganges, Nepal would have to be approached since most of the 
suitable sites are located there. The Indian Government has in­
sisted that a third party cannot be brought into the picture be­
cause the Farakka issue is a bilateral one and thus the solution 
to it would also have to be bilateral. Bangladesh has insisted 
that if a comprehensive approach to the development of the total 
water resources of the region is desirable, as India acknowledges, 
then Nepal, with almost all its territory in the Ganges basin, 
must be a part of the collective endeavour.
At least two reasons for India's objection to Nepal's parti­
cipation may be suggested. First, India wanted to keep Bangladesh 
out of the picture and reach its own agreements with Nepal to maxi­
mize its gains. As post-1975 events show, that is precisely what
253.
45. The Hindu, 3 December 1971, p. 8
happened. Second, Nepal must be kept out of the JRC because of
47
the Indian "fear that Nepal might be the Chinese Trojan Horse11.
For its part, Bangladesh has also refused to consider the 
merits of the Indian proposal for at least three reasons. First,- 
India would retain control over the link canal because the barrage 
to be built on the Brahmaputra to regulate the flow of water to the 
Ganges would be built in Indian territory. With the barrages at 
both ends of the link canal lying in India, Bangladesh would have 
relatively little control over the canal's use. Should India de­
cide to divert increasingly more water from the Brahmaputra to the 
Ganges to meet its own demands, northern and central Bangladesh, 
which mostly depend on the Brahmaputra waters, would face the same 
problems as the southwest areas of Bangladesh were now facing be­
cause of the Farakka Barrage. Once again Bangladesh would be at
48
the mercy of India. Second, the construction of the canal across
northwest Bangladesh would mean the loss of thousands of hectares
of valuable agricultural land. With problems of overpopulation and
insufficient foodgrains already at crisis points, Bangladesh could
not afford to lose any irrigable lands. Third, there was a general
feeling within informed circles in government and outside, that by
insisting on the link canal India was telling Bangladesh, in effect,
49
to forget about the waters of the Ganges. Because of these
46. Confidential interview with a JRC official in Dhaka, 8 July 1985
47. Confidential interview with a senior Bangladesh Foreign Minis­
try official in Dhaka on 5 August 1985
48. Interview with the editor of a Bengali newspaper in Dhaka who 
wishes to remain anonymous. July 1985
49. In the many Interviews I conducted in June-August 1985, this 
emerged as a general resentment against India.
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considerations, the League Government; as indeed have all subsequent 
Governments, found it impossible to entertain the Indian Govern­
ment's link canal proposal.
This, however, does not mean that the Indian and Bangladeshi
proposals have received unanimous support in their own countries.
Regarding India's link canal idea, there was only lukewarm support
from the Government of West Bengal. As one Bangladesh official
expla i ned i t :
The West Bengal Government has also realized 
that the Ganges waters would not be forthcom­
ing because of the callous ways the waters are 
being withdrawn in the upper reaches in Bihar 
and Uttar Pradesh. Since they would not get 
the required amount of the Ganga waters, they 
were forced to lend support to the Union's 
link canal approach. This was the Union's way 
of forcing West Bengal support for the link
The Assamese reaction to the link canal proposal, moreover,
has been one of suspicion as to the motives of the Union Government.
According to a JRC member in Dhaka:
Regarding the link canal the Assamese leaders 
have all along opposed it because they want 
their needs to be taken care of first. The 
Assamese suspect that the Union Government is 
less interested in their welfare and would use 
the Brahmaputra waters as a political weapon 
against the m . ^
Newspaper reports and studies by the Assam Institute of Development
52
Studies confirm the above interpretation.
50. Interview with an official of the Ministry of Irrigation and 
Flood Control in Dhaka on 27 June 1985
51. Interview, op.clt. (25)
52. The Assam Tribune (Guwahati, India), 22 July 1981; 17 March 
1982; and 14 May" 1982
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With regard to Bangladesh's proposal to India, there has been 
some disagreement among influential individuals in Bangladesh. They 
have challenged the premise that Nepal would always take a sympa­
thetic attitude towards Bangladesh, and have pointed to the fallacy 
of considering Nepal a permanent ally of Bangladesh. In the words 
of Rehman Sobhan, a senior member of the Bangladesh Planning Com­
mission in the Mujib Government and currently Chairman of the influ­
ential Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies:
B.M. Abbas' arguments that storage tanks in 
Nepal would be beneficial for Bangladesh is 
debatable. Nepal being under Indian control 
we would be permanently under Indian control 
regarding getting our share of the waters.
His suggestion for reservoirs in Nepal can 
be against Bangladesh's interests.^
Notwithstanding the above, the question still remains: given 
the importance of the issue in the context of bilateral relations, 
why was it not tackled urgently at the highest political level?
IV
On the Bangladesh side, keeping the Farakka issue outside the
JRC appears to have been a deliberate policy. According to Sobhan:
For a long time the question of Ganges water 
sharing was kept out of the JRC because Khon- 
dakar Mostaque Ahmed wanted it so. Mostaque 
preferred to deal with it personally. Only 
when he was removed and Serneabad became the 
Irrigation Minister did the water issue come ^  
up for mutual discussion in the JRC framework.
53- Interview in Dhaka on 9 June 1985 
54. Ibid.
This may be so, given Mostaque's hardline attitude towards India.
Then the question arises, Why was Mostaque given the portfolio of 
Irrigation and Flood Control? Given Mostaque's political biases,
Mujib should have been aware of the slim chances of any progress 
in the Farakka issue. Unfortunately, neither Mujib nor Tajuddin 
is alive to answer this question. Mostaque has refused to be in­
terviewed, and one can rely only on secondary sources. According 
to Government officials connected to the water issue, because 
Mostaque was a strong defender of Bangladesh's interests his ap­
pointment made it certain that Bangladesh would be able to make 
an effective presentation of its case. This expectation would 
seem to be borne out by the fact that it was during the Mostaque- 
Singh talks in New Delhi that the Indian Government made a public 
commitment that the Farakka Barrage would not be commissioned with­
out prior agreement on the equitable apportionment of the Ganges 
water.
But partisan political concerns also seemed to be present. 
Enayetullah Khan, editor of the leftist weekly Holiday, recalls 
that:
Mostaque was keeping the issue alive for po­
litical reasons...He was trying to make...his 
career out of it. He had almost capitalized 
on it. The tussle between Mujib and Mostaque 
was not ideological. There was potential ri­
valry. Only two people could historically 
have challenged Mujib: Tajuddin Ahmed and
Mostaque.cc 
oj
Whatever the case, by 1974 the gradual deterioration in Indo-Bangla 
relations forced Mujib to replace Mostaque with Serneabad in the
257.
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Ministry. Apparently, Mostaque himself believed that he was trans­
ferred because he was “too hard on Farakka“. ^
Besides Mostaque, the other hardliner was Abbas, who was chair­
man of the Commission and who had represented Pakistan in the water 
talks in the 1960s; he too was seen as an obstacle to the talks. Ac­
cording to one of his colleagues in the JRC:
One would have to admit that Mr. Abbas per­
haps found it hard to change his ideas and 
views on the water issue. In retrospect, 
perhaps he was a bit hard on the negotia- 
t i o n s .
Another colleague commented that the “Indians did suggest casually
5 8
why Bangladesh had chosen Mr. Abbas who was used by Pakistan“. And
according to Ruhul Quddus, Mujib1s Principal Secretary:
I suggested to Mujib that the water problem 
should be solved as early as possible. But 
Abbas kept the water problem alive and con­
tinued to politicize it. So the water talks 
failed because of a conspiratorial approach 
and administrative bungling. But Mujib never 
believed that Abbas had any mala fide inten­
t i o n s . ^
Whether there was any “conspiratoria 1 approach“ could be a
for endless debate, but there seems to have been doubts with-
JRC regarding Abbas:
Abbas never exposed the technical team to the 
decision makers. Therefore, on occasions, we 
doubted somewhat what Mr. Abbas told us about 
the opinions and decisions of the decision 
makers .^
56. Ibid. , p . 144
57- Interview, o p .ci t . (25)
5 8. Ibid.
59- Interview in Dhaka on 7 July 1985
60. Interview, o p .ci t . (25)
matter 
in the
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And, finally, Abbas himself stated that he was aware of his image
in certain Government circles as a hawk on the water issue:
The then Finance and Planning Minister Mr.
Tajuddin Ahmed was one person who c 1early 
showed that he did not like my stand on the 
water dispute with India. Everytime he met 
me he would tell me to change my outlook.
Perhaps an additional reason why the issue was not tackled at
the highest political level was because it
was being kept alive. We felt that we were 
never allowed to prepare a solid case in our 
defence. Not enough was done on our s i d e . ^
The above observation appears to be partly confirmed by Mrs. Gandhi's
own recollections of her summit with Mujib in May 1974: "Sheikh Mujib
felt that his experts should look again at the issue, and they were
6 3
not here". Echoing the same theme, a senior Bangladeshi official 
reca11e d :
Muj i b was not well informed by the people he 
took with him. Mentally he was troubled.
When he returned from the summit he chastized 
the officials that Bangladesh's officers could 
not reply to the Indian questions. Mujib had 
the impression that he was being undermined.
When he returned he asked for a report to be 
prepared by people not connected with the ^
Ministry of Power, Water and Flood Control.
An alternate suggestion has been that the Farakka issue remained 
unresolved because the Leaque Government was too busy with certain 
national concerns more fundamental than the Farakka issue, and ac­
corded it a low priority. Tied to this was also the idea that the 
Government did not wish to appear indecent by demanding an immediate
61. Abbas, op.cit. (1), p. 33
62. Interview, o p .c i t . (25)
63- Crow, op.ci t . (34), p. 138
64. Ibid.
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resolution of the Farakka issue even when Bangladesh was still 
largely dependent on India for financial, material and diplomatic 
hel p.
In retrospect, one could perhaps make a case that the Govern­
ment did indeed attach a low priority to the Farakka issue. This 
would be borne out by the opinions of senior Government officials 
of that period. Kamal Hossain, Foreign Minister from March 1973 
to August 1975 and Law Minister before that, recalled: "People for­
get now, but during those first three years we were preoccupied by
6 ^
so many urgent issues". Abdul Malek Ukil, then Speaker of the
Jatiyo Sangsad gives a more vivid picture:
During 1972 we could only think of reconstruc- 
tion...lnd¡a was doing everything for us, re­
constructing bridges, giving us food, providing 
transport... India was giving us massively. ^
Thus, there could very well have been the tendency, at least tempora­
rily, to sweep it under the rug. One official associated with the 
Indo-Bangla negotiations from 1974 onwards had this to say:
Bangladesh ignored the basic facts which are 
underlying and are in direct conflict with 
the interest of India. As time passed they 
emerged. The Mujib-Indira declaration did 
not solve anything. In a wishy-washy manner 
they thought they could solve 11.^^
The last view seems to come close to the truth. When Bangladesh at 
that time had to rely so completely on India for its livelihood, it 
was politically difficult for it to take a strong stand on the 
Farakka issue.
65- Ibid.
66. Ibid. , p . 140
67. Ibid., p. 141
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This would perhaps also explain M u jib1s personal dilemma 
over India. That he was a nationalist and a patriot was accepted 
by the great majority of Bangladeshis as an article of faith. In 
fact, in moments of frustration his patriotic nature would show. 
According to Abbas, when India was unwilling to recognize Bangla­
desh's interest:
he turned to me and said that we should build 
a barrage on the Ganges on our side of the bor­
der and flood India. I replied, "Give me the 
money and I will do
But M u j 'b was also the prisoner of his time. He could not detach 
himself from the political drama of which he was a central charac­
ter. He could change neither the themes of the play nor the cast 
to suit his needs. He was in fact acutely aware of his limitations, 
and this weighed him down and made him procrastinate. According to 
one of his Private Secretaries:
Sheikh shahib was acutely aware of Mrs. Gandhi's 
all-out help for Bangladesh in those dark days.
He would often recall how Mrs. Gandhi had re­
quested many world leaders to intercede on his 
behalf to save him from being hanged by Yahya 
Khan [when Muj i b was a prisoner] in Pakistan
To what extent this personal element affected his posture to­
wards India is not known, but that he was to a certain degree poli­
tically handicapped is confirmed by Shamsur Rahman, M u j i b 's ambassa­
dor to the Soviet Unionand his confidant:
On a number of occasions Sheikh shahib told me 
that his hands were tied, he could not do what 
he wanted to do because of the agreements reach­
ed in Mujibnagar.yQ
68. Interview with Abbas in Dhaka on 10 July 1985
69. Confidential inL_;vv!ews with one of Muj i b ' s private secretar­
ies in Dhaka on 15 July 1985
70. Interview, op.cit. (42)
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Muj I b was referring to the period of the war when he was in prison 
in Pakistan and Tajuddin Ahmed was the leader of the Provisional 
Government in Calcutta. When asked what were the agreements 
Mujib referred to, Rahman said that he did not ask and Mujib did 
not elaborate.
Those who stand opposed to the Awami League could cite this 
as evidence of the Mujib Government's subservience to Indian in­
terests. The fact that the Bangladesh Government did not send 
a protest note to the Indian Government over the latter's viola­
tion of the agreement on the test run of the feeder canal, and 
the additional fact that Mujib had agreed during his summit with 
Mrs. Gandhi to allow India to commission the Farakka Barrage 
without a quid pro quo, would add to the arsenal of the Awami 
League's detractors.
Whatever may be the case, the general belief in Bangladesh 
is that India was less than forthcoming in the efforts to recon­
cile Indo-Bang1adesh differences. In fact the majority view 
would be harsher and probably closer to the view expressed by a 
sen ior JRC offi cia l :
I do feel India wants to keep the issue alive 
and use it to bring political pressure on us.
I am suspicious of Indian moves. I take their 
offers of talks with a grain of salt. India 
has been consistently rigid in its stand on 
the water issue and they could afford to do 
so simply because they control the upper 
reaches of the Ganges.^
71. Interview, o p .c 1t . (25)
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Conclusion: It would seem that from the very beginning the 
Indian leaders were aware that the resolution of the water dis­
pute would be a difficult task. Further, given the volatile na­
ture of Bangladeshi politics, particularly where anti-Indian 
sentiments were strong and existed even within the senior leader­
ship of the governing party, it is conceivable that India would 
be concerned about adverse political repercussions in Bangladesh's 
domestic politics should the water sharing talks fail. Thus, the 
inclusion of Article 7 in the JRC Statutes could be interpreted 
as a precautionary measure by the Indian Government to prevent 
any disagreement in the JRC from being aired publicly. This con­
cern was particularly evident after the May 1974 summit that failed 
to resolve the issue of water sharing between the two countries.
As Abbas reports, during the JRC talks held in Dhaka the follow­
ing month, Mujib was under pressure from India not to highlight 
the meeting:
[_ Muj i b ]] informed me that the then High Com­
missioner for India, Mr. Samar Sen, had just 
called on him...the Indian Government wanted 
that Bangladesh should go soft on publicity 
over the Indo-Bang1adesh meetings. Sheikh 
Mujib advised me that at the end of the JRC 
meeting, whatever be the outcome, I should 
say that the discussions were held in a very 
cordial atmosphere. I told him that I would 
say 'cordial' but not 'very cordial1. ^
M u j i b ' s acquiescence in Indian advice also served his Government's
V
72. Abbas, op.cit. (1), p. 37
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interests, because the airing of continuous failure to resolve 
the issue would have been politically damaging.
Even before the water negotiations were underway, senior 
Indian officials unfailingly impressed upon Bangladeshi officials 
the virtues of joint investigation, joint planning and the desir­
ability of avoiding third-party involvement in bilateral disputes. 
India, for instance, was less interested in World Bank overtures 
than Bangladesh was.
As the upper co-riparian state, India was not affected by any 
shortages in the Ganges flow; there was enough water in the Ganges 
River for Indian irrigation needs. It became an issue only when 
growing increases in the volume and frequency of unilateral with­
drawals in the upper reaches of the Ganges began to cause shortages 
in the lower reaches, adversely affecting the economy of the areas 
through which the Ganges flows. Moreover, when the Farakka Barrage 
was built In response to the needs of the Calcutta Port, it became 
clear to the lower co-riparian state that India was less than con­
cerned with the possible i11-effects downstream.
Bangladesh came into being within a year of the construction 
of the Farakka Barrage. It was too short a time for the Bangla­
deshi water experts to assess the full effects the commissioning 
of the barrage would have on Bangladesh. The issue was not taken 
up urgently by the two Governments because it had not become a 
dispute between them yet. The League Government, quite justifi­
ably, attached greater importance to the immediate problems facing 
the new state, and accorded the Ganges water issue a low priority.
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It appears that timing was an important factor in the dispute. 
When a broad understanding could have been reached at an early 
stage, the issue then was not pressing enough, in comparison with 
other issues, to warrant Prime Ministerial attention to it. When 
it did become a dispute, the tenor of bilateral relations had left 
the two Prime Ministers little flexibility to resolve it in one 
sitting. It should be remembered that at the May 1974 summit, if 
Mrs. Gandhi was less than forthcoming on the Ganges issue, she did 
yield ground on the border issue. But by then, options for both 
Governments had diminished considerably. In India, the attitude 
of the West Bengalis towards Bangladesh had hardened because of 
the suspension of the border trade. The expected economic wind­
fall was a mirage, and the West Bengalis were also blamed for smug­
gling. As West Bengal's stand on the Ganges issue hardened, Mrs. 
Gandhi's political flexibility correspondingly decreased.
M u j i b , too, had to contend with growing anti-Indian sentiments 
at home. Though the reasons for most of the social, political and 
economic ills of that period are to be found in the internal dyna­
mics of mis-government, it politically suited everyone to paint 
India as the scapegoat. The ruling Awami League was seen by many 
as obsequious to Indian interests. It was, therefore, necessary 
for Mujib publicly to appear unbending on the Farakka talks. In 
a sense, it was as though his Government's patriotic credentials 
depended on his stand on the issue.
Added to all this was governmental ineptitude. The choice of 
Mostaque to head the Ministry of Flood Control, Power and Irrigation,
and of Abbas to head the Joint Rivers Commission may have been a 
political move, but not an intelligent one. While both of them, 
known hardliners on India, may have served to signal Mujib's at­
tempts to bring some balance within his 'pro-Indian' Cabinet, 
their inflexible stand on the negotiations may have worsened the 
di spute.
As apprehension and hostility between the interest groups of 
the two countries increased, both Governments were hard put to ac­
commodate each other's needs. The heart of the matter was that 
Bangladesh could not accept India's proposal for augmenting the 
Ganges flow because it would have created additional acute problems 
for the country. And India refused to consider Bangladesh's pro­
posal because it wished to reserve the Ganges waters for its own 
use.
In the case of sharing the waters of the Ganges, the influ­
ence theory may appear at a glance to be of peripheral relevance.
The issue was of such political significance to important sections 
of the public in both countries, that neither Government could be 
seen yielding on it. In public the influence process appeared 
inoperative, but in private, the influence process seemed still 
to operate because of potential gains for both Governments.
However, it must be noted that influence is future-oriented, 
that is, actual outcomes may not be evident till later. Also, 
while influence attempts are issue-specific, influence outcome may 
manifest in different spheres. The very fact that neither Govern­
ment could yield on the water issue could also influence each
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Government to be less inflexible in other areas of contention, fo 
the sake of amity. Thus, the failure of the influence process to 
operate overtly in a particular circumstance does not necessarily 
mean that influence theory is thereby invalidated.
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Chapter 9 
CONCLUSION
A. Summary of Findings
In the introduction to this study, a number of allegations 
in Bangladesh regarding Indo-Bangla relations were paraphrased 
as follows: the Provisional Government, in seeking Indian mili­
tary assistance to rid Bangladesh of the Pakistan Army, had 
reached certain understandings with India which were inimical 
to Bangladesh's interests; after independence, the League Govern­
ment had become a subaltern to Indian interests; and, the League 
Government's commitment to Indo-Bangla friendship had undermined 
Bangladesh's sovereignty. The findings of this study do not sup­
port any of these allegations.
Had the Provisional Government acceded to the demands of 
other parties to form a national united front comprising parties 
of various political persuasion, to give collective leadership to 
the independence struggle, perhaps the League would have been 
immune from the first charge. But the League's single-minded 
pursuit to consolidate its claim to the leadership of the Bangla­
desh independence movement, and India's underwriting of it, raised 
questions of its political motives and cast doubts on Its patriotic
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credentials. Though the secret wartime understandings between it 
and the Indian Government have n o t b e e n m a d e  officially public, the 
nature of what little evidence has surfaced from interviews with 
people associated with those events, does not suggest anything in­
jurious to Bangladesh's interests. These understandings appear to 
have dealt mainly with the technicalities of Indian military assis­
tance to the independence struggle.
The second allegation also appears to be harsh and unjustifi­
able. While it could be argued with some justification that 
Tajuddin Ahmed was quite accommodating to the Indira Government 
during the crisis period, and also willing to kowtow to the Indian 
Government subsequently, this was definitely not the case with 
Mujib. Though Mujib often alluded to political constraints on 
his Government due to certain understandings between Indira Gandhi 
and the Provisional Government, there is no evidence to suggest 
that his Government at any time acted as a puppet regime.^ The 
opposite appears to have been the case; Mujib fought tooth and 
nail to maximize his country's gain in its relations with India.
Similarly, the public articulation of friendship for India, 
often expressed in superlative terms, while it served important 
political purposes, did not in any way undermine Bangladesh's so­
vereignty. On the contrary, Mujib used it quite effectively to 
camouflage his Government's and his own motives.
1. Mujib's decision not to fly from London to Bangladesh (after 
his release from captivity in Pakistan) in the jet aircraft 
provided by the Indian Government; not to stop in New Delhi 
on his way to or from the Islamic Summit in Lahore; and not 
to place the Bangladesh brigade under Indian military command 
are cases in point.
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A number of what may be characterized as political themes 
emerge in the study of Indo-Bangla relations in the period under 
review. These are:
1. Independence of Bangladesh and the restoration 
of the Awami League to power;
2. Enhancement of India's strategic position in 
South Asia;
3. Restoration of political stability in the region;
b. Pursuit of mutually beneficial economic relations;
5. Resolution of outstanding disputes.
These issues did not all affect the interests of the two Governments 
in the same manner or to the same degree, but they, nonetheless com­
bined to make up the fabric of bilateral relations of the time.
1. Independence of Bangladesh and the restoration of the 
Awami League to power. In the period between April and December
1971, the primary concern of the Indira Government and the Provi­
sional Government was how to return the Awami League to power in 
an independent Bangladesh. This period was marked by a massive 
collective effort to externalize the struggle in order to gain the 
support of the world community, and, in this, India's political 
and diplomatic assistance was indispensable and invaluable.
Since the Provisional Government's survival was at stake, it 
repeatedly requested the Indian Government to grant sovereign re­
cognition to Bangladesh, hoping to force its hand. It eagerly 
sought Indian military assistance to repel the Pakistan Army at 
the earliest instance, so that the leftist forces inside Bangladesh
would not be able to ride the tide of alienations resulting from 
the war, to mount a challenge to the League's claim to postwar 
leadership. To this end, the Provisional Government negotiated 
certain arrangements with the Indian Government to force India's 
formal commitment to its cause. Thus, if the Provisional Govern­
ment appeared pliant and ingratiating to Indian interests, it was 
all with a political purpose. To what degree this accommodating 
posture was necessary Is of course debatable, because India's in­
terests in Bangladesh's independence and in the Awami League's 
accession to power were no less than those of the Provisional 
Government.
But even though the political objective of the two Governments 
was the same, there were the inevitable irritants. The Indian Go­
vernment strongly supported the demand of a number of political 
parties from East Pakistan that the Provisional Government should 
comprise all the parties which supported the national Independence 
movement, because it believed that broadening its base would, to 
that extent, elicit external support to the cause. The Provisional 
Government, however, refused to share the leadership of the move­
ment, in order to reserve its singular claim to postwar leadership
of Bangladesh, though It did acquiesce in the formation of the mul-
2
tipartite consultative committee. Fearing a challenge to its
2. As the resistance movement began to be coordinated, the Awami 
League leadership was suspicious of everyone outside its par­
ty fold. The non-Awami Leaguers, who were no less patriotic, 
were barred from guerrilla enrolment, thus creating bad blood 
between the League and the restof the political forces in 
Bangladesh. This also meant that non-Awami League guerrillas 
did not have formal access to weapons given to the League 
guerrillas by India. See Far Eastern Economic Review, 18 
December 1971 , p. 8
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leadership from the militant wing in the party, the Provisional 
Government also opposed, though unsuccessfully, the Indian Govern­
ment's decision to train and arm the Mujib Bahini, which the latter 
saw as a form of strategic insurance perhaps for later.
The choice of an Indian general as the commander of the joint 
force, and the required acquiescence in Dhar's advice and political 
guidance, were two other minor issues that irritated a section of 
the Mukti Bahini and certain officials of the Provisional Government 
respectively. The dropping of Mostaque, who was the Foreign Minis­
ter in the Provisional Government and who had maintained unauthori­
zed links with the US Consulate in Calcutta, from the delegation 
that was sent to New York during the 1971 General Assembly session 
to present Bangladesh's case privately to the delegations from 
other countries, did however serve the interests of both Governments.
2. Enhancement of India's strategic position in South A s i a . 
Intimately tied to, and providing the rationale for, India's mili­
tary support for the Bangladesh cause was its long-term state in­
terest of enhancing its strategic posture in the subcontinent. This 
state imperative was the paramount factor in India's calculations 
regarding both the East Pakistan crisis and subsequent relations 
with Bangladesh.
India had not been able to exercise a political role in South 
Asia commensurate with its size and potential. The crisis in East 
Pakistan in 1971 provided India with the opportunity to acquire the
political and military status it sought in the subcontinent, and 
if there were any qualms about realizing it through military means, 
these were dispatched with the argument that "the so-called inter­
national norms have never deterred any major power from taking 
action to protect its own interests".^ India's interest, in this 
case, was to reorder the balance of power in South Asia in its 
favour.
The single most important factor which had obstructed India's 
strategic ascendance in the region had been Pakistan; its dismem­
berment in December 1971 removed that obstacle. The defeat of its 
Army brought democratic governments to power in Pakistan and in 
Bangladesh - an expressed desire of the Gandhi leadership - which, 
theoretically, reduced also the likelihood of military adventurism 
that had plagued subcontinental relations since 19^7.
The independence of Bangladesh considerably enhanced the se­
curity of India's turmoi1-stricken eastern region. First, a friend­
ly government was restored to power in Bangladesh. Its proclama­
tion of eternal friendship for India meant, at the least, consi­
derably reduced border tension in the east. Also, the prevalent 
sentiment within the League being against a large standing army, 
it meant that Bangladesh would not be a security threat to India's 
eastern flank. The Indo-Bang1adesh friendship treaty was not only 
a guarantee to that effect, it also increased India's military op­
tions in the region.
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3. Remark by K. Subrahmanyam, Director of India's Institute for 
Defence Studies and Analysis. The National Herald (Delhi),
6 Apri1 1971•
2 74.
Second, the secessionist movements in Mizoram and Nagaland 
which had been abetted by Pakistan would no longer get training, 
arms and sanctuary in Bangladesh, and would be forced to seek po­
litical accommodation with the Union Government or atrophy. And, 
third, the League Government could be counted on to stamp out any 
extremist movement within Bangladesh's borders, thereby denying 
any intellectual or spiritual sustenance to similar movements in 
its periphery.
Thus, by 1972, India liquidated the military threat in the 
east; considerably weakened it in the west; curbed the secession­
ist movements in its far eastern states; and entered into treaties 
with Bangladesh and the Soviet Union to attain political and mili­
tary supremacy in South Asia. Its objective of enhancing its 
strategic posture in the region was realized.
IV
3. Restoration of political stability to the region. Th i s 
comprised three interconnected issues: consolidation of the new 
status quo in the subcontinent; prevention of extremist and radi­
cal politics; and prevention of external interference in the af­
fairs of the region. The two Governments were equally concerned 
with these overlapping issues, though for different reasons.
Consolidation of the new status quo in the region within the 
shortest possible time was of utmost significance to both leader­
ships. It may be noted that the primary reason why Mrs. Gandhi 
restrained the Indian Army on the western front was to avoid direct
k
superpower intervention in the crisis, for this would have under­
mined India's strategic objectives. After the dismemberment of 
Pakistan, Mrs. Gandhi adroitly used the Simla Talks of 1972 to 
consolidate swiftly the new realities in the region, to present 
to the world - particularly to the United States and China, the 
two adversary powers with political stakes in the region - a fait 
accompli regarding these new political arrangements. An additional 
benefit for India was the permanent freezing of the three decade 
old Kashmir issue, which had been the cause of several Indo-Pakistan 
wars before 1971.
In the east, the first joint task had been the return and re­
habilitation of the refugees who had fled to India from then East 
Pakistan. The Indian Government had also offered senior adminis­
trative officers to assist the new Government in Dhaka to hasten 
the League's administrative control of the country.
The eradication of radical or extremist politics from the 
region was a necessary corollary to the preservation of the new 
status quo. It is to be noted that during the nine month long 
crisis, the Indian Government had eliminated many Naxalites, and 
members of the CPI (Marxist) and other extremist groups in West 
Bengal and Assam,^ thereby dealing a heavy psychological blow to 
the leftist forces in Bangladesh. To minimize challenges to its
4. It should be noted that the dispatch of the USS Enterprise 
into the Bay of Bengal, ostensibly to assist in the with­
drawal of American citizens from East Pakistan during the 
December 1971 war, was to deter a full-scale Indian military 
invasion of West Pakistan. See the "Anderson Papers" The 
New York Times, 6 January 1972.
5. Vancouver Sun (Canada), 27 November 1971; Le Monde, 30 No­
vember 1971; Economic and Political Weekly (Bombay), b De­
cember 1971-
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political authority in the absence of M u jib, the Provisional Gov­
ernment also banned a number of religion-based parties, and this 
ban was not lifted even upon the return of Mujib, who had consis­
tently and publicly espoused the democratic rights of the people. 
The Provisional Government did not, again for security reasons, 
object to India's taking away of the surrendered weapons, though 
this alienated the rightist faction within its party, and the 
Bangladesh Army, and played into the hands of the anti-Indian 
forces, such as Toaha's East Pakistan Communist Party (EPCP), 
which rejected the legitimacy of the League's leadership. But 
Indian interests were well served; both the Bangladesh Army and 
the anti-Awami League political forces were denied those weapons.
When tribal insurgency unexpectedly broke out in the Chitta­
gong Hill Tracts in southeastern Bangladesh at the end of March 
1972, troops from the Indian Army, which had formally withdrawn 
from Bangladesh's soil on 13 March, once again responded to the 
League Government's request for assistance in quelling it; this 
conduced to the interests of both Governments, despite the risk 
of Pakistani and Chinese propaganda. It may be noted that the 
only significance of the friendship treaty at the time was the 
extent to which it signalled the Indian Government's commitment 
to the viability of the League regime.
The Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini, created ostensibly to assist the 
police in the maintenance of law and order, was appropriated to 
function as the armed wing of the party and liberally used to 
destroy political dissent. India's intelligence establishment
had readily responded to the League's request to train this force, 
as it was also in India's interest to see to the consolidation of 
the League's political authority over Bangladesh. But the insecu­
rity of the League Government increased as the opposition met vio­
lence with violence, and by 1975 Mujib was obliged to install a 
one party dictatorship with himself as the lifelong president. 
Though this was the antithesis of what the League and the Congress 
stood for, Mrs. Gandhi, for reasons of security, supported the move
The third issue relating to the restoration of political sta­
bility was the need to cordon off the region from external inter­
ference, a dilemma the Indian leaders have had to contend with 
since 1947. Since the natural order in the subcontinent - meaning 
Indian hegemony - had been assiduously sabotaged by external inter­
ests, it had been the Indian policy to insist on bilateralism on 
regional issues, and this was very much evident throughout the 
period in review. For instance, India refused to allow UN ob­
servers on the East Pakistan border fearing that it would prolong 
a solution to the conflict, or undermine the solution desired by 
India. India also opposed outside mediation in the crisis, and 
insisted that it could be resolved only if the Pakistan Government 
agreed to negotiate with Mujib.
After independence, the virtues of bilateral talks were re­
peatedly stressed. Haksar and Swaran Singh never tired impressing 
upon Bangladeshi Government officials the need to keep the World 
Bank and other external interests outside the Ganges water talks.
6 . Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 February 1975, p. 13
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When Bangladesh leased out maritime areas to American oil compan­
ies to explore for oil, Mrs. Gandhi privately cautioned:
You do not know the American game. It is 
their plan to create rift between India arid 
Bangladesh. I won't be surprised if they 
¡^Ashland OiT] withdrew unilaterally when 
enmity does not come about between u s *y
Nor were the Indian leaders comfortable with the League Government's 
decision to extend the stay of the Soviet Navy's salvage team (head-
g
ed by Admiral Zuenko) beyond the initial contract period, for they 
saw this as an intrusion into India's sphere of influence. The 
Indian leaders also discouraged the League Government's attempts 
to restore diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of 
China. Once again, it was to prevent the Chinese - India's most 
important adversary outside South Asia - from establishing an ad­
ditional political base in the region, and to deny the pro-Chinese 
forces in Bangladesh a new lease on life. Since the presence in 
the subcontinent, in whatever form, of the US, or the USSR, or the 
PRC, did not conduce to India's view of regional security, it be­
hooved Indian leaders to obviate external machinations.
Mrs. Gandhi's Government was also against Bangladesh's member­
ship in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). Bhutto's 
ingenuity in linking Bangladesh's membership in the OIC and its par­
ticipation in the Islamic summit in Lahore in early 1974, to the 
granting of Pakistan's recognition to it, was a deliberate attempt
7. Confidential interview with a Minister in M ujib's second cabinet, 
Dhaka, July 1985.
8. Interview with Foreign Secretary S.A. Karim in New York on 23 
March 1985- However, Mujib did reject the Soviet request for 
permission to hold the October Parade in the port city of 
Chittagong. Source: confidential interview with one of Mujib's 
private secretaries in Dhaka in July 1985.
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to undermine the League Government's secular pretensions, and to 
remind India of the Islamic character of the Bangladesh] people.
Mrs. Gandhi feared that this would strengthen Islamic forces with­
in Bangladesh with at least two adverse effects. First, M u j i b 's 
secularist policies would increasingly come under attack, which 
would affect the interests of the Hindu minority in the country. 
Second, the scope for Muslim countries' interference in Bangla­
desh's domestic politics would increasingly draw it closer to 
Pakistan; neither of these would redound to Indian interests.
V
4. Pursuit of mutually beneficial economic relations. Ini­
tially, there was almost a strident anti-Western bias in the econo-
9
mic philosophy of the League Government. The Indian leaders were 
pleased that socialism was declared a state principle of the League 
Government, for it indicated that Bangladesh's economy would 
follow a non-capitalist path of development. Whether this would 
mitigate Bangladesh's economic backwardness was of little concern 
to the Indian leaders; what mattered to them was the political ad­
vantages to be had, namely, a closer alignment with the non-capi­
talist forces in the world and consequently less dependence on the 
West.
From the outset, the Indian leaders emphasized the complemen­
tarity of the two economies even when these were highly competitive,
9. Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmed had rejected publicly aid from 
those countries which had been against Bangladesh's indepen­
dence - meaning mainly the United States. Far Eastern Econo­
mic Review, 19 February 1972, p. 18; 15 November 1974, p. 3^
and urged Bangladesh to open up its water, road and rail facili­
ties and its border to allow unimpeded commerce and trade within 
the region. Great hopes were pinned on a jute community, a cus­
toms or a trade union, a common electric grid, and on coordinated 
planning and mutual sharing of the resources of the Ganges-Brah- 
maputra-Meghna water basin. To channel the resources of the region 
in the desired direction, the Indira Government was able to con­
vince the League Government, quite early in their relationship, 
of the need for regular "talks, consultations and visits of dele­
gations", and for the setting up of appropriate machinery for that 
purpose. The periodic meetings of the two planning commissions 
and a number of other parallel agencies of both Governments were 
institutionalized through bilateral agreements to give effect to 
this coordinated approach, and the signing of the border trade 
pact, agreements on industrial collaboration, and India's commit­
ment to finance Bangladesh's First Five Year Plan, were all means 
to that end.
But India was unable to sustain its level of aid to Bangla­
desh, nor did Bangladesh's economic needs lessen with time, and 
by 1973, the League Government was prepared to ask for a Western 
aid consortium.
In addition, there were a number of other developments that 
undermined Indo-Bangla economic relations. Smuggling was the 
single-most important factor that poisoned the relationship be­
tween the two peoples, and the inability of the two Governments 
to stop it, led to the suspension of the much-needed border trade 
within six months of its implementation.
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Since the Provisional Government espoused a socialistic de­
velopment pattern, it was an unwritten assumption before Bangla­
desh's independence that private trade between the two countries 
would be banned, Marwari capital would not be allowed into the 
country, and state trading would be imposed. The policies imple­
mented after independence fell short of the mark; private trade 
was not banned, and state trading was so ineptly handled and so 
corruption-ridden that it hardly furthered the Government's so­
cialistic aims.
The proprietary attitude of the West Bengalis towards Bangla­
desh was a further blow to the Union Government's economic objec­
tives. While the latter saw lndo-Bangla relations primarily in 
political terms, with economic gains flowing from it, West Bengal's 
attitude towards Bangladesh was shaped solely by economic motives.
In general, the Indian bourgeoisie saw in Bangladesh great economic 
opportunities waiting to be tapped,but the new entrepreneurial 
class in Bangladesh saw the Indian bourgeoisie as a new exploiting 
class, out to deny it the opportunities that were finally realized 
after twenty-four years of struggle.
Mrs. Gandhi's Government took a number of precautionary mea­
sures to check the drift towards the breakdown of economic rela­
tions between the two countries, such as suspending border trade, 
insisting that only surpluses from Bangladesh would be imported, 
and requesting Bangladesh to issue higher specifications for tex­
tile imports from India. But unabated smuggling with its concomi­
tant effects - depletion of foreign exchange earning resources,
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domestic scarcity of essentials, higher prices of consumerab1es
- on Bangladesh's economy, continued to sour bilateral relations.
VI
5« Resolution of outstanding disputes. One last theme that 
appears in this study is the attempts of the two Governments to 
negotiate a number of bilateral disputes which directly impinged 
on the tenor of their relationship. The three unresolved issues 
inherited by the League Government were: delimitation of certain 
sectors of the land border; agreement on the maritime boundary; 
and agreement on the sharing of the waters of the Ganges.
Neither Government was under any compulsion to seek an early 
resolution of these outstanding issues, because the immediate con­
cerns of both Governments were the consolidation of the League's 
authority in Bangladesh, and Bangladesh's economic viability. The 
strategy of the League Government was to consolidate first the po­
sitive aspects of the bilateral relationship and to leave potential­
ly conflicting issues for later discussion, so that the benefits 
of the relationship of the early years would have a positive in­
fluence on these negotiations later. This had mixed results.
The land border delimination talks led to an agreement in 
favour of Bangladesh, but the other two issues remained unresolved, 
primarily because of the crucial nature of the national interests 
at stake. Though negotiations, difficult as they were, continued 
and the areas of disagreement were being continually narrowed 
down, the forcible removal of the League Government left these 
disputes unresolved.
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In addition to the general themes that dictated the evolu­
tion of Indo-Bangla relations in the first five years after 
Bangladesh's independence, the various factors of alienation 
must also be noted. Even as the independence struggle took 
shape, three issues alienated important sections of the Bangla­
deshi elites. First, the overwhelming political support that 
the League had received in the national elections in December 
1970 was an expression of support for its unequivocal demand for 
political autonomy for East Pakistan; it was not a mandate for 
the League to seek the political dissolution of united Pakistan. 
Second, the Provisional Government's request to India for its 
assistance in the anti-Pakistan struggle did not sit well with 
various political groups. Third, the banning of political par­
ties was attributed by the rightists to Indian machination.
After independence, yet other elite groups were alienated. 
Assumptions in India that it could dictate to Bangladesh the size 
and requirements of its military, and that India should be the 
sole provider of training and arms were resented by Osmani and 
the high command. Further, New Delhi's efforts to convince Mujib 
not to take back the repatriated military personnel into the Ban­
gladesh Army, and its request to place a Bangladeshi brigade under 
Indian command during the latter's counter-insurgency operations 
in Mizoram and Nagaland in m i d-19 74, also alienated M u jib; had 
Mujib acquiesced in the latter, the resulting primus inter pares 
status of the Indian military command would have undermined
VI I
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Bangladesh's sovereignty. The Indian Defence Ministry's initial 
refusal to return the Chinese-made weapons captured in East Pakistan 
had also greatly alienated the Army command. While too much im­
portance should not be attached to these events, their political 
significance should not be summarily dismissed either.
The underlying reason for such Indian behaviour was the false 
perceptions of Bangladesh in India. A large section of the in­
formed public and many in the Indian Government, including Dhar, 
seemed to believe that Bangladesh should be eternally grateful 
to India for its assistance in the struggle, and this gratitude 
should translate into unhindered access to Bangladesh: the Ban­
gladesh Army should be at the disposal of the Indian Government; 
Bangladesh's external policies should take into account Indian 
interests; Bangladesh's national planning and policies should be 
coordinated with those of India; Bangladesh should be a market for 
Indian manufactured goods; India should be given the first choice 
to import primary goods from Bangladesh; Bangladesh's currency 
should be tied to the Indian rupee; etc. Bangladesh, on the other 
hand, also erred in assuming that there would be no quid pro quo 
for the Indian assistance given in its creation.
VI I I
We now turn to the questions raised in the Introduction about 
the cause of deterioration in Indo-Bangla relations. The findings 
of this study suggest that while the League Government faced con­
siderable difficulty in articulating its secularist policies, it
did nevertheless succeed in preventing communal ism from becoming a 
political factor. In this regard, two decisions of the League Go- 
verment were of considerable impact: the banning of religion-based 
parties; and M u jib1s refusal to allow the Hindus who had fled East 
Pakistan during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War to return and repossess 
their properties. This would have dispossessed those who had ac­
quired the abandoned properties legally or illegally, and caused 
resentments of a communal nature. Religion, therefore, was not a 
factor in the deterioration of relations between the two peoples.
However, the evidence indicates that economic factors played 
the prédominant role in the souring of relations. By and large, 
both Governments failed to appreciate the sensitivity with which 
Bangladeshis viewed their economic relationship with India. Con­
tradictory inclinations in both countries complicated it further.
As already stated, while the Union Government saw Indo-Bangla re­
lations in a long-term perspective and sought permanent economic 
arrangements through institutional setups that would endure, the 
West Bengalis were guided by more parochial considerations of im­
mediate gains for their state. And in Bangladesh, Finance Minis­
ter Tajuddin Ahmed's and first Foreign Minister Abdus Samad A z a d 's 
uncritical approach to economic relations with India clashed with 
the economic philosophy of Commerce Minister M.R. Siddiqui, who 
represented the interests of the rising bourgeoisie.
It is likely that Bangladesh's initial dependence on India 
was by compulsion and not by choice. At that early stage, the 
only country that could underwrite Bangladesh's economic viability 
was India, and the nature and extent of Indian assistance in that
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period amply demonstrate that. However, the political implication 
of such dependence was not lost on Mujib. To reduce or balance 
off this dependence, and in the absence of other sources of aid,
Mujib made an unsuccessful bid to secure a Soviet commitment to 
assist in Bangladesh's economic recovery. When, in the second 
half of his administration, Mujib was forced to turn to the West 
for economic assistance, this switch also demanded of him a cer­
tain degree of ideological readjustment, a drifting away from so­
cialist rhetoric, and a reorientation of the Governmental appara­
tus. It is quite likely that this triggered a reappraisal of 
India's relations with Bangladesh in New Delhi, and the difficul­
ties experienced by Bangladesh in the negotiations on the maritime 
boundary and the Ganges issues in the years 1974-75 may have been 
a reflection of that.
However, the nature of economic relations was not the sole 
cause of deterioration in bilateral relations. A myriad of fac­
tors, varying in political significance from eyebrow raising 
incidents to those that tended to undermine the sovereign expres­
sion of the Bangladeshi people, coalesced to adversely affect 
Indo-Bangla relations. Despite M u jib's enviable hold over the 
people, which afforded him a measure of immunity in political 
action, he failed to consolidate the gains accruing from Indo- 
Bangla relations, or to build upon them. Nor did he make any 
effort to explain to the public the benefits to be had from a 
stable political relationship with India, and this is perhaps 
because he himself was not convinced of these. As a re­
sult, his Government failed to capitalize on a promising relationship
and, in this sense, Indo-Bangla relations were a victim of the 
League Government's ineptitude and shortsightedness.
B . Validity of Influence Theory
In order to assess the validity of influence theory in India- 
Bangladesh relations, it is necessary first to ascertain whether 
the context in which the influence process can operate existed; in 
other words, we need to recall the determinants of the influence 
process. The first prerequisite for an influence attempt, we noted, 
was the preception by Indian leaders that India and Bangladesh 
would be “in a relationship of significant interdependence" and 
that Bangladesh's "future behaviour consequently could well be 
such as to exercise either a harmful or beneficial impact on" India. 
The nature and degree of India's assistance in the creation of 
Bangladesh, Bangladesh's initial reliance on India, and the seal­
ing of their relationship with a treaty amply demonstrated to both 
countries that the relationship was going to be one of "significant 
interdependence". Based on this, Indian decision makers made a num­
ber of assumptions regarding Bangladesh's role in the region, and, 
therefore, India had to be sensitive to Bangladesh's future behav­
iour, lest it went contrary to Indian interests. The first prere­
quisite, therefore, was present.
The second determinant was the predictions of India's decision 
makers regarding the nature of Bangladesh's future behaviour; what 
was Bangladesh likely to do in the absence of any conscious influ­
ence attempt by India? Given Bangladesh's Muslim population, was
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it plausible that Bangladesh's decision makers would want to main­
tain a strong link with the Muslim Ummahl How would that affect 
secular politics in Bangladesh? Also, given Bangladesh's foreign 
policy principle of 'friendship for all, malice to none', to what 
extent Bangladesh would be willing to accommodate the interests of 
external powers, particularly the United States and China, and to 
what degree that would compromise India's interests in Bangladesh, 
were also matters of great concern to the Indian leadership.
This tied in with the third determinant - that an influence 
attempt would result if India developed certain preferences regar­
ding Bangladesh's current or future behaviour. India did have 
fairly extensive preferences regarding Bangladesh; for instance, 
it wished Bangladesh to have a pro-Indian Government, a secular 
approach to politics, a non-capitaiist development pattern, a 
token military, to join Indi'a in developing the water resources 
of the entire eastern region, and periodically to exchange ideas 
on major issues affecting the interests of both countries. Given 
these preferences, it was more than likely that India would attempt 
to influence the formulation, or continuation, of Bangladesh's po­
licies in a certain direction.
The fourth determinant was that the frequency of influence 
attempts would depend on the level of interaction between the two 
states. As is clear from the preceding chapters, the level of 
interaction between the two was indeed high and it stretched across 
the entire gamut of relationships and over the whole period.
The fifth determinant was that influence attempts by one
state would depend on the degree and quality of responsiveness 
of the state to be influenced. For instance, during the discus­
sions on the land border delimitation, certain key issues seemed 
to have been resolved by Mujib1s extraordinary gesture to Mrs.
Gandhi to draw the border as she pleased. If Mujib was not 
fairly sure that such a gesture would pay off, he would not 
have gambled. In this case, Mujib1s influence attempt - to 
make Mrs. Gandhi accept Bangladesh's definition of the border - 
was based on his estimation of the type of response he would most 
likely get from Mrs. Gandhi.
I I
We now turn to the actual instances of influence that were 
manifest in the course of I ndo-Bang1adesh relations. It is im­
portant to note, at this point, that the definition of influence
- it is manifest when one actor affects, through non-coercive 
means, directly or indirectly, the behaviour of another actor in 
the hope that it redounds to the policy advantage of the first 
actor - is not concerned with motives; whether the reaction of 
the actor affected was out of self-interest or not, the fact that 
its behaviour was affected to suit the interest of the first ac­
tor is sufficient to suggest the manifestation of influence.
Keeping this in mind, six criteria for identifying instances of 
influence were laid down previously. The first criterion with 
which to judge whether influence was manifest was observing shifts, 
changes or modification of behaviour or stands of an actor. It 
appears that both countries modified their stands on a number of
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issues of bilateral importance. Despite the Indian desire to 
maintain border trade, Mujib was able to influence Mrs. Gandhi 
to agree to its suspension at the first bilateral review. On 
the issue of returning the Chinese-made weapons, although there was 
resistance from Dhar, Jagjivan Ram and the Indian. Defence Minis­
try, Mrs. Gandhi did change her Government's position and returned 
the weapons to Bangladesh on its request. During Mostaque's visit 
to New Delhi for talks on the Ganges issue, he managed to secure 
the Indian Government's commitment that the Farakka Barrage would 
not be commissioned without Bangladesh's prior approval. And on 
the issue of land border delimitation, Mujib was able to bring 
about a shift in the Indian Government's position on the disputed 
areas. These are some examples of Bangladesh's success in influ­
encing shifts in India's declared positions on those issues.
There are also examples of Bangladesh accommodating Indian 
requests. For instance, the date for receiving the diplomatic 
credentials of Subimal Dutt was advanced so that the Indian High 
Commissioner might become the dean of the diplomatic corps in 
Bangladesh. And on the critical issue of augmentation of the 
Ganges waters, despite the World Bank's readiness to assist the 
two countries in whatever manner possible, Mujib acquiesced in the 
Indian desire to keep third parties uninvolved in bilateral pro­
blems. Though Mujib could have secured World Bank assistance for 
related water projects inside Bangladesh, he was willing to fore­
go the option.
A second criterion that was suggested as a means of identi­
fying instances of influence was the sharp improvement in a country's
ability - such as, expansion of its diplomatic presence in the 
host country, greater access to its decision makers, the frequ­
ency and level of interstate visits - to carry out transactions 
in the host country. A number of examples of influence can be 
cited by applying this criterion. For instance, when the Pro­
visional Government took its seat in Dhaka, Prime Minister Tajud- 
din Ahmed, aware of Mrs. Gandhi's strong dislike of Mostaque 
for his pro-US and Islamic outlook, dropped him from the post 
of Foreign Minister which he held in Calcutta, and appointed the 
pliable Abdus Samad Azad as the new Foreign Minister. While 
Tajuddin himself distrusted Mostaque, his awareness of Mrs. Gandhi's 
sentiments reinforced his desire to replace Mostaque with someone 
readily acceptable to both leaders.
It was the direct contact between Mujib and Mrs. Gandhi that 
led to the settlement of theland border issues, but other conten­
tious issues like the allocation of the Ganges waters had been 
left to two hawkish ministers. After the May 197^ summit, M u j i b 's 
acceptance of Samar Sen's advice not to publicize the continued 
disagreements on the water talks, and to have Abbas declare that 
the talks with the visiting Indian delegation were held in a very 
cordial atmosphere, is another example of influence through high 
level access. And one can only speculate to what extent the Indian 
defence attache's unencumbered access to the General Headquarters 
in Dhaka reinforced the Army command's desire to prevent the re­
patriated officers from being absorbed into the Bangladesh Army.
The third criterion - the nature and extent of the general 
level of involvement between the two governments - and the fifth
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criterion - any sudden and significant increase in the quantity, 
quality and variety of resources committed by one country to ano­
ther country - in some sense overlap. Both these criteria can be 
applied to Indo-Bang1adesh relations to cite examples of influ­
ence flow. For instance, one could argue that the nature and 
degree of Bangladesh's reliance on India, both before its inde­
pendence and after, were such that the League Government acquiesced 
in the Indian desire for “regular talks, consultations and visits 
of delegations... between the two countries"; the setting up of 
“appropriate machinery...where necessary, to promote close co­
operation in the fields of development and trade"; and for per­
iodic meetings between "the officials of the Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs, Defence, Planning Commissions and the Ministries and De­
partments dealing with economic, commercial, cultural and technical 
affairs of the two Governments".
The League Government's decision to turn to India for mili­
tary assistance to quell the insurgency in southeast Bangladesh, 
and also to train the Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini , would suggest a cer­
tain degree of attractiveness India held for it, thus indicating 
influence flow. Also, Pakistan-trained repatriated military of­
ficers were sent, for the first time, to India for military 
training; the best example being General Ershad himself - the 
current strongman in Bangladesh - who spent the years 197^-76 at 
the National Defence College in India. Bangladesh, on its part, 
was able to effect India's diplomatic spearheading of its admis­
sion to the Nonaligned Movement and the Commonwealth.
The fourth criterion for influence flow was the level of 
responsiveness of one country to the needs of the other. Once 
again, Mrs. Gandhi's willingness to shelve the border trade; her 
yielding to Mujib on the land border issues; her public commit­
ment that the Farakka Barrage would not be commissioned without 
Bangladesh's agreement; and Muj i b ' s acquiescence, despite the 
JRC's advice to the contrary, in the Indian desire to test run 
the barrage, are examples where one party to the dispute either 
conceded or lowered the ante so that sound bilateral relations 
could be maintained or achieved. Thus, in each case there was 
a display of a certain degree of responsiveness to the needs of 
the other leadership.
The sixth criterion was: the extent to which India's strate­
gic position in South Asia improved would be an indication of in­
fluence flow. The friendship treaty with Bangladesh and the 
liquidation of the eastern front; Bangladesh's assistance in 
containing the secessionist movements in India's eastern states; 
and the overall reduction of defence and security problems in the 
region, are concrete manifestations of India's improved strategic 
posture in the subcontinent, to which Bangladesh willingly and 
substantially contributed.
I I I
Finally, it is necessary to point out the several themes 
emerging in this study that are specific to the influence rela­
tionship between India and Bangladesh. First, influence primarily 
flowed from India to Bangladesh when the latter was dependent
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solely on the former. This was the case during the nine month 
crisis period, when the Provisional Government existed and func­
tioned in Calcutta at the pleasure of the fndira Government, and 
was obliged to be guided by Indian advice. The Provisional G o v ­
ernment's dependence on India at the time was so complete that 
it had no bargaining position whatsoever; its only value to India 
was the promise of a pro-Indian leadership in the future Bangladesh.
The second theme is that influence primarily flowed from Ban­
gladesh to India when the former had reduced its dependence on 
the latter. This is illustrated particularly in the period 1973"
75, when Bangladesh had succeeded in securing alternative sources 
of assistance. While India's importance to Bangladesh correspon­
dingly diminished, Bangladesh's importance to India remained at a 
high level. Since Bangladesh wanted to regain its independence of 
action, it sought to minimize the effects of what little dependence 
it had on India by directing the power it did possess towards re­
sisting the incompatible influence of its benefactor. Though Ban­
gladesh was still willing to cultivate India's patronage - as in­
dicated by Mujib's personal letter to Mrs. Gandhi seeking Rs 1000 
million (US $138 million) for food imports during the famine in 
1 9 7 4 ^  - it was equally prepared to resist any influence which it 
found inimical to its interests. In the event, since India wished 
to maintain its dominance over the South Asian political system by 
promoting tranquility and stability in the region, it was obliged 
to be receptive to Bangladesh's needs; this accrued to Bangladesh's 
ability to influence outcomes in India.
10. According to Mujib's Private Secretary at the time. Confiden­
tial interview in Dhaka in July 1985
The third theme is that the receptivity of influence was 
conditioned primarily by coincidence of interests. The political 
values and philosophy of the Awami League and the Congress Party 
being similar, throughout the period in review, there were a num­
ber of instances of interests in tandem, such as, a democratic 
form of government, secular politics, socialist bias in economy, 
token army, and the recalling of the Indian Army to quell the in­
surgency in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.
Fourth, the influence process was affected by interests 
defined not by some abstract notion, but by inter-group rivalry.
The League Government was not able to articulate policies vis-a- 
vis India according to a simple formula, because its leadership 
comprised people of diverse political persuasion, ranging from 
A z a d 1s communist background to Mostaque's Islamic ideology, and 
who were easily subjected to political pressures and influences 
from the domestic political process. For Instance, the pro-Indian 
lobby within the Government argued for greater accommodation with 
India on the Ganges issue and argued against Bangladesh joining 
the OIC, while the pro-West lobby argued for a tough stand on the 
Ganges negotiations and for Bangladesh joining the OIC.
The last theme that emerges In this study is that institu­
tionalization of Influence was counterproductive. Where attempts 
were made to formalize the relationship, these worked to the dis­
advantage of bilateral relations. For instance, the regular 
"talks, consultations and visits of delegations", or the periodic 
meetings of the various ministries, reinforced the growing sus­
picion in Bangladesh that the country was being subjected to
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increasing Indian interference. And the friendship treaty, con­
trary to the expectations of both its supporters and detractors, 
undermined Indian influence over Bangladesh. Given the imbalance 
of power between the two countries, one assumes that the act of 
formalizing the treaty would have institutionalized Indian influ­
ence. But, in reality, the act of formalizing it exacerbated 
factional tension within the country, and indeed within the party 
itself, which in the long run diminished India's ability to influ­
ence desirable outcomes in Bangladesh. It may also be argued 
that, in the act of formalizing the treaty, Mujib demonstrated 
his strength, whereas Mrs. Gandhi displayed a kind of weakness: 
in order to placate certain influential sections of the public, 
she needed the treaty more than Muj ib did, and Mujib, because 
his writ ran across the country, was in a position of strength 
to concede it. In this sense, the influence theory was stood on 
its head.
As has been demonstrated in the previous pages, however, the 
notion of influence can serve as an acceptable framework of en­
quiry into the conduct of relations between India and Bangladesh 
during the League Government. Perhaps this was possible because 
of the asymmetric and contiguous nature of the two states. If 
these were absent, to ascertain whether the notion of influence 
building in the third world would still be relevant, would require 
separate case studies.
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Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Peace 
Between India and Bangladesh
INSPIRED by common ideals of peace, secularism, democracy, 
socialism and nationalism,
HAVING STRUGGLED together for the realization of these 
ideals and cemented ties of friendship through blood and sa­
crifices which led to the triumphant emergence of a free, 
sovereign and independent Bangladesh,
DETERMINED to maintain fraternal and good-neighbourly re­
lations and transform their border into a border of eternal 
peace and friendship,
ADHERING firmly to the basic tenets of non-alignment, 
peaceful co-existence, mutual co-operation, non-interference 
in internal affairs and respect for territorial integrity and 
sovere i g n t y ,
DETERMINED to safeguard peace, stability and security and 
to promote progress of their respective countries through all 
possible avenues of mutual co-operation,
DETERMINED further to expand and strengthen the existing 
relations of friendship between them,
CONVINCED that the further development of friendship and 
co-operation meets the national interests of both States as well 
as the interests of lasting peace in Asia and the world,
APPENDIX I
RESOLVED to contribute to strengthening world peace and 
security and to make efforts to bring about a relaxation of 
international tension and the final elimination of vestiges 
of colonialism, racialism and imperialism,
CONVINCED that in the present-day world international 
problems can be solved only through co-operation and not through 
conflict or confrontation,
RE-AFFIRMING their determination to follow the aims and 
principles of the United Nations Charter, the Republic of India, 
on the one ha nd? and the People's Republic of Bangladesh, on the 
other, have decided to conclude the present Treaty.
Article I
The High Contracting Parties, inspired by the ideals for 
which their respective peoples struggled and made sacri­
fices together, solemnly declare that there shall be 
lasting peace and friendship between their two countries 
and their peoples, each side shall respect the indepen­
dence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 
other and refrain from interfering in the internal af­
fairs of the other side.
The High Contracting Parties shall further develop and 
strengthen the relations of frièndship, good-neighbour­
liness and all-round co-operation existing between them, 
on the basis of the above mentioned principles as well 
as the principles of equality and mutual benefit.
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Being guided by their devotion to the principles of 
equality of all peoples and States, irrespective of 
race or creed, the High Contracting Parties condemn 
colonialism and racialism in all forms and manifes­
tations and are determined to strive for their final 
and complete elimination.
The High Contracting Parties shall co-operate with 
other States in achieving these aims and support the 
just aspirations of peoples in their struggle against 
colonialism and racial discrimination and for their 
national liberation.
Article 3
The High Contracting Parties reaffirm their faith in 
the policy of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence 
as important factors for easing tension in the world, 
maintaining international peace and security, and 
strengthening national sovereignty and independence.
Art i c 1e 4
The High Contracting Parties shall maintain regular 
contacts with each other on major international pro­
blems affecting the interests of both States, through 
meetings and exchanges of views at all levels.
Art i c 1e 5
The High Contracting Parties shall continue to streng­
then and widen their mutually advantageous and all-round 
co-operation in the economic, scientific and technical 
fields. The two countries shall develop mutual co-oper 
ation in the fields of trade, transport and communica­
tions between them on the basis of the principles of 
equality, mutual benefit and the most-favoured nation 
pr i ne i pie.
Art i c 1e 2
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The High Contracting Parties further agree to make 
joint studies and take joint action in the fields of 
flood control, river basin development and the deve­
lopment of hydro-electric power and irrigation.
Article 7
The High Contracting Parties shall promote relations 
in the fields of art, literature, education, culture, 
sports and health.
Article 8
In accordance with the ties of friendship existing be­
tween the two countries, each of the High Contracting 
Parties solemnly declares that it shall not enter into 
or participate in any military alliance directed against 
the other party.
Each of the High Contracting Parties shall refrain from 
any aggression against the other party and shall not 
allow the use of its territory for committing any act 
that may cause military damage to or constitute a 
threat to the security of the other High Contracting 
Party.
Art i cle 9
Each of the High Contracting Parties shall refrain from 
giving any assistance to any third party taking part in 
an armed conflict against the other party. In case 
either party is attacked or threatened with attack, the 
High Contracting Parties shall immediately enter into 
mutual consultations in order to take appropriate ef­
fective measures to eliminate the threat and thus ensure 
the peace and security of their countries.
Art I cle 6
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Art î c 1 e 10
Each of the High Contracting Parties solemnly de­
clares that it shall not undertake any commitment, 
secret or open, toward one or more States which may 
be incompatible with the present Treaty.
The present Treaty is signed for the term of twenty- 
five years and shall be subject to renewal by mutual 
agreement of the High Contracting Parties.
The Treaty shall come into force with immediate ef­
fect from the date of its signature.
Any differences in interpreting any article or arti­
cles of the present Treaty that may arise between the 
High Contracting Parties shall be settled on a bilat­
eral basis by peaceful means in a spirit of mutual 
respect and understanding.
Done in Dacca on the nineteenth day of March, nineteen hundred 
and seventy-two.
Source: Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 
Publications Division, Bangladesh Documents, Vol. II, New 
Delhi: Patiala House, 1972, ppT ¿45-640".
Art ic1e 11
Article 12
INDIRA GANDHI
Pr ime Min i ster
for the Republic of India
SHEIKH MUJIBUR RAHMAN 
Pr ime Min i ster 
for the
People's Republic of Bangladesh
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Trade Agreement Between India and Bangladesh 
28 March 1972
THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND 
THE GOVERNMENT OF BANGLADESH,
CONSCIOUS of the urge of their two peoples to enlarge areas 
of mutual co-operation;
DESIROUS of strengthening economic relations between the two 
countries on the basis of equality and mutual benefit;
RECOGNIZING that the common people of both countries should 
be the beneficiaries of close co-operation between the two Govern 
ments in the fields of trade and development;
AWARE that this objective can best be secured by organizing 
trade between the two countries on a State-to-State basis as far 
as possible;
HAVE AGREED as follows:-
Article I
The two Governments recognizing the need and require­
ments of each other in the context of their developing 
economies undertake to explore all possibilities for 
expansion and promotion of trade between the two coun­
tries on the basis of mutual advantage.
APPENDIX 2
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The two Governments agree to an interim trade agree­
ment as set out in Schedule 'A' attached to this 
Agreement.
Article 3
Imports and exports of commodities and goods produced 
or manufactured in India or Bangladesh as the case may 
be which are not included in Schedule 'A' and, in the 
case of commodities and goods included in that sche­
dule, imports and exports in excess of the values 
specified therein shall be permitted in accordance 
with the import, export and foreign exchange laws, 
regulations and procedure in force in either country 
from time to time.
Art icle 4
In order to meet the day to day requirements of the 
people living within a sixteen kilometre belt of the 
border between West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, 
and Mizoram on the one hand and Bangladesh on the other, 
and with a view to providing facilities to these people 
to dispose of their goods, border trade shall be 
allowed in specified commodities in accordance with 
Schedule 'B' attached to this Agreement.
Article 5
The two Governments agree to make mutually beneficial 
arrangements for the use of their waterways, railways 
and roadways for commerce between the two countries 
and for passage of goods between two places in one 
country through the territory of the other.
Art i c 1e 2
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Each Government shall accord to the commerce of the 
country of the other Government treatment no less 
favourable than that accorded to the commerce of any 
third country.
Art i cle 7
The provisions of Article 6 shall not prevent the 
grant or continuance of:
(a) privileges which are, or may be, granted 
by either of the two Governments in order 
to facilitate frontier trade,
(b) advantages and privileges which are, or 
may be, granted by either of the two Gov­
ernments to any of their respective
neighbouring countries,
(c) advantages resulting from a customs union, 
a free-trade area or similar arrangements 
which either of the two Governments has con­
cluded or may conclude in the future,
(d) advantages or preferences accorded under any 
scheme for expansion of trade and economic 
co-operation among developing countries, 
which is open for participation by all 
developing countries and to which either
of the two Governments is or may become 
a party.
Art i c 1e 8
The two Governments agree to co-operate effectively with 
each other to prevent infringement and circumvention of 
the laws, rules and regulations of either country in re­
gard to matters relating to foreign exchange and foreign 
trade.
Art i c 1e 6
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A r t i d e  9
The two Governments agree to accord, subject to their 
respective laws and regulations, reasonable facilities 
for the holding of trade fairs and exhibitions and 
visits of business and trade delegations sponsored 
by the Government concerned.
In order to facilitate the implementation of this 
Agreement, the two Governments shall consult each 
other as and when necessary and shall review the 
working of the Agreement at the end of six months 
from the date of signature.
This Agreement shall come into force from 28th March 
1972, and shall remain in force, in the first instance, 
for a period of one year.
Art i cle 10
Art Ì cle 11
L.N. MISHRA,
Minister of Foreign Trade, 
Government of India.
M.R. S IDDI Q U I ,
Minister of Trade and Commerce, 
Government of Bangladesh.
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1. The two Governments agree that licences shall, where 
necessary, be granted in accordance with the laws, regula­
tions and procedures in force in either country from time 
to time to permit the import or export of the commodities 
and goods in Lists I and II below, up to the value mention­
ed against each with a view to balanced trade in commodites 
of special interest. [Lists I and II deletedT]
2. For the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of 
paragraph 1, the Local Head Office of the State Bank of 
India at Calcutta and the bank designated by the Bank of 
Bangladesh, Dacca, shall open special accounts with each 
other, to be utilized solely for the purpose of making 
payments to exporters in either country by the bank in­
corporated and resident in that country on behalf of its 
correspondent in the other country. Subject to the laws 
and regulations as in force in the two countries from time 
to time, overdraft facilities shall be given by either 
bank to its correspondent in the other country. In the 
event of the overdraft in either account being in excess 
of the limit stipulated by the relevant law or regulation 
as applicable to or in relation to that account, the Go v ­
ernment of the country in which the account is maintained
will grant a special loan to the bank concerned provided 
that the total amount of such loan or loans together shall 
not be in excess of five crores of Indian rupees or five 
crores of Bangladesh takas. The said loan shall be granted 
free of interest by the two Governments. In exceptional 
circumstances the two Governments will agree to increase 
the limit of the loan in order to facilitate the continu­
ance of trade. Such excess over rupees five crores will 
carry a rate of interest of six per cent. The amount
Schedule 'A'
outstanding on the expiry of the agreement shall be 
settled in Pounds Sterling or in any other manner mu­
tually agreed upon. The local Head Office of the 
State Bank of India at Calcutta will, in consultation 
with the bank designated by the Bank of Bangladesh, 
Dacca, finalize the details of the banking arrange­
ments in pursuance of the provisions of this article 
which would intev alia provide for adjustments of the 
overdrafts periodically.
3. In the event of a change in the parity rate of 
either the Indian rupee or the Bangladesh taka, while 
these arrangements are in force, the two Governments 
will consult each other with a view to reaching an 
agreed solution to the problem of adjustments.
4. Imports and exports of the commodities and goods 
in lists I and II above which are in excess of the 
values shown against them and of commodities and 
goods which are not included in those lists shall, 
subject to import, export and foreign exchange laws, 
regulations and procedures in force in either country 
from time to time, be financed through authorized 
dealers in foreign exchange in either country acting 
through their correspondents in the other country. 
Subject to the provisions of the exchange regulations 
in force in the two countries, an authorized dealer 
may grant to the correspondent in the other country 
an overdraft to such extent and on such terms and 
conditions as may be permitted by the Reserve Bank
of India or the Bangladesh Bank as the case may be.
The settlement of amounts due to from an authorized 
dealer from or to the correspondent in accordance with 
these arrangements will be in Pounds Sterling. The
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Reserve Bank of India and the Bangladesh Bank will 
in consultation with each other endeavour to pro­
vide the maximum facilities possible for facilita­
ting the flow of trade in accordance with the pro- 
vis i ons of Art i cle 3•
5- Subject to such exceptions as may be made by 
mutual agreement between the two Governments, com­
modities and goods imported into one country from 
the other shall not be re-exported to a third coun­
try .
Schedule 'B 1
Provisions relating to border trade referred to in 
Article k of the Agreement.
1. These facilities shall apply to the trade across 
the land customs frontiers between West Bengal, Assam, 
Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram on the one hand and 
Bangladesh on the other.
2. These facilities shall be available only to per­
sons living in areas, other than municipal areas, within 
sixteen kilometres of the land customs frontiers and 
holding special permits issued by their respective 
competent authority.
3. Every person holding such a special permit may 
carry across the border in each sector only such goods 
and commodities and in such quantities as are speci­
fied, in the annexure to this schedule, and for this 
purpose may cross the border only once a day in e$ch
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direction on any two specified days of a week and 
only through such routes as may be authorized in 
this behalf. If market conditions in a locality 
justify relaxation of the number of days in a week 
on which persons holding special permits may cross 
the border in that locality, the additional days 
shall be mutually agreed between the concerned com­
petent authorities in the two countries.
4. The carriage of such goods shall be free from 
import, export and exchange control restrictions as 
well as customs duty and customs formalities.
5- Each person may carry in cash a sum not exceed­
ing rupees one hundred in Bangladesh or India currency 
when crossing the border from either country into the 
other.
6. Either Government may maintain such checks and 
take such preventive measures including the right to 
search as are considered necessary to ensure that 
these concessions are not exceeded or abused.
7. These arrangements shall be subject to review 
after a period of six months to consider whether they 
should be extended or amended in any way. If even 
before the expiry of this period of six months either 
country feels the need to withdraw or modify the faci­
lities under this Agreement, it would enter into 
immediate consultations with the other country taking 
such measures as it may consider necessary.
jjAnnexure to Schedule 1B 1 deleted^
Source: Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broad 
casting, Publications Division, B a n g l a d e s h  Documents, 
Vol. II, New Delhi: Patiala Housed 1972, p p . 648-656.
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APPENDIX 3 
Land Boundary Agreement
TEXT OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S 
REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC 
OF INDIA CONCERNING THE DEMARCATION OF THE LAND BOUNDARY 
BETWEEN BANGLADESH AND INDIA AND OTHER RELATED MATTERS 
SIGNED ON MAY 16, 197**.
The Government of the People's Republic of Bangla­
desh and the Government of the Republic of India,
bearing in mind the friendly relations existing 
between the two countries,
desiring to define more accurately at certain points 
and to complete the demarcation of the land boundary 
between Bangladesh and India,
have agreed as follows:
Article I
The land boundary between Bangladesh and India in the 
areas mentioned below shall be demarcated in the fol­
lowing manner:
1. Mizoram-Bang1adesh Sector:
Demarcation should be completed on the basis of 
the latest pre-partition notifications and records.
2. Tripura-Sy1het Sector:
Demarcation which is already in progress in this 
area on the agreed basis, should be completed as 
early as possible.
3. Bhagalpur Railway Line:
The boundary should be demarcated at a distance 
of 75 feet parallel to the toe of the railway em­
bankment towards the east.
k. Sibpur-Gauranga1 a Sector:
The boundary should be demarcated in continuation 
of the process started in 1951-52 on the basis of 
the District Settlement Maps of 1915“191B .
5. Muhuri River (Belonia) Sector:
The boundary in this area should be demarcated 
along the mid-stream of the course of Muhuri river 
at the time of demarcation. This boundary will be 
a fixed boundary. The two Governments should 
raise embankments on their respective sides with 
a view to stabilizing the river in its present 
cou rse.
6. Remaining portion of the Tripura-Noakhali/Comi11 a 
Sector:
The demarcation in this sector should be completed 
on the basis of Chakla-Roshanabad Estate Maps of 
1892-1894 and the District Settlement Maps of 
1915~ 1918 for areas not covered by the Chakla- 
Roshanabad Maps.
7. Fenny River:
The boundary should be demarcated along the mid­
stream of the course at the time of demarcation 
of that branch of the Fenny River on Survey of 
India Map sheet No. 79M/15, 1st Edition, 1935, 
till it joins the stream shown as Asalong C on 
the said map. From that point on, downstream, 
the boundary should be demarcated along the mid­
stream of the course of the Fenny River at the 
time of demarcation of the boundary. The boundary 
in this sector will be a fixed boundary.
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8. Rest of Tripura-Chittagong Hill Tracts Sector:
The boundary will follow the mid-stream of that 
branch of the Fenny River, referred to in para
7 above, upto Grid reference 009779 (maps sheet 
as in para 7 above) from where the boundary will 
follow the mid-stream of the eastern-most tribu­
tary. From the source of this tributary, the 
boundary will run along the shortest distance
to the mid-stream of the stream marked Bayan 
Asalong, on the map referred to above, and thence 
will run generally northwards along the mid-stream 
of this river till it reaches its source on the 
ridge (indicated by grid reference 046810 on the 
map referred to above). From there it will run 
along the crest of this ridge upto Boghoban Trig 
Station. From Boghoban Trig Station upto the 
tri-junction of the Bang 1adesh-Assam-Tripura 
boundary (Khan Talang Trig Station), the boun­
dary will run along the watershed of the river 
systems of the two countries. In case of any 
difference between the map and the ground, the 
ground shall prevail. The boundary will be a 
fixed boundary In this sector.
9. Beanibazar-Karimganj Sector:
The undemarcated portion of tne boundary west of 
the Umapati v i 11 age should be demarcated in accor­
dance with the agreed basis of demarcation, 
leaving Umapati village in India.
10. Hakar Khal:
The boundary should be demarcated in accordance 
with the Nehru-Noon Agreement of September 1958, 
treating Hakar Khal as a geographical feature 
distinct from the Ichhamati River. The boundary 
will be a fixed boundary.
313.
11 Ba i kar i Kha 1 :
In the Baikari Khal, the boundary should be 
demarcated on the agreed basis and principles, 
namely, that the ground shall prevail, i.e., 
as per the agreement reached between the Direc­
tors of Land Records and Surveys of West Bengal 
and erstwhile East Pakistan in 1949. The boun­
dary will be a fixed boundary.
12. Enclaves:
The Indian enclaves in Bangladesh and the Ban­
gladesh enclaves in India should be exchanged 
expeditiously, excepting the enclaves mentioned 
in paragraph 14 without claim to compensation for 
the additional areas going to Bangladesh.
13- Hi 11i :
The area will be demarcated in accordance with 
Radcliffe Award and the line drawn by him on the 
m a p .
14. Berubari :
India will retain the southern half of South 
Berubari Union No. 12 and the adjacent enclaves, 
measuring an area of 2.64 square miles approxi­
mately, and in exchange Bangladesh will retain 
the Dahagram and Angarpota enclaves. India will 
lease in perpetuity to Bangladesh an area of 173 
metres x 85 metres near 'Tin Bigha' to connect 
Dahagram with Panbari Mouza (P.S. Patgram) of 
Bang 1adesh.
15. Lathiti1la-Dumabari:
From point Y (the last demarcation boundary pillar 
position), the boundary shall run southwards along 
the Patharia Hills RF boundary upto the point where 
it meets the western boundary of Dumabari Mouza.
There, along the same Mouza boundary upto the 
tri-junction of Mouzas Dumabari , Lathitilla and 
Bara Putnigaon through the junction of the two 
mouzas Dumabari and Lathitilla. From this point 
it shall run along the shortest distance to meet 
the mid-stream of Putni Chara. Thence it shall 
run generally southward along the mid-stream of 
the course of Putni Chara at the time of demar­
cation, till it meets the boundary between Sylhet 
(Bangladesh) and Tripura (India).
Art i c 1e 2
The Governments of Bangladesh and India agree that 
territories in adverse possession in areas already 
demarcated in respect of which boundary strip maps 
are already prepared, shall be exchanged within six 
months of the signing of the boundary strip maps by 
the plenipotentiaries. They may sign the relevant 
maps as early as possible and in any case not later 
than the 31st December 1974. Early measures may be 
taken to print maps in respect of other areas where 
demarcation has already taken place. These should 
be printed by 31st May 1975 and signed by the pleni­
potentiaries thereafter in order that the exchange 
of adversely held possessions in these areas may take 
place by the 31st December, 1975, In sectors still 
to be demarcated, transfer of territorial jurisdic­
tion may take place within six months of the signa­
ture by plenipotentiaries on the concerned boundary 
strip maps.
Article 3
The Governments of Bangladesh and India agree that 
when areas are transferred, the people in these areas
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shall be given the right of staying on where they 
are, as nationals of the State to which the areas 
are transferred. Pending demarcation of the boun­
dary and exchange of territory by mutual agreement, 
there should be no disturbance of the status quo 
and peaceful conditions shall be maintained in the 
border regions. Necessary instructions in this re­
gard shall be issued to the local authorities on 
the border by the two countries.
Art icie h
The Governments of Bangladesh and India agree that 
any dispute concerning the interpretation or imple­
mentation of this Agreement shall be settled peace­
fully through mutual consultations.
Article 5
This Agreement shall be subject to ratification by 
the Governments of Bangladesh and India and Instru­
ments of Ratification shall be exchanged as early as 
possible. The Agreement shall take effect from the 
date of the exchange of the Instruments of Ratifica­
tion.
Signed in New Delhi on May 16, 197^, in two originals each of 
which is equally authentic.
For the Government of the For the Government of
People's Republic of Bangladesh the Republic of India
(SHEIKH MUJIBUR RAHMAN)
Prime Minister of Bangladesh
(INDIRA GANDHI) 
Prime Minister of India
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Source: Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Minis­
try of Foreign Affairs, External Publicity Division, 
Bangladesh Documents, vol. 2, #4, April-June 1974, 
p p . 14-16. ”
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APPENDIX k
Statute of the Indo-Bang1adesh 
Joint Rivers Commission
Chapter 1
THE CONTRACTING PARTIES
Pursuant to the relations of friendship and cooperation 
that exist between India and Bangladesh,
DESIROUS of working together in harnessing the rivers 
common to both the countries for the benefit of the 
peoples of the two countries,
DESIROUS of specifying some questions relating to these 
matters,
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS
Chapter I I 
Art i c 1e I
There shall be established an Indo-Bang1adesh Joint Rivers 
Commission, hereinafter referred to as the Commission,
Art i c 1e 2
i) The Commission shall be constituted by each partici­
pating Government appointing a chairman and three members; 
of these two shall be engineers. The chairman and the 
three members shall ordinarily hold office for a period 
of three years,
Ii) Each participating Government may also appoint 
such experts and advisors as it desires,
Ar t  i c l e  3
The Chairmanship of the Commission shall be held 
annually in turn by Bangladesh and India,
Art i cle b
i) The Commission shall have the following functions, 
in part icular:
a) to maintain liaison between the participating 
countries to ensure the most effective joint 
efforts in maximizing the benefits from common 
river systems to both the countries,
b) to formulate flood control works and recom­
mend implementation of joint projects,
c) to formulate detailed proposals on advance 
flood warnings, flood forecasting and cyclone 
warn i n g s ,
d) to study flood control and irrigation projects 
so that the water resources of the region can 
be utilized on an equitable basis for the mu­
tual benefit of the peoples of the two coun­
tries, and
e) to formulate proposals for carrying out co­
ordinated research on problems of flood con­
trol affecting both the countries;
ii) The Commission shall also perform such other func­
tions as the two Governments may, by mutual agreement,
d i rect it to d o .
Chapter I I I
SUPPORTING STAFF AND SECRETARIAT ASSISTANCE
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Each Government will provide appropriate support­
ing staff and Secretariat assistance to its repre­
sentatives in the Commission to enable them to 
discharge their functions in an effective manner.
Chapter IV
SESSIONS 
Art icle 6
i) Subject to the provisions of this Statute, the 
Commission shall adopt its own rules of procedure,
ii) Meetings may generally take place alternately 
in the two countries, subject to the convenience of 
the two Governments,
iii) Special meetings of Working Groups or Ad-Hoc 
Expert Groups duly nominated by the respective Go v ­
ernments may be arranged, by the mutual consultation
of the Members.
Chapter V
RULES OF PROCEDURE
The Ordinary sessions of the Commission shall be held 
as often as necessary, generally four times a year.
In addition special meetings may be convened any time 
at the request of either Government.
Article 7
All meetings shall be closed meetings unless the Com­
mission desires otherwise.
A r t i c l e 5
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Chapter VI
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Art i c 1e 8
The Commission shall submit confirmed minute of all 
meetings to the two Governments. The Commission shall 
also submit its annual report by the 31st January, 
next year.
Art i cle 9
Decisions of the Commission shall be unanimous. If 
any differences arise in the interpretation of this 
Statute, they shall be referred to the two Governments 
to be dealt with on a bilateral basis in a spirit of 
mutual respect and understanding.
DONE in Dacca on the Twenty-fourth day of November, Nineteen Hundred 
and Seventy-Two.
ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF OF INDIA
Source: Indo-Bang1adesh Joint Rivers Commission, Record of Discussions 
of the Indo-Bang1adesh Joint Rivers Commission, Dhaka, May,
1985, pp. i-i i i .
BANGLADESH
S igned/-
(SHAFIQUL HUQ) 
Secretary, Ministry of Flood 
Control and Water Resources.
S i gned/-
(SUBIMAL DUTT)
High Commissioner for India 
in Bangladesh
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